Dеfendant was convicted by a jury of felonious assault (MCL 750.82; MSA 28.277) and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony (MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424[2]). He appeals as of right.
The felonious assault, for which defendant was convicted, arose out of his attempt to shoot a рolice officer who had entered the premises, pursuant to a search warrant, along with eight other *716 police officers, to search for illegal narcotics and an illegal weapon.
In the first issue raised on appeal, defendant claims that his felony-firearm conviction violates his constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy. This contention has been recently considered and rejected by the Supreme Court in
Wayne County Prosecutor v Recorder’s Court Judge,
Defendant’s second contention has more merit. Prior to trial, defendant moved to prevent the prosecution from mentioning, arguing or offering evidence related to information upon which the search warrant was based or evidence obtained as a result of the search. The trial court dеnied the motion in limine, observing that the people had a right to set forth the whole transaction and to demonstrate the motive of the defendant. During the course of the ensuing trial the prosecutor argued in his opening statement that the purpose for the search of defendant’s residence was to look for and seize illegal narcotics and a possible machine gun. The prosecutor also elicited testimony from the investigating officers that they secured the warrant in the course of а narcotics investigation, that the procedure for entering and searching the premises was established by state and Federal law enforcement agencies for entering a "narcotics pad”, and that various narcotics and narcotiсs paraphernalia were seized from the premises as a result of the search. The trial court did not give any instructions to the jury limiting the purpose for which they could consider the narcotics-related testimony. However, there were no objections to the court’s instructions, and no additional instructions were proffered by either party. Defendant was subsequently convicted by the jury on both *717 counts charged in the information. He subsequently moved for a new trial on the same grounds presently assigned as error in this appeal. The motion was denied and defendant was sentenced to two years imprisonment on the felony-firearm charge and four years probation on the felonious assault charge.
On appeal, defendant contends that sinсe he was not charged with possession of controlled substances, reference to such substances found during a search of his residence was improper and highly prejudicial to his cause because it indicated that the defendant might be guilty of оther unrelated crimes.
As a general rule, evidence of other unrelated crimes or bad acts by the accused is inadmissible to show that he is guilty of the crime charged.
People v Doud,
Evidence of other criminal or bad acts of the accused is often logically relevant to proving a defendant’s guilt for a charged offense. There is little doubt that a person’s guilt or propensities to commit other crimes or bad acts has the tendency to make the existence of his guilt in the instant case more probаble than it would be without the evidence. MRE 401. Since all relevant evidence is inherently prejudicial, it is only when the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice that the evidence is to be excluded.
United States v McRae,
593 F2d 700 (CA 5, 1979), MRE 403. And, "because it has been dеcided that whatever probative value such evidence has is outweighed by the disadvantage of diverting the trier of fact from an objective appraisal of the
*718
defendant’s guilt or innocence”, evidence tending to show that the defendant сommitted crimes other than those charged is generally inadmissible on the issue of. defendant’s guilt or innocence.
People v
DerMartzex,
There are, however, instances in which such evidence is admissible to establish other, legally recognized matters, so long as the evidence is not offered as mere circumstantial evidence to prove the bad character of the defendant, and hence, the probability of his guilt for the crime charged. Thus, if evidence of other bad acts of the defendant is being introduced fоr some purpose
other than
to raise the inference of a probability that the accused committed the crime charged, the rule excluding the evidence is simply inapplicable.
People v
Spillman,
In this regard the prosecution asserts that the challenged evidence in the case at bar was admissible under either or both of the following exceptions.
First, the prosecution claims that evidence of another and distinct crime is admissible where it was committed as part of the same transaction and forms a part of the res gestae. A number of cases confirm the accuracy of this proposition. 2 *719 Thus, where other criminal acts are an inseparable part of the whole deed for which defendant is charged, the prosecution is permitted to complete the story of the crime by proving the immediate context of haрpenings near in time and place. 1 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed), § 218, p 719, McCormick, Evidence (2d ed), § 190, p 447, 1 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence (13th ed), § 242, p 540.
Defendant acknowledges the "possible relevance” of offering evidence that the police officers were acting pursuant to a. search warrant in order to explain their presence at defendant’s residence on the night of the alleged assault. However, defendant claims that since he offered to stipulate to the validity of the search warrant it was unnecessary for the prosecutor to reveal the prejudicial information on which the warrant was based.
We note that information on which the warrant was based was indeed prejudicial to the defendant since it tended to make him аppear to the jury as an operator of a "narcotics pad”. At the same time, it would seem clear that the prosecution should be able to justify the presence of nine armed police officers breaking into and confronting the defendant in his own home at 2 a.m. Without some background information providing the jury with an explanation for the officers’ appearance at this unusual hour, the jury is left without complete knowledge of the entire story or transaction.
In
People v Gosch,
"This theft was one of the facts which the prosecuting attorney had a right to discuss. It was inseparably connected with the case, and the procuring of the warrant, and the officer having it in hand for execution, was the justification for his going there that night.” People v Gosch, supra, at 29.
See also
People v Durfee,
Since the identity of the officers executing the search warrant was essential to the prosecution’s case in terms of whether the defendant believed them to be police officers or merely burglars, it follows thаt the prosecutor should have been permitted to introduce and argue evidence relating to the various circumstances and purposes for the officers’ appearance on the night of the assault. Here, the jury was entitled to hear the "complete story”—information inseparable from the alleged assault. People v Delgado, supra, at 83.
However, defendant claims that, assuming argu *721 endo that such evidence was admissible, it was entirely inappropriate to permit into evidence testimony regarding the fact that narcotics and narcotics paraphernalia were seized subsequent to defendant’s assault. We agree that under the above cited "res gestae” or "complete story” exception to the rule against admitting evidence of defendant’s other bad acts or crimеs (here, illegal possession of controlled substances), such evidence was inadmissible. The relevance of the possible presence of narcotics at defendant’s residence only relates to the validity and explanation of the officers’ behavior at the time of their entry into the residence. However, it is irrelevant to the validity of that action that such narcotics were, in fact, actually discovered at the household. Thus, just as it would have been inappropriate in People v Gosch, supra, tо offer evidence bearing on the truth of whether defendant had, in fact, stolen some farm crops of the complainant, so too in the case at bar was it inappropriate, under the "res gestae” exception, to prove that narcotics were found in defendant’s home.
Nonetheless, the prosecutor contends that this evidence was admissible under another, well recognized exception to the above described exclusionary rule. In essence, the proseсution argues that it should have been permitted to offer proof that narcotics were discovered at defendant’s residence since it established a motive for defendant to "fight it out” because he didn’t want to get caught in an illegal activity. We agree.
Evidence of motive which suggests the doing of the act, or the purpose for which it is done, is always admissible even though such evidence shows or tends to show the commission of another crime. McCormick,
supra,
§ 190, p 450-451, 1 Wig-
*722
more,
supra,
§§ 215-217, pp 710-718, 1 Wharton’s,
supra,
§ 247, p 561. This rule is well recognized in Michigan.
People v Allen,
Of course, that a prosecutor is permitted to offer such evidence and argue from such evidence does not absolve a trial judge from exercising his discretion to determine whether the probative value of such evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to a defendant’s cause.
People v Oliphant,
*723
Finally, defendant claims that even if the challenged evidence was admissible under either of the above exceptions to the general rule against admitting evidence of the defendant’s other bad acts, the trial court errеd by failing
sua sponte
to give the jury a limiting instruction on the purpose for which such evidence could be considered. The Supreme Court has clearly and forcefully addressed this issue and has determined that, in the absence of request or proper objection, there is no absolute requirement that a trial judge give limiting instructions. Therefore, failure to instruct in this case, where there was no request for such instructions and no objection to the failure to instruct, was not reversible error.
People v Nawrocki,
Affirmed.
Notes
See MCL 768.27; MSA 28.1050; MRE 404 for various statutory exceptions, and
People v Nawrocki,
People v Delgado,