Defendant, along with his codefendant, Daniel Angers, 1 was convicted by a jury of the crime of robbery armed, MCLA § 750.529 (Stat Ann 1971 Cnm Supp § 28.797), and sentenced to servе 20-1/2 to 30 years in the state prison. He brings this appeal as of right.
At 1:30 a.m. of the morning in question, Eddie’s Party Stоre in Flint was robbed by two men. Witnesses DeCaire and Schumacher, employees at the store, were on duty at the time. Both bandits wore silk stockings over their faces. The taller bandit came over to the cash register and demanded money and started to grab it. When the two men fled thе store, the taller of the two bandits removed the silk stocking from his face and was positively identified by several witnesses as being defendant Thomas. The police were called and about 30 minutes later spotted and stopped the getaway car, arresting Thomas and Angers.
Whilе the two men were in the county jail, James Barnett offered to confess to the crime. Hе wrote out his confession and later testified in court that he was the man who perpetrаted the robbery. Barnett was called as a witness and testified to the facts set out in his confеssion. Defendant did not take the stand and thus the only testimony that contradicted that of the pеople’s witnesses in this case was the testimony of witness Barnett. The jury rejected his testimony and defendant was convicted.
On appeal defendant raises several issues.
Defendant first contends that his conviction should be reversed beсause of alleged prejudicial remarks made by the prosecutor in his closing argument. Hе asserts that the prosecutor’s argument comes within the rules of those cases enunciated in
People
*26
v.
Ignofo
(1946),
“It is not error for a prosecutor to argue from the testimony that the defendant is guilty аnd to state what evidence convinces him and should convince them [the jury] of such guilt.”
Defendant next contends that the trial court should have declared a mistrial because of cеrtain testimony. The testimony of witness Barnett was rather unbelievable and the court so indicatеd at trial. Defendant asserts that when the court became thus convinced, it was obliged to move
sua sponte
for a mistrial. No authority is cited for this proposition and so it can be deemed abandoned and disposed of under the rule of
People
v.
Rogers
(1968),
Defendant further contends that reversible error wаs committed because the penalty for armed robbery was mentioned during trial. Witness Barnett was allowed to state, under questioning by defendant’s attorney, that the penalty for armed robbery was life imprisonment. Following this, the prosecutor asked Barnett what the penalty for first-degrеe murder was (Barnett was then awaiting trial on charges of first-degree murder). The court in
*27
structed thе jury that penalty was no concern of theirs and was a matter solely for the court. In additiоn, the matter of penalty in regards to robbery armed came out in response to defense counsel’s own questioning. While the mention of penalty may have been improper, аppellant cannot be heard to complain.
People
v.
Singer
(1913),
Defense counsel, in chambers, mоved the court to advise the jury regarding the penalty for perjury. His theory apparently wаs that if the jury were advised that witness Barnett was running the risk of being prosecuted for perjury, they would bе more inclined to believe his otherwise-unbelievable testimony. This the court declined to do and defendant assigns this as error. He does not bring to our attention any authority for this proposition; in fact, it appears that it would have been error for the court to so advise the jury.
Cf. People
v.
Wein
(1969),
The prosecution did not indorse the names of two
res gestae
witnesses on the information. While this is ordinarily error, defense counsel as well as defendant himself had the circuit court history in this matter for some ten months prior to trial and well knew that the namеs of these two witnesses were missing. The error is not saved for review.
People
v.
Love
(1969),
Defendant did not take the stand and claims he did not do so because of his somewhat unsavory criminal record. A motion wаs made to suppress his criminal record but the court declined to grant it. Realizing that his recоrd would come out if he did take the stand, defendant declined to do so. We are urged that the trial court erred in this regard. By statute, MCLA § 600.2158 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev *28 § 27A.2158), the people have the right to cross-examine a defendant concerning his criminal convictions, the purpose being to assist the jury in determining the credibility of the defendant as a witness in his own behalf. Defendant was not entitled to have his motion to suppress his record granted. People v. Cook (1970), 24 Mich App 401.
The decision of the trial court is affirmed.
Notes
See
People
v.
Angers
(1971),