The defendant in this ease was indicted in the third district court, October 4, 1890, charged with the crime of grand larceny in stealing a horse of the value of $50. Several errors are assigned as having occurrеd at the trial, but, as there is no testimony embraced in the abstract or record, we cannot review them here.
The abstract in- this case is so imperfect that it is difficult for the court to considеr any of the questions presented, especially as there were no sufficient exceptions taken to the charge of the court as would ordinarily justify the court in making any examination into the record, but, inasmuch as this objection was not urged upon the hearing, we content ourselves with what appears from the charge of the court, and from the motion in arrest of judgment, as shоwing that, at the time the defendant was indicted on this charge, he was serving out a term of imprisonment previously imposed upon him by the court upon a former conviction, whereon he had been sentenced for two years5 imprisonment in the penitentiary, and from which imprisonment he had escaped, and in making his escape took-off the horse he is charged with stealing. He was takеn with the horse while endeavoring to make his escape, after which he was tried and convicted for the larceny in question, before the expiration of his first term of imprisonment. In reviewing the рroceedings, we find no error in the refusal of the court to charge the jury as requested by the defendant’s counsel. On motion for a new trial, and also in arrest of judgment, counsel for defendant urgеd that the court erred in instructing the jury that, “if the defendant was an inmate of the penitentiary at the
The next question presented by counsel for the defendant is that the defendant had been attainted of felony, and was serving a two-years sentencе in the penitentiary, previously "imposed by the court, and that such period had not yet expired when this indictment was found and trial had; and that the court had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter, or thе person of the defendant. ¡Section 4749, Comp. Laws 1888, provides that “A sentence of imprisonment in the penitentiary for any term less than life suspends all civil rights of the person so sentenced, аnd forfeits all public offices, and all private trusts, authority, or power during such imprisonment.” In California, under a similar statute, it is held (In re Nerac,
It was early held in England that persоns convicted of felony, and thereby attainted, might plead the same in bar to a subsequent prosecution for any other felony, whether committed before or after the first conviction, for the reason that by his first attaint his possessions were forfeited, his blood corrupted, and he became dead in law; therefore any further conviction or attaint would be fruitless. 4 Bl. Comm. 336; 2 Hale, P. C. 250;
Again, referíng to Bishop’s Criminal Law, the writer lays down the rule to be that, “ when a prisoner, under an unexpired sentence of imprisonment, is convicted of a second offense, or when there are two or more convictions on which sentence remains to be pronounced, the judgment may direct that each succeeding period of imprisonment shall cоmmence on the termination of the period next preceding.” 1 Bish. Crim. Law, §§ 731, 884; Comp. Laws Utah, 1888, §§ 4746, 4749, 4750. In re Nerac,
In this Territory there is no statute exempting a convict from punishment for an offense committed by him while serving out his term of imprisonment. Our general penal laws include all persons within their scope. The criminal is protected by the law, and is made amenable to it, while in prison, for any term of imprisonment. The statute of limitations requires prosecution for all felonies, other than for murder, to be commenced within four years after the commission of the offense (Comp. Laws 1888, § 4830), and if not so commenced the prosecution is barred. It is true an indictment may be found before the expiration of the statutory limit, and the prisoner may be arrested and tried thereon after the expiration of his term of imprisonment; but it is not difficult to discover that this practice, if inaugurаted, would not only greatly delay the execution of public justice, but in many instances would prevent a speedy trial that is guaranteed to all accused persons.' It would impair the necessary discipline required in public prisons,
On motion for a new trial, counsel for the appellаnt presented the affidavits of two jurors, who testified, in substance, that they understood the court to have charged the jury that, “If defendant was an inmate of the penitentiary, serving .out a sentence, and that he took the horse in question and rode it away for the purpose of escaping, he would be guilty, no matter what the intentions were in taking the horse,” and also stated their conclusiоns drawn from the charge, etc. It does not appear from the abstract whether the court received and acted upon the affidavits or not, but we are clearly satisfied, that the аffidavits should not have been received by the court nor considered upon this motion. In is well settled that affidavits of jurors will not be received to impeach or question their verdict, nor to show the grounds upon which it was rendered, nor to show their misunderstanding of fact or law, nor that they misunderstood the charge of the court, or the effect of their verdict, nor their opinions, surmises, and prpсesses of reasoning in arriving at a verdict. 2 Thomp. Trials, § 2618; 1 Bish. Grim. Proc. §§ 874, 1270; Woodward v. Leavitt,