THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEONARD R. FRICKS, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 2-16-0493
Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District
July 6, 2017
2017 IL App (2d) 160493
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Winnebago County, No. 11-CF-1688; the Hon. Rosemary Collins, Judge, presiding. Judgment Vacated and remanded.
Michael J. Pelletier, Thomas A. Lilien, and Vicki P. Kouros, of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.
Joseph P. Bruscato, State’s Attorney, of Rockford (Patrick Delfino, Lawrence M. Bauer, and Steven A. Rodgers, of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.
OPINION
¶ 1 Defendant, Leonard R. Fricks, entered a nonnegotiated plea of guilty to a
¶ 2
“No appeal from a judgment entered upon a plea of guilty shall be taken unless the defendant, within 30 days of the date on which sentence is imposed, files in the trial court a motion to reconsider the sentence, if only the sentence is being challenged, or, if the plea is being challenged, a motion to withdraw the plea of guilty and vacate the judgment. *** The trial court shall *** determine whether the defendant is represented by counsel, and if the defendant is indigent and desires counsel, the trial court shall appoint counsel. *** The defendant’s attorney shall file with the trial court a certificate stating that the attorney has consulted with the defendant *** to ascertain defendant’s contentions of error in the sentence and the entry of the plea of guilty, has examined the trial court file and both the report of proceedings of the plea of guilty and the report of proceedings in the sentencing hearing, and has made any amendments to the motion necessary for adequate presentation of any defects in those proceedings.”
Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016).
¶ 3 It is well established that the attorney’s certificate must strictly comply with the requirements of
¶ 4 In Janes, our supreme court observed that the courts in People v. Denson, 243 Ill. App. 3d 55 (1993), People v. Dickerson, 212 Ill. App. 3d 168 (1991), People v. Vickery, 207 Ill. App. 3d 574 (1991), People v. Johnson, 207 Ill. App. 3d 122 (1990), and People v. Hayes, 195 Ill. App. 3d 957 (1990), granted the defendants therein “the right to file a new motion to withdraw guilty plea and the right to have a hearing on the new motion” (emphases added) (Janes, 158 Ill. 2d at 33) as a remedy for counsel’s failure to comply with the certificate requirement. Immediately after that observation, the Janes court stated, “With this opinion, we affirm the holdings of these cases and unequivocally state that, [with the exception of the requirement that the defendant file a motion to withdraw his or her plea or to reconsider his or her sentence], the remedy for failure to strictly comply with each of the provisions of
¶ 5 In People v. Lindsay, 239 Ill. 2d 522 (2011), our supreme court concluded, contrary to Oliver, that filing a new motion on remand is optional. The Lindsay court reasoned as follows:
“There is no question that this court used language in Janes that, in isolation, appears to mandate the filing of a new motion on remand:
‘[T]he remedy for failure to strictly comply with each of the provisions of
Rule 604(d) is a remand to the circuit court for the filing of a new motion to withdraw guilty plea or to reconsider sentence and a new hearing on the motion.’ [Citation.]And we can hardly fault the Oliver court for giving authoritative weight to this portion of our decision. That said, *** the preceding language does not appear in isolation but rather immediately follows the court’s explicit endorsement of a series of appellate court decisions holding that the appropriate remedy for the failure to file a
Rule 604(d) certificate is to ‘grant[ ] the defendants therein the right to file a new motion to withdraw guilty plea and the right to have a hearing on the new motion.’ (Emphases added.) [Citation.] Unlike the language relied upon in Oliver, this language is permissive, allowing individual defendants to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the filling of a new motion on remand is warranted. And significantly, it was this permissive language that the court employed in the concluding paragraph of the decision, where the court sets forth its instructions for the remand:‘Therefore, pursuant to this court’s supervisory authority, we retain jurisdiction and remand this cause to the circuit court *** to allow defendant to file a new motion to withdraw his guilty plea and for a hearing on that motion in full compliance with
Rule 604(d) .’ (Emphasis added.) [Citation.]Clearly, nothing in this language mandates or requires the filing of a new motion on remand. On the contrary, the court was simply allowing defendant—that is, giving him the opportunity—to
file a new motion on remand. Whether he exercised that option was entirely up to him.” (Emphases in original.) Id. at 528-29.
¶ 6 In the case now before us, the State seeks to extend Lindsay’s reasoning to the requirement that a new hearing be held on remand. According to the State, although defendant had a right to a new hearing, he was not required to exercise that right.1 However, that argument is contrary to Lindsay’s express holding:
“[W]e hold that, when defense counsel neglects to file a
Rule 604(d) certificate, the appropriate remedy is a remand for (1) the filing of aRule 604(d) certificate; (2) the opportunity to file a new motion to withdraw the guilty plea and/or reconsider the sentence, if counsel concludes that a new motion is necessary; and (3) a new motion hearing.” Id. at 531.
The Lindsay court used permissive language with reference to filing a new motion: the defendant is to be afforded the “opportunity” to do so “if counsel concludes that a new motion is necessary.” Id. The Lindsay court did not use such language with reference to holding a new hearing. Presumably, the Lindsay court crafted its holding with care, so as to avoid the kind of misinterpretation that occurred in Oliver. Thus, if the Lindsay court had intended the new motion hearing to be optional, we cannot fathom why the court would not have said so explicitly.
¶ 7 In the present case, there was no hearing on remand on the motion to reduce defendant’s sentence. Indeed, the motion was not considered anew. Pumilia merely acceded to the trial court’s previous ruling, which the trial court merely reiterated. The trial court did not review the original hearing on the motion. Pumilia did not summarize what transpired at that hearing for the trial court’s benefit. Thus, what occurred on remand was a “mere charade performed for the purpose of reinstating an appeal.” People v. Tejada-Soto, 2012 IL App (2d) 110188, ¶ 14.
¶ 8 The State relies on People v. Shirley, 181 Ill. 2d 359, 369 (1998), which found “limited value” in an additional remand where, on the first remand, the defendant “was afforded a full and fair second opportunity to present a motion for reduced sentencing.” The context for that statement is the Shirley court’s rejection of “defendant’s implicit premise that the strict compliance standard of [Janes] must be applied so mechanically as to require Illinois courts to grant multiple remands and new hearings following the initial remand hearing.” (Emphasis added.) Id. Thus, Shirley presupposes that an “initial remand hearing” actually took place. The failure here to hold any hearing on remand on defendant’s motion to reduce his sentence clearly distinguishes this case from Shirley. We thus conclude that this case must again be remanded for a hearing on defendant’s motion to reduce his sentence.
¶ 9 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the order of the circuit court of Winnebago County denying defendant’s motion to reduce
¶ 10 Vacated and remanded.