687 N.Y.S.2d 202 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1999
Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Schenectady County (Lamont, J.), rendered December 20, 1996, upon a verdict convicting defendant of four counts of the crime of robbery in the second degree.
We are not persuaded. As a preliminary matter, we note that although defendant was also indicted for these robberies under Penal Law § 160.10 (1) (alleging that he was “actually present” during the commission of the crimes), he was convicted only of those counts charging accessorial liability under Penal Law § 160.10 (2) (b), based upon Eleb/s display of “what appears to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm”. We therefore do not consider the arguments advanced by defendant and the People which relate to the elements of Penal Law § 160.10 (1), specifically the criteria for an accomplice to be deemed “actually present”.
Addressing first defendant’s contention that the evidence was not legally sufficient to support the jury’s finding, we assess this claim in the context of whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the People, could lead a rational trier of fact to conclude that the elements of the crimes had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt (see, People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621). The gist of defendant’s argument is that while the evidence established that he drove Eleby to the locations of the robberies, it did not establish his own requisite mental culpability in that there was no proof that he was aware that Eleby intended to forcibly steal property or that while inside the stores, Eleby displayed what appeared to be a firearm. This claim requires scrutiny only insofar as it relates to defendant’s knowledge and shared intent as to Eleb/s forcible stealing; his awareness that Eleby would or did display
Nor can we say that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence. Viewing the evidence in a neutral light, and according deference to the fact finder’s ability to observe the witnesses and evaluate their credibility (see, People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495; People v Rose, 215 AD2d 875, lv denied 86 NY2d 793, 801), we cannot say that the jury failed to give the evidence the weight it should have been accorded.
Similarly without merit is defendant’s contention that the accomplice testimony of Eleby was insufficiently corroborated. To satisfy the corroboration requirement of CPL 60.22 (1), the independent proof must connect the defendant with the offense sufficiently to convince the jury that the accomplice is telling the truth; it need not independently prove that defendant committed the crime (see, People v Smith, 55 NY2d 945; People v Bass, 255 AD2d 689, 691). By his own testimony, defendant
We summarily reject defendant’s argument that County Court impermissibly charged lesser-included offenses to the jury. Defendant was charged with robbery in the second degree in the indictment. Whether or not the trial court properly charged robbery in the third degree as a lesser-included offense is academic in view of defendant’s conviction on the higher charge.
Cardona, P. J., Mercure, Crew III and Yesawich Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.