Opinion
Sixty-year-old Jose Serrano Espinoza, a career criminal, appeals from an order requiring postrelease community supervision (hereafter PRCS; Pen. Code, § 3451, subd. (a).)
In 1999 appellant was convicted of commercial burglary (§ 459) and petty theft with prior theft-related offenses (§ 666), with special findings that he suffered five serious felony convictions (§ 1170.12) and served five prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced appellant as a “Three Strikes” offender to 25 years to life in state prison. We affirmed the judgment in an unpublished opinion on January 20, 1999 (People v. Espinoza, (B121327)).
In 2013, appellant filed a section 1170.126 petition to recall his sentence. - The trial court granted the petition and resentenced appellant to seven years four months in state prison. Over appellant’s objection, the trial court ordered appellant to participate in PRCS. (§ 3451, subd. (a).)
Presentence Custody Credits/Analogy to Parole
Where the presentence credits exceed the total state prison term, the excess credits, commonly known as Sosa credits, are deducted from the defendant’s parole period. (In re Sosa (1980)
Section 1170, subdivision (h)(6), part of the Criminal Justice Realignment Act provides that the act applies to all persons sentenced or released form prison on or after October 1, 2011. Appellant was resentenced September 19, 2013, and immediately released. He is subject to section 3451, subdivision (a), which provides; “Notwithstanding any other law . . . , all persons released from prison on or after October 1, 2011, or, whose sentence has been deemed served pursuant to Section 2900.5 after serving a prison term for a felony shall, upon release from prison and for a period not exceeding three years immediately following release, be subject to community supervision provided by a county agency designated by each county’s board of supervisors . . . .”
Appellant argues that PRCS is analogous to parole and that his excess custody credits exempt him from PRCS. Appellant, however, was resentenced under a sentencing scheme that requires PRCS. (§§ 1170, subd. (h)(6), 3451, subd. (a).) Even if appellant was entitled to custody credits before he was resentenced, it does not reduce the mandatory supervision period. (§ 3451; see In re Cervera (2001)
We can “construe” the language of a statute if its application would lead to an absurd result. (See, e.g., Unzueta v. Ocean View School Dist. (1992)
In theory, the section 3453 terms and conditions of PRCS may be onerous and burdensome but they may also be viewed as providing incentive for the recidivist to mend his ways. In other words, we can reasonably say that the Legislature, like the trial court in the instant case, believed that such terms and conditions are not statutorily imposed as punishment. We need not go so far as to say that such terms were motivated from benevolence. It is sufficient to observe that the Legislative largess which resulted in appellant’s release from prison came with a price, PRCS. This was the tradeoff. At oral argument, respondent characterized this as a “package deal.” Appellant is not permitted to pick and choose which portion of realignment he agrees to and which portion he does not. “He who takes the benefit must bear the burden.” (Civ. Code, § 3521.)
Of course, if there is some constitutional protection to which appellant is entitled, he may, in theory, seek refuge under its umbrella. As we shall explain, there is no constitutional impediment precluding PRCS.
Ex Post Facto
Appellant asserts that section 3451 violates the ex post facto clauses of the United States and California Constitutions because it retroactively increases the punishment for a crime that was committed before the statute was enacted. (U.S. Const, art. I, § 10, cl. 1; Cal. Const., art. I, § 9; California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales (1995)
Equal Protection
Appellant argues that awarding custody credit reductions for parolees {In re Sosa, supra,
“The right to equal protection of the law generally does not prevent the state from setting a starting point for a change in the law. ‘[T]he Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid statutes and statutory changes to have a beginning and thus to discriminate between the rights of an earlier and later time.’ [Citation.] The same rule applies to changes in sentencing law that benefit defendants. ‘Defendant has not cited a single case, in this state or any other, that recognizes an equal protection violation arising from the timing of the effective date of a statute lessening the punishment for a particular offense. Numerous courts, however, have rejected such a claim—including this court. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lynch (2012)
Conclusion
PRCS serves an important public interest to “improve public safety outcomes” and facilitate “successful reintegration back into society.” (§ 3450, subd. (b)(5); see People v. Torres (2013)
The judgment is affirmed.
Gilbert, P. J., and Perren, J., concurred.
On, June 16, 2014, the opinion was modified to read as printed above. Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied September 17, 2014, S219746. Werdegar, J., did not participate therein.
Notes
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
The probation report describes appellant and his life of crime: “The defendant is an individual whose criminal career began at the age of 11. The defendant’s criminal behaviors include, but are not limited to, drug and alcohol related offenses, burglary, theft, and vehicle violations. The defendant has been sentenced to . . . juvenile hall, local jail, the California Rehabilitation Center, and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Regardless of the level of intervention, the defendant continued his pattern of behavior, up until the age of 43, when he was committed to Prison for a life sentence. As a result, he has spent the majority of his life incarcerated, or under probation or parole supervision.”
This is an apt description. Appellant abused alcohol, heroin, and other drugs for decades. Most of his prior offenses are theft related. We point this out because appellant’s criminal history is significant for what it does not show: violence. He is now 60 years old and suffers from poor health.
“The realignment legislation enacted in 2011 has two primary prongs: creating a new sentencing mechanism for defendants who are sentenced on and after October 1, 2011, and creating a new process whereby certain offenders being released from prison custody would no longer be supervised by the state parole system, but instead would be supervised by a local supervision agency. The new supervision system is called ‘postrelease community supervision,’ or ‘PRCS.’ PRCS does not shorten any prison term; it merely modifies the agency that will supervise the defendant after release.” (Couzens & Bigelow, Felony Sentencing After Realignment (Mar. 4, 2014) <http://www.courts.ca.gov/ partners/documents/felony_sentencing.pdf> [as of May 27, 2014].)