People v. Flores

Aug 4, 2026
G065324

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Jeannie M. Joseph, Judge. Affirmed.

Alex Coolman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher P. Beesley and Cobi S. Furdek, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Defendant Juan Carlos Mendez Flores1 (Mendez) appeals from his convictions for child sex offenses, contending the prosecutor committed misconduct by improperly vouching for one victim’s credibility. We read the prosecutor’s statements as reasonably commenting on that victim’s candid concessions in her testimony. We therefore affirm.

FACTS

When she was eight years old, the victim lived with six other people, including her older sister and Mendez, who was the brother of her mother’s boyfriend. One night, Mendez slept in the same bed as the victim and her sister. The victim woke up to Mendez touching her vaginal area with his hand, trying to insert a finger into her vagina. The victim tried to get him to stop, but Mendez just moved her hand away. Mendez also grabbed her face and kissed her on the cheek. The victim then moved to the floor and fell back asleep.

When questioned by the police about the incident, the victim lied and told the officers that her father had touched her inappropriately. The victim was later interviewed a second time at a Child Abuse Services Team (CAST) facility. In that interview, she described sleeping in the bed with her sister and Mendez that night and said she felt him tickling her “privacy part.” She said she screamed when he touched her and she did not know why no one could hear her. During this interview, she admitted lying about her father touching her, and said Mendez asked her to lie and threatened to touch her again. The victim said in the same interview her mother had also told her to lie to police about Mendez, and she was afraid her mom would hit her if she found out she had told the truth. She said this was the only incident involving Mendez, but she added later in the CAST interview that Mendez sometimes smacked her on her butt.

Mendez was initially charged with 21 offenses against four victims. Two charges were later dismissed. As is relevant here, he was charged with one count of sexual penetration of a child 10 years old or younger (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (b)2) and three counts of lewd acts upon a child under 14 (§ 288, subd. (a)), one count each for touching her genitalia, kissing her cheek, and touching her buttocks.

At trial, the victim testified Mendez put two fingers between her labia but did not penetrate her vagina. She testified: “Q. And when you felt his hand touching your vagina, at any point did he insert a finger inside your vagina? A. No. Q. You don‘t remember him—A. No. Q.—inserting a finger at all? A. No.”

The victim also testified she did not remember if Mendez ever touched her buttocks. She testified: “Q. Do you remember if [Mendez] ever touched your—your butt, your buttocks area at all? A. No. Q. Do you remember him ever touching your anus specifically? Do you remember anything like that? A. I don‘t remember.”

The victim also conceded she had exaggerated in the CAST interview when she described “screaming” when Mendez touched her. She said she originally accused her dad because her mother told her if she told the truth about Mendez, she and her sister would have to go and stay with their father, who she hated.

In closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury: “[the victim] came into court as a 14-year-old girl. She did not try to embellish anything. She didn’t try to make herself look better. She admits on the stand that when she was younger, she lied about these things with her dad. But she was clear and unwavering that this defendant, Juan Mendez, touched her vagina; that he kissed her cheek. [¶] And she was honest from that stand when she said she didn’t remember a finger going inside her vagina. She was honest when she said ‘I don’t remember him touching my butt.’ She’s not lying about that. She honestly doesn’t remember. That’s a hallmark that you can trust her as a credible witness.”

Defense counsel objected that the prosecutor was vouching for the victim. The court told the jury, “All right. Again, you will follow the law as I provide it to you, and what the attorneys say is argument.” The prosecutor then said the victim had “zero motive to lie” and was “not testifying with any agenda.”

The jury found Mendez guilty on 18 counts. It acquitted Mendez of one count of committing a lewd act by touching the victim’s buttocks. One count had been dismissed before trial. The court sentenced Mendez to 75 years to life plus 2 years.

DISCUSSION

Mendez contends the prosecutor’s comments during closing arguments were improper vouching.3

A “‘prosecutor is prohibited from vouching for the credibility of witnesses or otherwise bolstering the veracity of their testimony by referring to evidence outside the record.’” (People v. Fernandez (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 540, 561 (Fernandez).) “Misconduct arises only if, in arguing the veracity of a witness, the prosecutor implies she has evidence about which the jury is unaware.” (Ibid.) Otherwise, “‘so long as a prosecutor’s assurances regarding the apparent honesty or reliability of prosecution witnesses are based on the “facts of [the] record and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, rather than any purported personal knowledge or belief,” her comments cannot be characterized as improper vouching.’” (Ibid.)

The prosecutor’s statements about the believability of the victim were adequately “‘based on the “facts of [the] record and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom.”’” (Fernandez, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 561.) The prosecutor expressly noted the victim “admit[ted] on the stand” that she had falsely blamed her father. Similarly, the prosecutor expressly noted the victim “was honest from that stand when she said she didn’t remember a finger going inside her vagina. She was honest when she said ‘I don’t remember him touching my butt.’” In other words, the prosecutor reasonably drew an inference about the victim’s honesty from the evidence— namely, from her own candid concessions about her prior inconsistent

statements and her memory lapses. The prosecutor said nothing that reasonably suggested the prosecutor was basing that inference on “‘evidence outside the record’” “about which the jury [was] unaware.” (Ibid.)

Mendez relies on a case that illustrates the distinction between proper, evidence-based inferences and improper vouching. He cites United States v. Kerr (9th Cir. 1992) 981 F.2d 1050, 1053 for the proposition that “the prosecutor’s assurances that his witnesses were ‘candid,’ ‘honest,’ and ‘not hoodwinking you’ were likely to have affected the jury’s verdict.” But in Kerr, the prosecutor repeatedly suggested he knew something about the witness’s candor: “‘I think he . . . was very candid,’” “‘I think he was honest,’” and “‘were they hoodwinking you when they testified? I think not.’” (Ibid., italics added.) Expressing this kind of personal knowledge about a witness’s credibility is what impermissibly puts “‘the prestige of the government behind the witness[es]’” (Ibid.) In contrast, here the prosecutor never told the jury what the prosecutor thought, instead permissibly offering an evidence‑based conclusion based on the victim’s testimony.4

Mendez also asserts the word “‘hallmark’” shows the prosecutor was referring to his “own experience as a player in the judicial system,” and conveying “an experienced-based [sic] judgment that certain styles of testimony are more associated with truth than others.” We’re not so sure. We read that comment as merely invoking the commonsense principle that a person who can admit her mistakes and uncertainty is more credible than someone who does not take responsibility for prior inconsistencies or memory lapses.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

SCOTT, J.

WE CONCUR:

GOODING, ACTING P. J.

SCHWARM, J.*

*Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution

Notes

1
At the start of trial, the court thoughtfully asked defendant what he preferred to be called, and he said, “Mendez is fine.” We will honor that preference in this opinion, though he has been input into our electronic case management system as Flores. We join others with lamenting systematic difficulty with accommodating “the dominant custom throughout all of Latin America and Spain,” which is “to utilize both paternal and maternal surnames in self-identification.” (Cherena Pacheco, Latino Surnames: Formal and Informal Forces in the United States Affecting the Retention and Use of the Maternal Surname (1992) 18 T. Marshall L. Rev. 1, 11 [discussing the primer apellido (paternal surname) and segundo apellido (maternal surname)].)
2
All statutory references are to this code.
3
Mendez contends the court failed to sustain his objection. It certainly did not say the word “sustained,” nor did it expressly strike the statements. We will presume the court impliedly overruled the objection for sake of argument, despite its immediate admonition to the jury.
4
Having concluded there is no prosecutorial misconduct, we need not address whether the conduct was prejudicial to Mendez.