26 Cal. 135 | Cal. | 1864
Suit was brought against the defendant and certain real estate, to recover the delinquent taxes which had been assessed upon the real estate to said Frisbie, for the year 1861, in Solano County.
The action was commenced and prosecuted to judgment, under the General Revenue Act of 1861. Frisbie answered the-complaint, denying that the land was subject to taxation, or that he was indebted in any sum for State or county taxes, or that the land was in Solano County, and alleging that the lands were in Napa County, where they had been duly assessed for taxes for 1861, and that he had paid the taxes for that year, in that county. The plaintiffs demurred to the answer, on the ground that it did not conform to the provisions of section forty-two of that Act, and the demurrer was sustained, and the defendant declining to answer, judgment was rendered for the plaintiff. The defendant appealed and the judgment was affirmed. The remittitur was filed in the Court below on the 7th day of July, 1863. On the 27th of April, 1863, an Act was passed, which took effect from its passage, amending section fortyrtwo of the Revenue Act of 1861, by adding another defense, viz: “Fourth. That the land is situate in
The only error assigned by appellants is that the Court erred in ordering the judgment to be opened, and allowing the. respondent to interpose a further defense.
The appellants now raise the objection that the respondent did not pursue the remedy afforded by the amendatory Act of 1863, with due diligence. The" statute does not prescribe the time within which the motion must be made; and if the respondent was governed in this respect by the provisions of the Practice Act, the question of diligence was for the Court below, in the exercise of a sound discretion, and we would not be justified in reversing its action, except in case of an abuse of discretion. Besides this, the appellants failed to make the objection in the Court below.
The most important point in the case urged by the appellants, is that the Act of April 27th, 1863, is unconstitutional and void, so far as it is applicable, by its terms, to cases in the condition of this case; and in support of the proposition he says that- by virtue of the judgment of the Court below, and its affirmance by the Supreme Court, the right of the appellants became vested, that the judgment was a final determina-'
It will be observed that the Act was passed and took effect twenty-two days previous to the entry of the judgment of the Supreme Court, and therefore the appellants, at the time the rights claimed under the statute accrued to the respondent, did not have a vested right in the judgment, but their rights were limited to their cause of action, the appeal having suspended the operation of the judgment. (Thornton v. Mahoney, 24 Cal. 569.)
The appellants have argued, with much force and learning, the proposition that the Act amounting simply to an order granting a new trial, is unconstitutional and void. If their construction of the Act is correct it would be difficult, if not impossible, to maintain the Act when applied to causes that have passed to judgment, and, perhaps, to pending causes in which the issues have been found, for it would be justly regarded as an assumption of judicial powers by the legislative department. But we think that construction is not correct, and that the Act may be upheld on other principles.
If a statute is susceptible of two constructions, one of which is consistent and the other inconsistent with the restrictions of the Constitution, it is the plain duty of the Court to give it that construction, which will make it harmonize with the Constitution, and comport with the legitimate powers of the Legislature. A correct understanding of the results, intended to be accomplished by the Act, must be had, before it can be determined whether the means employed are legitimate. Although the Act in question, if applied to a case which was in a condition similar to that of the present case at the time of the passage of the Act, and which was being litigated between individuals, would be declared by the Court to be unconstitutional, yet it does not follow that it would be so declared in a case to which the State is a party.
In this case the State is plaintiff, and during the progress of
Was anything more or further intended to be accomplished by the Act, so far as it had relation to a suit that had passed to a judgment, than to declare that the plaintiff thereby consented that the judgment might be reopened, upon proceedings to be taken by the defendant, and that when it was reopened the defendant might set up in his answer the fourth ground of defense mentioned in the Act ?
The Legislature seems to have considered that a defendant ought to be permitted to show that his real estate was not subject to taxation in the county where it was assessed, because it was not situate in that county, and to have been of the opinion that, under the Bevenue Act of 1861, the defendant could not set up that fact as a defense to the action. It is unnecessary for us to determine whether or not the defendant was deprived by that Act, or could by any Act of the Legislature be precluded from showing that a parcel of his property was not subject to taxation in two or more counties at the same time; but the Legislature, holding the view that the defendant, by the words of that Act, had been deprived of the benefit of a defense that of right he should have possessed, resorted to the amendatory Act, to manifest the consent of
The people cannot complain that they have been divested of their vested rights, for they have voluntarily consented to the reopening of the judgment. The Act is not liable to the objections that might be urged with great, if not conclusive, force against an Act that should attempt to reopen a judgment in a single specified action, or to prescribe the time, place or manner of its trial; for this Act is general in its application, and is essentially a law, and not merely a direction given to a Court.
The order appealed from is affirmed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.