People v. Ford

Oct 30, 2007
Versions:44 A.D.3d 1070
844 N.Y.S.2d 400

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The right of a defendant to withdraw a previously entered plea of guilty rests within the sound discretion of the sentencing court (see People v Seeber, 4 NY3d 780 [2005]; People v Mann, 32 AD3d 865 [2006]; People v Kucharczyk, 15 AD3d 595 [2005]), and this determination generally will not be disturbed absent an improvident exercise of discretion (see People v DeLeon, 40 AD3d 1008 [2007]). In this case, the record reveals that the defendant entered his plea of guilty knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, having reached a favorable plea bargain with the assistance of competent counsel with whose representation the defendant was satisfied (see People v Mann, 32 AD3d 865 [2006]). The defendant‘s generalized and unsubstantiated claim of innocence at the time of sentencing was not sufficient to warrant the vacatur of the plea (see People v De Jesus, 199 AD2d 529, 530 [1993]; People v Carter, 191 AD2d 640 [1993]; People v Stephens, 175 AD2d 272 [1991]; People v Williams, 156 AD2d 497 [1989]). Nor did the defendant‘s subsequent expression of unhappiness with the length of the sentence to which he had agreed require a vacatur of his plea (see People v Hagzan, 155 AD2d 616, 617 [1989]; People v Morris, 118 AD2d 595 [1986]). Furthermore, contrary to the defendant‘s arguments on appeal, “[a]n attorney assigned to represent a defendant in a criminal case has no duty to participate in a baseless pro se motion to withdraw a plea of guilty which was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made” (People v Caple, 279 AD2d 635, 635 [2001]; see People v Rodriguez, 181 AD2d 643 [1992]; People v Glasper, 151 AD2d 692, 693 [1989]). Santucci, J.P., Goldstein, Dillon and Angiolillo, JJ., concur.