281 A.D. 757 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1953
Action by the People of the State of New York against a national bank for a permanent injunction, restraining defendant from violating subdivision 1 of section 258 of the Banking Law. Plaintiff appeals from a judgment dismissing the complaint on the merits after trial. Judgment reversed on the law and the facts, with costs, and judgment directed for the plaintiff, with costs, restraining defendant, its officers, agents, servants and employees from advertising or otherwise using the word “saving” or “savings” in relation to its banking or financial business in its dealings with the public, and from in any way soliciting or receiving deposits as a savings bank. Findings of fact inconsistent herewith are reversed and new findings are made as indicated herein. Respondent admitted deliberate violation of the statute, and failed to establish its defense of unconstitutionality. Savings banks have developed in this State as a distinctive type of mutual institution, since their beginning, with special benefits and safeguards. (Mercantile Bank v. New York, 121 U. S. 138.) For almost a century only such banks have been allowed by State law to put forth a sign as a savings bank. (L. 1858, ch. 132.) For almost half a century the only banks permitted to use the word “savings” in the State of New York have been the mutual savings banks. (L. 1905, ch. 564.) Thus there was basis for a legislative finding that in the course of time the word “saving” or “savings” had become so associated with the idea of “savings bank” that, if used by another kind of bank, some people were apt to be misled into thinking it to be a mutual savings bank. (Herring, etc., Safe Co. v. Hall’s Safe Co., 208 U. S. 554, 559; 9 L. R. A. 148, Elgin Nat. Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Co., 179 U. S. 665; 150 A. L. R. 1095, 1134 — 1135, and cases cited in annotation.) In addition, there is a presumption that there was sufficient basis for the Legislature to act (11 Am. Jur., Constitutional Law, § 132), which respondent failed to meet and overcome by competent proof. The police power of the State is not limited to the preservation of public health and safety, but extends to the prevention of fraud, deceit and imposition. (Merchants Exchange v. Missouri, 248 U. S. 365; Hall v. Geiger-Jone's Co., 242 U. S. 539.) Such power may be exercised to protect not only the intelligent and prudent, but also the ignorant and rash, from being imposed upon. (Dillingham v. McLaughlin, 264 U. S. 370, 374; Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 122; People ex rel. Bennett v. Leman, 277 N. Y. 368, 375.) Section 258 of the Banking Law is an exercise of the police power aimed at preventing a deception from being practiced upon the public. (People v. Binghamton Trust Co., 139 N. Y. 185, 192.) As such, its prohibition of the use of the words in question does not constitute an unreasonable deprivation of rights. (Dillingham v. McLaugh