delivered the opinion of the court:
Thе State appeals the November 5, 1998, order of the circuit court of McHenry County granting defendant Brian Ernst’s motion to suppress evidence and quash arrest. The defendant had been arrested and charged with driving a vehicle while his blood-alcohol concentration was .08 or more (625 ILCS 5/11 — 501(a)(1) (West 1998)). The trial court ruled that the defendant’s emergency health cаre providers had improperly reported the defendant’s blood-alcohol test results to the arresting officer in violation of the physician-patient privilege (735 ILCS 5/8 — 802 (West 1998)). We reverse and remand the cause for trial.
On January 31, 1998, the defendant was charged by complaint with driving a vehicle while his blood-alcohol concentration was .08 or more (625 ILCS 5/11 — 501(a)(1) (West 1998)). On March 23, 1998, the defendant filed a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. In his motion, the defendant argued that the arresting officer had no probable cause to believe that he had committed an offense.
On May 8, 1998, the trial court held a hearing on the defendant’s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. At the hearing, the defendant cаlled Deputy William Henninger of the McHenry County sheriff’s police. Deputy Henninger testified that, on January 31, 1998, at approximately 2:45 a.m., he received a call regarding a one-vehicle accident. When he arrived at the scene, he observed a Chevrolet Cámaro off to the side of the road and against a tree. Lieutenant Tom Monday, who had alrеady arrived on the scene, told him that the Cámaro belonged to the defendant. Deputy Henninger observed that the defendant had facial and scalp injuries that were bleeding. An ambulance was called, and Deputy Henninger had the defendant sit in the front seat of the squad car to wait while Deputy Henninger completed an accident report. In response to Deputy Henninger’s questioning about the accident, the defendant explained that he had driven around a curb too fast and could not control the car.
Deputy Henninger testified that the defendant was in the squad car for four to five minutes. During this time, the defendant’s speech was clear and coherent. Although the defendant’s eyes were bloodshot and glassy, Deputy Henninger attributed this condition to the defendant’s head injuries. The defendant did not smell of alcohol.
Deputy Henninger testified that the defendant was then taken by ambulance to Woodstock Memorial Medical Center. At the hospital, Deputy Henninger continued to work on his report while the defendant was behind a curtain in a treatment room. After completing the report, he gave the defendant a copy, obtained the telephone number of the defendant’s parents, called them, and then advised the defendant that his parents were on their way.
Deputy Henninger testified that, later during the morning of January 31, 1998, he was advised that the hospital had called the police station and that the results of the defеndant’s blood-alcohol screening were available. Deputy Henninger and Lieutenant Monday returned to the hospital and received a report in an envelope from nurse Kathy Harrison. The officers were unable to decipher the results of the
After the defendant indicated that he had no further evidence to introduce on his motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, the State moved for a directed finding. The trial court granted the State’s motion, finding that the blood-alcohol test results provided sufficient probable cause to support the arrest of the defendant.
On June 5, 1998, the defendant filed a motion to reconsider the trial court’s ruling. In reliance upon Village of Arlington Heights v. Bartelt,
In response to the motion to reconsider, the State argued that section 11 — 501.4—1 of the Code (625 ILCS 5/11 — 501.4—1 (West 1998)) permitted the use of blood-alcohol test results to estáblish probable cause for arrest. The State argued that section 11 — 501.4—1 specifically authorized medical personnel to report the results of blood tests to the Department of State Police or local law enforcement agencies. 625 ILCS 5/11 — 501.4—1 (West 1998). The State argued that Bаrtelt was not applicable to the instant case because section 11 — 501.4—1 was enacted after that case was decided.
On August 25, 1998, following a hearing, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to reconsider and denied the State’s motion for a directed finding. The trial court found that, although section 11 — 501.4—1 allowed the admission of blood-alcohol tеst results at trial, it did not permit the use of such evidence in probable cause hearings. The trial court therefore ruled that the enactment of section 11 — 501.4—1 had not overruled Bartelt and that the physician-patient privilege did not permit ex parte disclosures of blood-alcohol test results by medical personnel to the police. Rather, the triаl court ruled that such evidence could only be used in prosecutions and only after such evidence had been disclosed pursuant to judicially authorized methods of discovery. See Bartelt,
On November 5, 1998, the trial court resumed the hearing on the defendant’s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. The State presented the testimony of Kathleen Harrison, the registered nurse assigned to the emergency room on January 31, 1998. Harrison testified that she provided Deputy Henninger and Lieutenant Monday a copy of the defendant’s blood-alcohol test results. When the State asked Harrison to explain the contents of the report, the trial court sustained the defendant’s objection on the basis of the physician-patient privilege.
At the close of the hearing, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. The trial court found that, although the State had shown sufficient probable cause to arrest the defendant, the defendant’s blood-alcohol test results had been improperly obtained as a result of an ex parte disclosure. The trial court ruled that this was a violation of the principles articulated in
On appeal, the State argues that nurse Harrison’s disclosure of the defendant’s blood-alcohol test results was expressly permitted by section 11 — 501.4—1 of the Code and was not a violation of the physician-patient privilege. The State argues that mediсal personnel may report blood test results to law enforcement officers without prior court authorization and that the results can be used to establish probable cause for an arrest.
A trial court’s ruling on a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence is generally subject to reversal on appeal only if it is manifestly erroneous. Peоple v. Carlson,
Section 11 — 504.4—1 of the Code relates to the reporting of blood test results performed in the regular course of providing emergency medical treatment. That section provides, in relevant part, as follows:
“(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the results of blood or urine tests performed for the purpose of determining the content of alcohol *** in an individual’s blood or urine conducted upon persons receiving medical treatment in a hospital emergency room for injuries resulting from a motor vehicle accident may be reported to the Department of State Police or local law enforcement agenсies. Such blood or urine tests are admissible in evidence as a business record exception to the hearsay rule only in prosecutions for any violation of Section 11 — 501 of this Code or a similar provision of a local ordinance, or in prosecutions for reckless homicide brought under the Criminal Code of 1961.
(b) The confidentiality provisions of law pеrtaining to medical records and medical treatment shall not be applicable with regard to tests performed upon an individual’s blood or urine under the provisions of subsection (a) of this Section.” 625 ILCS 5/11— 501.4 — 1 (West 1998).
Our research has revealed no previous decision interpreting this statutory language: In interpreting the meaning of a statute, our primary concern is tо ascertain and give effect to the true intent of the legislature. People v. Hickman,
Here, the language of the statute at issue is clear and unequivocal. Subsection (a) of section 11 — 501.4—1 plainly provides that the results of blood-alcohol tests conducted
Additionally, section 11 — 501.4—1 contains no limitation that blood-alcohol test results only be disclosed pursuant to judicially authorized methods of court discovery. We believe that to impose such a requirement would be contrary to the purpose of the statute as evidenced by its plain language. The statute authorizes the reporting of blood-alcohol test results to law enforcement authorities. A common definition of the word “report” is “to make known to the authorities.” Merriam-Webster Dictionary 625 (5th ed. 1997). By using the word “report,” we believe that the legislature intended medical personnel to initially alert police of the presence of alcohol in the blood of individuals receiving emergency treatment from motor vehicle accidents, even in instances where the police might not otherwise suspect the use of alcohol. Requiring the police to obtain such information through judicially authorized methods of discovery would defeat the primary reporting function created by the statute.
Moreover, as already nоted, the legislature has specifically provided that the physician-patient confidentiality requirements are inapplicable with regard to the reporting of blood-alcohol test results. 625 ILCS 5/11 — 501.4—1(b) (West 1998). The source of the physician-patient privilege is statutory and the scope of that privilege is generally a matter for the legislature. See Kunkel,
As the defendant correctly notes, other Illinois courts have held that a defendant’s blood-alcohol test results can only be disclosed pursuant to judicially authorized authority. See People v. Wilber,
We also agree with the State that blood-alcohol test results reported pursuant to the statute may be used in formulating probable cause to arrest: We believe that, by permitting these results to be reported to the police in the first instance, the legislature intended that the police would utilize these results in determining whether to effectuate an arrest. A
The defendant objects to such an interpretation, relying on that portion of section 11 — 501.4—1 that provides that blood-alcohol test results “are admissible in evidence as a business record exception to the hearsay rule only in prosecutions for any violation of Section 11— 501 of this Code or a similar provision of a local ordinance, or in prosecutions for reckless homicide brought under the Criminal Code of 1961.” (Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS 5/11 — 501.4^1 (a) (West 1998). The defendant argues that this languagе limits the admissibility of such evidence to trial and does not authorize its use during probable cause hearings. We disagree.
The defendant misinterprets the phrase “only in prosecutions.” When the phrase is read with the remainder of the sentence, it becomes clear that the phrase was intended to limit the types of cases in which blood test results could be admitted. In other words, the statute provides that such evidence may only be admitted in prosecutions for violations of section 11 — 501 of the Code or similar provision of a local ordinance, or in prosecutions for reckless homicide. Therefore, the statute limits the use of such evidence according to the nature of the offense, as opрosed to the nature of the hearing. We therefore hold that blood-alcohol test results reported pursuant to section 11— 501.4— 1 may be utilized during probable cause hearings.
In so holding, we acknowledge that our conclusion is contrary to that reached in Bartelt. As noted above, in Bartelt, the reviewing court held that, absent specific statutory authority, oral statements by medical personnel could not be used for the purpose of establishing probable cause. Bartelt,
In closing, we note that there was sufficiеnt evidence introduced at the hearing demonstrating that the police had sufficient probable cause to arrest the defendant. The blood test results demonstrated that the defendant had a blood-alcohol level over .08. On the night in question, the defendant lost control of his vehicle, drove off the road, and hit a tree. Additionally, Deputy Henninger noted thаt the defendant’s eyes were bloodshot and glassy. We believe that, under the totality of the circumstances, there was sufficient probable cause to arrest the defendant for driving a vehicle while his blood-alcohol concentration was .08 or more.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order quashing the defendant’s arrest and suppressing the evidence and remand this cause for trial.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of McHenry County is reversed, and the cause is remanded.
Reversed and remanded.
INGLIS and THOMAS, JJ., concur.