*1 v Fex PEOPLE v FEX 9, January application by Docket No. 91979. Decided 1992. On Court, people appeal, Supreme leave for in lieu of leave, granting Appeals reversed the of the Court of and reinstated the of the circuit court. Certiorari granted by Supreme May the United — (1992). William Fex was in the Jackson Circuit Court with robbery possession during and armed a firearm the commis- trial, court, felony. Britten, J., sion of a Before Gordon W. dismissal, finding denied the defendant’s motion for the trial to 180-day Agree- be within the limitation of the Interstate Thereafter, ment on Detainers. the defendant was convicted Murphy jury. P.J., Appeals, Neff, The Court of and and Marilyn JJ., unpublished opinion per Kelly, J. reversed in an (Docket people appeal. curiam No. The seek leave curiam, opinion per signed by In an Brickley, Justices Boyle, Riley, Griffin, Mallett, Court held: Appeals calculating 180-day period. The Court of erred begins prisoner’s request to run when a indictment, information, disposition complaint of an is re- ceived officials of the state which the pending. agreement, delivery Under the has caused receipt. when there is actual Reversed. joined by dissenting, Cavanagh, Justice Justice Chief peremptory stated that reversal should be reserved cases required. law is
which the settled and no factual assessment case, legal required, peremptory In this because a assessment is appropriate. Kelley, Attorney Gay General, Frank J. Secor Hardy, Filip, Prosecuting General, Solicitor Joe Attorney, Schrotenboer, Jerrold Assistant Prosecuting people. Attorney, for the Payne
John B. for the defendant. op the Court this reversed The Court of Per Curiam. ground his convictions on defendant’s time within the did not take trial Agreement on in the Interstate that is found limit *2 of Court We conclude Detainers. 180-day period. We in its of erred calculation the Court of of therefore reverse Appeals of circuit and reinstate the court.
I robbery a took at In December investigation, Following an Jackson restaurant. charged robbery with armed the defendant was during possession the commission of firearm felony.1 750.529, 750.227b; MSA MCL of that 28.424(2). 28.797, conviction, defendant was an
For unrelated during 1988 at Westville Correc- incarcerated September 7, 1988, Center in Indiana. On tional Michigan placed had learned that he Jackson rob- on him as a result detainer gave bery. day, the Indiana author- That he robbery ities his charge.
The Indiana authorities mailed the defendant’s September 22, It on 1988. was received Prosecuting County Attorney the Jackson September 26, 1988. began 22, 1989, trial on March
The defendant’s jury March 22 was 177 when a was selected. County, after the was received Jackson Indiana, it was mailed from and 196 after also with intent The defendant was assault 750.82; murder, was MSA 28.277. but count later dismissed. MCL Fex days after the defendant delivered his authorities. Indiana trial, Prior to the defendant had a written filed Agree motion for dismissal ment on Detainers under Interstate seq.; (iad). MCL 780.601 MSA et 4.147(1) seq. argued motion, et his he begin trial not would until after the limi tation found Article the iad.
The court trial heard and denied the motion on day day, jury the first of trial. The next found guilty robbery felony- the defendant of armed firearm.2
The defendant’s convictions were reversed Appeals.3 applied has appeal. for leave to
II *3 III(a) provides Article of the iad that a defen brought dant "shall be trial within to one hundred eighty days after he shall have to be deliv prosecuting appropriate ered to the officer and the prosecuting court of the officers’ writ imprisonment ten of the notice of his and his request for a final to be made of the complaint indictment, . . .” information or . This squarely presents question case the whether the phrase "caused to be delivered” refers to the date given prison authorities, when the is to or the date when the is received officials of pending. the state where the is The iad several old in is decades and is written permits style interpretation urged by the twenty The defendant was sentenced to a term of from five to years two-year robbery. mandatory for armed He also the felony-firearm. term consecutive 3Unpublished opinion per Appeals, curiam decided (Docket June No. Court persuaded that we are
the However defendant.4 urged by proper interpretation the is that the III(b), pris prosecutor. Article the states iad give duty to the or to send oner’s prison holding him. Similar are language, would indicate that which or from the date runs easily authorities, , have been could sent employed III(a), had been Article if the drafters Instead, runs the time from so inclined. delivery, prisoner which is has caused when receipt. expla- interpretation consistent with This the United nation offered Nash, 716, 721; 105 S Ct Carchman (1985): 3401; 87 in- Art. Ill Specifically, warden lodged prisoner form against tion of a detainer has been disposi- may request final him and that he information, indictment, complaint or prisoner If is based. which the detainer upon makes it, request, forward the warden must such infor- together providing certain with a certificate confinement, mation to the the terms about prosecuting appropriate official and court State. The authorities in the receiv- ing bring the to trial State then must shown, good absent cause days, within 180 information, indictment, court must dismiss will complaint prejudice, and the detainer any [Emphasis cease be of force or effect. added.] explicitly must does not state that the notice be *4 say trigger 180-day period. it to the Nor does order Instead, prisoner deliver his the statute the must III(b) specifi delivery. prisoner “caused” the Since Article the to have prisoner give request cally the to the to states that (the request prisoner personally to to send the authorities say prisoner prosecute), who has state that seeks to fulfilled the one could III(b) delivery obligation under has "caused” power so. to the extent that it is within the to do v Fex Opinion op the Court report A similar view is found in the Judiciary pre- United States Senate Committee passage sented when it recommended of the iad: agreement, Under are required informations, prisoners indictments, to inform of all complaints on the basis of which lodged against detainers have been them other jurisdictions. may request Prisoners then trial on pending charges. Any request such through is transmitted proper the warden to the official in the then has 180 other bring prisoner Rep 91-1356, to trial. Cong No 91st [S (2nd Sess), reprinted in 3 Cong US Code & Admin (1970). Emphasis News added.] requiring receipt prison- The rule adopted overwhelming er’s majority has been in the jurisdictions
of that have considered this question.5 typical A discussion is found in State v (Tenn, 1989), Moore, 774 SW2d where the explained: Tennessee In our opinion receiving state cannot be attempting try prisoner within receiving until state has been notice, by the byor officials of sending state, proceed of a under Article III. Once that burden has pris- been satisfied by the oner, must, receiving course, state comply with the terms of Compact. There is a division authority point. on this A few states have calculated the time signing from the date of the II, disposition, regardless Form whether the state receives the See, e.g., State, not. McCallum 407 So 2d 865 purpose An agreement obvious of an interstate is to achieve a body jurisdictions uniform agreement. of law in the that have enacted the contrary, Absent sound reasons to the it is therefore interpret agreement sensible to an such in the same as a manner majority jurisdictions. of other *5 117 439 Mich
122
op
the Court
(Ala
1981),
App
Ill
People Daily,
v
46
App,
Crim
(1977),
756;
1131
195;
360 NE2d
4 Ill Dec
3d
674;
Martens,
500
398 Mass
Commonwealth
v
1041;
S Ct
(1986),
481
107
282
den
cert
NE2d
(1987),
Wells, 186 NJ
1982;
v
In these cases has been noted that would contrary public day the 180 interest start receipt by prosecutor of period before actual prisoner’s request and that could not have this People v Fex Opinion op the Coukt legislative enacting the Article III intent been Com- pact. state to be proceed after the "shall have prosecuting appro- delivered to the priate officer and the prosecuting court of the officer’s imprisonment written notice of his and his disposition” charges pending for final (Emphasis there. *6 added). case, In present the Court of Appeals cited prior three decisions for the rule that the 180-day period is statutory triggered when a defendant provides for final disposition prison Marshall, People authorities. 170 Mich App (1988); Malone, 428 People NW2d 39 177 393, 398-399; Mich App (1989); 658 NW2d Bowman, 215, 218-219; App Mich (1991). However, NW2d 645 an examination these authorities demonstrates that they are of limited applicability. Marshall, prisoner’s initial
disposition was never prison delivered by authori- ties. Similarly, Bowman involved a complete fail- ure to forward a request.6 The statement in Malone was dictum.7
In light considerations, of all these we are per- suaded that the majority adopted rule should be in Michigan. We thus conclude the Court of Appeals erred when it found that the defendant was not tried within 180-day stated Ill(b) promptly Since Article states that "shall prisoner’s request, question forward” a we reserve the how the iad applied should be where there is a in a case where the is never forwarded or very delay delivering substantial the defendant’s Malone, analysis applied by Appeals Under the the Court of timely regard defendant was tried without to whether triggered by giving was the defendant notice to authori receipt ties pending. in the state where the was Mich 117 Dissenting Opinion Levin, J. reverse therefore iad. We and reinstate 7.302(F)(1). MCR the circuit court.9 Mallett, Riley, Griffin, Boyle, and
Brickley, JJ., concurred. (dissenting). to the view I adhere J.
peremptory
cases
should be reserved
reversal
assess-
and no factual
the law is settled
in which
ment is
in the
required.
required.1
case, as indicated
In the instant
legal
opinion,
majority
assessment
appropri-
Peremptory
ate.
phrase,
meaning
hundred
one
"within
prisoner]
eighty
shall have
[the
after
to the
to be delivered”
arguments, and are not
other
the defendant’s
We have considered
granted
persuaded
on those claims.
relief should be
pending appeal
is therefore
for bond
The defendant’s motion
moot.
denied as
314, 322;
Ed,
Chippewa Valley
422 NW2d
Bd of
Roek v
*7
Co,
(1988) (Levin, J.,
opinion);
separate
Amerisure Ins
Grames v
680
434 Mich
Little,
(1990) (Levin, J.,
867,
dissenting); People v
868-875
(1990) (Levin, J., dissenting);
752, 769-770;
People
885-886
v
434 Mich
(1990)
896,
Center, Inc,
Activity
Mich
Harkins v Northwest
(Levin, J., dissenting); Dep’t
American Commer
of Social Services v
(1990) (Levin,
508,
Co,
515;
Liability
Cavanagh, C.J., concurred 2Ante, p 120. reports.” are a Government of not of “[W]e laws committee Mortier, —; Wisconsin Intervenor v Public 111 S Ct (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).