290 P. 59 | Cal. Ct. App. | 1930
On July 16, 1926, one C.H. Wadsworth was held to answer after a preliminary examination on a felony charge. His bail was fixed at $500. On July 21, 1926, the defendant surety company furnished an undertaking in the sum of $500, which was approved by a judge of the superior court, and the said Wadsworth was released from custody. The condition of said bond is as follows:
"Now we, Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland, a corporation . . . hereby undertake that the above named C.H. Wadsworth will appear in that or any other court in which his appearance may be lawfully required upon that charge and will at all times render himself amenable to its orders and processes, and will appear for judgment and surrender himself in execution thereof; or if he fails to perform either of these conditions, that we will pay to the People of the State of California the sum of Five Hundred Dollars."
Thereafter, said Wadsworth entered a plea of not guilty, but later, on October 25, 1926, he entered a plea of guilty, waived time and applied for probation. Pending a report and hearing on this application, said defendant was allowed to remain at liberty. The hearing on said application for probation was regularly continued, from time to time, until February 26, 1927, and the said Wadsworth having failed to appear at that time, after due proceedings, said bond was regularly declared forfeited and this action was brought thereon. In its answer the defendant surety company set up as a defense that when the said Wadsworth appeared in the superior court, pleaded guilty and asked for probation, the liability of the bonding company was at an end; and that it was unaware of the release of Wadsworth after conviction, and had not consented to such release. The plaintiff moved to strike out this portion of the answer, which motion was granted. Upon the trial of the case, judgment was entered for the plaintiff. The defendant surety company has appealed on a bill of exceptions covering the proceedings resulting in the order to strike, and upon the judgment-roll. The only question presented by the appellant is as to whether or not the portion of the answer stricken out by the trial court constituted a good defense to this action; the only point argued by the appellant being that it was the duty of the court to order Wadsworth into custody upon his plea *163 of guilty, and that appellant was released from liability on the bond when the court failed so to do.
The said Wadsworth was admitted to bail under the provisions of section
". . . hereby undertake that the above-named C.D. will appear and answer the charge above mentioned, in whatever court it may be prosecuted, and will at all times hold himself amenable to the orders and process of the court, and if convicted, will appear for judgment and render himself in execution thereof, or if he fails to perform either of these conditions, that he will pay to the people of the state of California the sum of ____ Dollars."
The law not only provides for such an admission of a defendant to bail, after he has been held to answer, but provides the definite form of the undertaking which shall be given. This does not stop with a provision that he shall hold himself amenable to the orders and processes of the court until he is convicted, but also provides that if convicted he will appear for judgment and render himself in execution thereof. There is a clear distinction between conviction and the pronouncing of judgment. (Ex parteBrown,
[2] If this be not the case, there is no provision in our law for admission to bail between the time of conviction and the appearance for judgment. Unless time is waived there must be at least two days between these events, and in case of application for probation, a much longer period usually elapses. No good reason appears why bail should not be permitted during such an interval. The form of the *164
bond provided by section 1278 definitely covers such an interval. And section
We find nothing in the statutes denying authority to release a defendant upon bail, the bond being so conditioned as to make the surety responsible for the appearance of the defendant up to the time for pronouncing judgment. On the other hand, the statutes seem to particularly authorize such a bond.
[4] Under such circumstances it becomes a question of what the parties themselves have contracted to do. (People v.Fidelity Deposit Co. of Maryland,
Appellant cites cases to the effect that an application for admission to bail after conviction is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. The cases referred to have reference to an admission to bail after conviction and upon appeal, as provided for in section
The views we have herein expressed are in line with the weight of authority elsewhere. (People v. MacGregor,
The judgment appealed from is affirmed.
Cary, P.J., and Ames, J., pro tem., concurred.