Opinion
Frankie J. contends a condition of probation prohibiting his possession of weapons of any description was improper. He alleges the condition was unrelated to the facts of his case or his *1152 background. He also asserts the court, and not the probation officer, should have selected the terms and conditions of probation.
I
On January 4, 1985, twо male assailants severely beat, raped, and sodomized Carolyn L. They also forced her to orally copulate them. A petition charging appellant with these crimes was filed January 14. The juvenile court, on April 16, found appellant committed rape (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (2): two counts), rape by a foreign object (Pen. Code, § 289: one count) and oral copulation (Pen. Code, § 288a: two counts). 1 He was removed from his parents’ custody and placed in Joplin Youth Center for 16 months. Various conditions of probation were orally imposed by the court.
In November, appellant escaped from Joplin. A petition was filed alleging the escape (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 871) and appellant admitted the allegаtion. He received 60 days consecutive to his earlier commitment. The court reinstated the previously imposed probationary conditions and further ordered: “[Ojn termination of the commitment, the minor will be released to the custody of his father on the usual terms and conditions.”
Upon completion of his commitment on July 2, 1986, appellant was released аnd under the direction of his probation officer, appellant signed a preprinted form entitled “Terms and Conditions of Probation.” Condition No. 1 required that he report to his probаtion officer. No objection is raised to that condition although it, too, was not orally discussed by the court. Condition No. 3 required Frankie J. to “obey all laws.” Frankie J.’s possession of a handgun, without the written consent of his parents, also violated this provision. (Pen. Code, § 12021.5.) It is apparent from the testimony of Frankie J.’s stepmother at the violation hearing that he did not have her permission to possess the handgun. 2 Condition No. 10 provides: “You are not to have any weapons of any description, including firearms, nunchucks or martial arts weaponry, and knives of any kind, in your possession while you are on probation, or involve [yourjself in activities in which weapons are used, i.e. hunting, target shooting.” None of these conditions were previously orally imposed. Other terms which had been orally imposed by the court, but which were not part of the preprinted form, were added by the probation officer. These tеrms prohibited association with any gang, *1153 especially the Fifth Street gang, participation in gang activities and contact with the victim or appellant’s codefendant.
On September 16, 1986, a petition was filed alleging appellant had violated the terms and conditions of his probation by failing to report to his probation officer on two occasions (condition No. 1) and by possessing a dangerous weapon, a handgun (condition No. 10). The court found the allegations to be true and committed appellant to the California Youth Authority.
II
Frankie J. asserts the weapons restriction is invalid because it was not reasonably related to the facts of his case or his background. We disagree.
Section 730 of thе Welfare and Institutions Code authorizes courts to establish conditions of probation in juvenile cases. It provides in part: “The court may impose and require any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced.” A condition of probation will be considered invalid if it (1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduсt which is not reasonably related to future criminality.
(People
v.
Lent
(1975)
Because of its rehabilitative function, the juvenile court has broad discretion when formulating conditions of probation. “A conditiоn of probation which is impermissible for an adult criminal defendant is not necessarily unreasonable for a juvenile receiving guidance and supervision from the juvenile court.”
(In re Todd L.
(1980)
Applying the
Lent
and
Todd
criteria, аnd from our own careful scrutiny of the record, we conclude the weapons restriction was appropriate. Although no weapon was seen by or used upon the victim, there is substantial evidence the use of a weapon was contemplated. Frankie J.’s codefendant told the victim they were going to kill her, and Frankie J., at
*1154
his codefendant’s direction, left to obtain a knife.
3
But for the fortuitous escаpe of the victim, Frankie J. would doubtless have returned with a knife. These facts are sufficient to warrant the weapons restriction. It “bears a reasonable relationship to thе crime he committed and to preventing future criminality.”
(In re Todd L., supra,
Ill
Frankie J. also contends the trial court improperly delegated its decisionmaking power to the probation officer in the selection of the “usual terms and conditions” of probation. We disagree. At Frankie J.’s recommitment, the court imposed specific terms and conditions of probation. In аddition, the court ordered Frankie J. released to the custody of his father on “the usual terms and conditions.”
Where, as here, the minor/defendant is represented by counsel at the time the court uses a short-cut phrase, such as “usual terms and conditions,” “violate no law,” and “obey all laws,” it is incumbent upon the minor/defendant or his counsel to object and to request clarification.
(People
v.
Walmsley
(1985)
Frankie J. does not claim he wаs unaware of the weapons condition but asserts it should have been orally communicated to him in court by the
*1155
judge. This contention was specifically addressed and rejectеd in
People
v.
Thrash
(1978)
The order revoking probation and committing Frankie J. to the California Youth Authority is affirmed.
Crosby, J., and Wallin, J., concurred.
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied May 4, 1988.
Notes
On the date of the offense, appellant was four months short of his thirteenth birthday. His accomplice was 20 years old.
She testified shе did not know how the handgun got inside her house. When it was discovered, she had it placed in the trunk of her car and called Frankie J.’s probation officer. She told him she had found the gun beneаth Frankie J.’s bed.
When the codefendant first grabbed the victim, he said, “We want to kill you.” After being beaten, raped, sodomized and forced to orally copulate both assailants, the victim heard the older male say to Frankie J., “Give me the knife.” Frankie J. replied, “I don’t have it.” The older assailant stated, “Go home and get it.” Frankie J. departed on his bicycle.
There is an additional factor which would also justify the weapons restriction. Gang activities and weapon possession go hand-in-hand. The court was aware of Frankie J.’s associatiоn with gang members and specifically ordered him not to associate with them or to participate in gang activities. Frankie J. admitted his possession of the handgun was a direct result of his participation in gang activities.
It is not necessary for a defendant to reject probation as a prerequisite to challenging the validity of a condition of probаtion.
(In re Bushman
(1970)
Our review of the record has disclosed no objection to the use of the standard preprinted probation form.
Frankie J.’s probation officer testified the preprinted form, entitled “Terms and Conditions of Probation,” is the usual form used by the probation department. He did not add conditions 1 or 10; they are part of the preprinted form.