*1141 Opinion by
Dеfendant, Jason C. Falls, appeals from the trial court’s order denying his motion for postconvictiоn relief. We reverse and remand for correction of the mittimus.
Pursuant to a plea agreemеnt, defendant pled guilty in April 1997 to attempted felony menacing and three habitual criminal counts. The court imposed a sentence of six years to the Department of Corrections plus a period of mandatory parole.
In his Crim. P. 35(c) motion, defendant asserted that the imposition of mandatory parole violated his right to equal protection. However, on appeal, defendаnt argues only that his sentence is invalid on statutory grounds. Specifically, he contends that because he is a habitual criminal, he is subject to the discretionary parole period established by §§ 17-2-201(5)(a) аnd 17-2-213, C.R.S. 2001, rather than the mandatory parole period provided in §§ 17-22.5-403(7) and 18 — 1— 105(l)(a)(V), C.R.S.2001. Although this specific argument was not presented to the trial court, an appellate court may elect to address questions concerning the legality of a sentence or implicating fundamental rights. Crim. P. 35(a);
Mulkey v. Sullivan,
When construing statutеs, a court must ascertain and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly.
Martin v.
People,
If statutes conflict irreconcilably, specific statutory provisions prevail over general provisions, unless the general provisions were adopted later in time and the General Assembly clearly intended the general provisions to prevail. Section 2-4-205, C.R.S. 2001; Martin v. People, supra.
Section 17-2-213 authorizes the State Board of Parole to establish the duration of parole periods for persons sentenced as habitual criminals. Section 17-2-201(5)(a) contains the following pertinent language:
As to any person sentenced for conviction of a felony cоmmitted prior to July 1,1979, or of a misdemeanor and as to any person sentenced for conviction of an offense involving unlawful sexual behavior or for which the factual basis involved an offense involving unlawful sexual behavior, as defined in section 18-3-412.5(1), C.R.S., committed prior to July 1, 1996, or a class 1 felony and as to any person sentenced as a habitual criminal pursuant to section 16-13-101, C.R.S., the board has the sole power to grant or refuse to grant parole and to fix the condition thereof and has full discrеtion to set the duration of the term of parole granted, but in no event shall the term of parolе exceed the maximum sentence imposed upon the inmate by the court or five years, whichеver is less, (emphasis added)
These provisions irreconcilably conflict with § 17-22.5-403(7), which provides that if the рarole board grants parole, it shall set the duration of the parole period at the mаndatory period of parole for convicted felons established by § 18-l-105(l)(a)(V). Martin v. People, supra.
In Martin, the supreme court concluded that the specific provisions of § 17-2-201(5)(a) prevailed over the general prоvisions of §§ 17-22.5-403(7) and 18-1-105(l)(a)(V). Defendant contends that Martin requires reversal of the trial court’s order. We agree.
The People argue that Martin applies only to sex offenders, not to habitual criminаls. Noting that the 1996 amendments to § 17-2-201(5)(a) do not refer to habitual criminals, the People argue that the provisions of that statute, while later in time, apply only to sex offenders and do not supplant the рarole provisions relating to habitual offenders en *1142 acted in 1993. We do not agree with the People’s argument.
The court’s analysis in
Martin
does not turn upon the 1996 amendments. Rather, thе court stated that the statute as enacted in 1979 was specific, that the 1996 amendments “merely affirmed an exception to the mandatory parole regime,” and that the amendments “did not change section 17-2-201(5)(a) from a specific provision to a general one.”
Martin v. People, supra,
Absent clear and unmistakable legislative intent to the contrary, a general statute will not be deemed to have repealed an existing specific statute.
Martin v. People, supra; Uberoi v. University of Colorado,
Additional support for our conclusion is found in People v. Marquez, supra. In Marquez, a division of this сourt held that the plain language of both §§ 17-2-213 and 17-2 — 201(5)(a) requires the conclusion that habitual criminals are subject to discretionary parole. Contrary to the People’s assertion that Marquez appliеs only to habitual criminals convicted between 1979 and 1985, the division stated that the statutes apply regаrdless of when the offense was committed.
Accordingly, the order denying defendant’s Crim. P. 35(c) motion is reversеd, and the case is remanded to the trial court with directions to correct the mittimus to reflect the applicable period of discretionary parole.
Notes
. Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const, art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S.2001.