On April 18, 1978, an Ingham County Circuit Court jury convicted defendant of wilfully and maliciously burning a dwelling house and the contents thereof, contrаry to MCL 750.72; MSA 28.267, and of wilfully burning insured personal property with intent to defraud the insurer, contrary to MCL 750.75; MSA 28.270. She appeals from her cоnvictions as of right.
Defendant raises three issues for our consideration, only one of which merits substantial discussion. At trial, Inspector Holliday of the Lansing
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Fire Department testified that it was his opinion that the fire in question was maliciously set and that it wаs arson. Defendant failed to object. Absent a showing of manifest injustice, specific objections to the admission оf evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
People v Alexander,
Defendant also complains of several remarks made by the prosecuting attorney during his closing argument. Defense counsel’s failure to object at trial precludes our review unless failure to consider the issue would result in a miscarriage of justice.
People v Delgado,
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court’s failure to suppress evidence gathered at the scene оf the fire by Inspector Holliday was reversible error. She relies upon
People v Tyler,
399 Mich
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564, 570;
"If there has been a fire, the blaze extinguished and the firefighters have left the premises, a warrant is required to reenter and search the premises, unless there is consent or the premises have been abandoned.” Id., at 583.
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the decision was affirmed.
Michigan v Tyler,
"Although the Michigan Supreme Court appеars to have accepted this principle, its opinion may be read as holding that the exigency justifying a warrantless entry to fight a fire ends, and the need to get a warrant begins, with the dousing of the last flame.399 Mich, at 579 ,250 NW2d, at 475 . We think this view of the firefighting function is unrealistiсally narrow, however. Fire officials are charged not only with extinguishing fires, but with finding their causes. Prompt determination of the fire’s origin may be necessary to prevent its *38 recurrence, as though the detection of continuing dangers such as faulty wiring оr a defective furnace. Immediate investigation may also be necessary to preserve evidence frоm intentional or accidental destruction. And, of course, the sooner the officials complete their duties, the less will be their subsequent interference with the privacy and the recovery efforts of the victims. For these reasons, оfficials need no warrant to remain in a building for a reasonable time to investigate the cause of a blaze after it has been extinguished. And if the warrantless entry to put out the fire and determine its cause is constitutional, the warrantless sеizure of evidence while inspecting the premises for these purposes also is constitutional.” Id., at 509-510.
Nor did the Court feеl that the failure of the fire officials’ failure to remain on the premises continuously have any significance sincе "the morning entries were no more than an actual continuation of the first”. Id., at 511.
Application of the ruling set out in Michigan v Tyler, persuades us that defendant’s claim is unfoundеd. At the hearing regarding the motion to suppress, Inspector Holliday testified that he arrived at the scene of the fire at approximately 11:30 p.m. on August 6, 1976. At approximately 4 a.m. he left for his office in order to retrieve his camerа which is a part of his investigating procedure. The last of the flames were extinguished at approximately 4:45 a.m. However, because of the possibility of incipient or rekindled fires, Inspector Holliday remained. To assist him in determining the сause of the fire, he called for an electrical inspector and a representative from Consumers Power as well as a furnace inspector. Between 4 and 7:30 of the morning of August 7, twelve containers of debris were remоved from the premises and kept for subsequent analysis. In addition a clock was removed and pictures of the burnt dwell *39 ing were taken. At approximately 10 a.m., Inspector Holliday and his assistants vacated the premises.
The instant circumstances are not unlike those present in Tyler. The fire officials arrived while the fire was in progress. Those entrusted with investigative responsibility remained for a limited period of time aftеr the blaze was extinguished for the purpose of determining its cause and ensuring that fire did not rekindle itself. As stated in Tyler, "officials need no warrant to remain in a building for a reasonable time to investigate the cause of a blaze after it has been extinguished”. Id., at 510. Hence, the warrantless seizure of evidence in this case was constitutional.
Affirmed.