THE PEOPLE, Plаintiff and Respondent, v. DENNIS WILLIAM EDWARDS, Defendant and Appellant.
Crim. No. 23821
Supreme Court of California
July 25, 1985
39 Cal.3d 107
Richard Power, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
Michael D. Bradbury, District Attorney (Ventura), Vincent J. O‘Neill, Jr., Chief Assistant Deputy District Attorney, and Marcia C. Levine, Deputy District Attorney, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
GRODIN, J.—Defendant Dennis William Edwards appeals from convictions of furnishing and/or administering heroin (
We conclude therе was substantial evidence from which the jury could properly have found defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter and that the trial court therefore erred in refusing to give the requested instruction. We further conclude that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that defendant could not be convicted of furnishing heroin to Rogers if he and Rogers were merely copurchasers of the heroin. As we shall explain, although the trial court‘s failure to properly instruct the jury requires that both of defendant‘s convictions be reversed, the People shall have the option of accepting a modification of the judgment to reflect a conviction of involuntary manslaughter and unlawful heroin use.
Defendant and his girlfriend, Victoria Rogers (the deceased), went to San Bernardino to find work. Rogers had recently been fired from her job in another city and defendant had been unemployed for some time. Before coming to San Bernardino, Rogers had sold her car and, with the proceeds, she and defendant planned to rent an apartment in San Bernardino and purchase a cheaper car. Defendant apparently had possession of all of the couple‘s money.
On October 27, 1982, defendant and Rogers were hitchhiking on their way to look at an apartment for rent when they were picked up by Burt Royce and his girlfriend, Lula Nava. Royce and Nava agreed to take de-
After drinking beer and smoking marijuana at the couple‘s apartment, Royce, Rogers and defendant drove to look at a used car which defendant and Rogers were interested in purchasing. Nava, who was ill, remained at the apartment.
What followed next is taken from the tape-recorded statement defendant gave to police the day after his arrest. After looking at the used automobile and making arrangements to have it delivеred that evening, Royce, Rogers and defendant visited two bars where the two men drank beer and Rogers drank rum and cokes “one after the other.” According to defendant‘s statement, while at the second bar Royce began talking about heroin and told defendant and Rogers that he could get some “real good black stuff.” Defendant and Rogers told Royce that neither of them had ever tried heroin before but, after some discussion, they agreed to “get some.”
The three then left the bar, рicked up another woman, Isotta Mullican, and drove to a motel to purchase the heroin. Defendant gave $50 to Mullican who apparently left the car, purchased two balloons of heroin and returned to the car. The four then drove to Mullican‘s house where they all congregated in the bathroom as Mullican prepared the heroin. Mullican supplied the syringe used for the injection and the spoon and cigarette lighter used to “cook” the heroin. After Royce and Mullican had each injected themselves with one-half balloon, Mullican injected Rogers and then defendant with a half-balloon each. Rogers and defendant each “tied-off” their own arms to facilitate injection.
After defendant was injected, he noticed that Rogers was slipping off the toilet seat on which she had been sitting. Defendant asked Rogers if she was all right but received no response. Upon examination, defendant was unable to detect any sign of breathing or pulsе. He placed Rogers in the shower and turned on the cold water but Rogers did not respond. Royce then began giving Rogers mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, but to no avail. Eventually, Royce and defendant dragged Rogers out of the house, put her into Royce‘s car and drove to a nearby market.
The paramedics soon arrived and, suspecting a heroin overdose, began treating Rogers accordingly. When thе police arrived they questioned Royce and defendant. Defendant gave the police a false name and told them that he and Royce had found the woman (Rogers) unconscious outside the market. The police did not believe defendant and suspected that both he and Royce were under the influence of narcotics. Defendant and Royce were arrested.
The following day, in a taped interview, defendant admitted his involvement to the police, and led them tо Mullican‘s house where the police found two empty balloons and a spoon in the bathroom. Rogers had suffered irreversible brain damage and died a week later without ever regaining consciousness. The cause of death was heroin overdose.
Defendant was charged with furnishing and/or administering a controlled substance in violation of
I.
At the close of trial, defendant requested that the jury be instructed on the offense of involuntary manslaughter. The trial court refused to give the requested instruction, believing there was insufficient evidence to sup-
Defendant relies heavily on People v. Mayfield (1964) 225 Cal.App.2d 263 [37 Cal.Rptr. 340], for his contention that the jury could properly have found he did not furnish the heroin to Rogers but, rather, was guilty only of aiding and abetting Rogers’ use of heroin. In Mayfield, the three defendants, during a conversation in a bar, decided to pool their funds and purchase a supply of heroin for their own use. All three men went together in search of the source and, along thе way, met the deceased, Willie Ricard, who was also interested in purchasing heroin and who offered to chip in his pro rata share. Although it was unclear who actually made the purchase, two balloons of heroin were acquired and the four returned to one of their apartments where each injected himself with a half a balloon. Ricard died shortly thereafter of a heroin overdose and the defendants were convicted of violating
The prosecution‘s theory at trial had been that the defendants “provided, feloniously, and in violation of
The distinction drawn by the Mayfield court bеtween one who sells or furnishes heroin and one who simply participates in a group purchase
In his tape-recorded statement to police, defendant stated that he and Rogers had gotten some money together by selling Rogers’ car, that he carried all of the couple‘s money, and that the two of them planned to use the money to buy a new car and rent an apartment. From this evidence the jury could have inferred that, although defendant gаve Mullican the $50 to purchase the heroin, the money came from “pooled” or “joint” funds belonging to both defendant and Rogers. The jury could reasonably have concluded, therefore, that defendant and Rogers were equal partners in financing the purchase.
Even if defendant and Rogers were equal partners in financing the heroin purchase, the jury could nonetheless have found defendant guilty of furnishing heroin to Rogers if it concluded that defendant instigated the purchase and was аctively involved in arranging and consummating the deal, while Rogers was wholly passive and merely accepted the heroin when it was obtained and offered to her.7 However, there was substantial evidence from which the jury could have concluded that defendant did not instigate the purchase and that he and Rogers were equal partners in the decision to make the purchase and in its consummation, as well.
In his tape-recorded statement to police, defendant stated that it wаs Royce who first suggested the heroin purchase to defendant and Rogers. Royce was an admitted heroin user who, although himself penniless, knew
Although defendant did not expressly state that he and Rogers jointly agreed to buy the heroin, his comments to the police suggest that it was a mutual decision. For instance, defendant stated that аs he and Rogers left the bar with Royce, Royce “started talking to us about heroin, you know, and, and, ah, we said well we‘ve never tried it before, you know, and he started running it down to us and telling us about this real good black stuff that he could get . . . . So, ah, then Vicky [Rogers] and I finally conceded [sic] that, yeah, you know, we‘ll get some . . . .”
Both defendant‘s statement that Royce suggested the purchase and the inference that defendant and Rogers jointly decided to make the purchase, are further supported by evidence that Rogers and defendant were equally inexperienced with heroin. Defendant told both Royce and the police that neither he nor Rogers had ever used heroin before. The forensic pathologist who performed the autopsy on Rogers testified that he found no evidence of chronic intravenous drug abuse. Similarly, a police detective who carefully examined defendant‘s arm with a magnifying glass testified that he could find only one needle mark, apparently the one defendant had acquired the preceding day in Mullican‘s bathroom.
Finally, there is substantial evidence to suggest that defendant and Rogers were equally active in the consummation of the purchase. There was evidence that both agreed to buy the heroin, both accompanied Royce and Mullican to the site where Mullican purchased the heroin from a source unknown to either defendant or Rogers, and both went into Mullican‘s bathroom where each received an injection of heroin. Neither one acted as a go-between or agent of the other. The jury could properly have found that the only difference between defendant‘s conduct and that of Rogers was that defendant actually handed the $50 to Mullican. In light of the evidence that the $50 belonged to both defendant and Rogers, this act, alone, would not constitute furnishing.
Although the evidence is far from overwhelming, we conclude there was substantial evidence that Royce suggеsted the heroin purchase, that defendant paid for the heroin with joint funds and that defendant and Rogers were “equal partners” both in the decision to make the purchase and in its consummation.8 Had the jury believed this evidence, it could properly have
Defense counsel requested an instruction on involuntary manslaughter.9 This request was denied. “[I]t is reversible error to refuse a manslaughter instruction in a case where murdеr is charged, and the evidence would warrant a conviction of manslaughter.” (People v. Carmen (1951) 36 Cal.2d 768, 773-774 [228 P.2d 281]; People v. Gaulden (1974) 36 Cal.App.3d 942, 951 [111 Cal.Rptr. 803].) As we have explained, there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction of manslaughter in this case. It was therefore reversible error for the trial court to refuse the requested instruction.10 Because the factual question posed by the omitted
II.
Defendant‘s conviction of furnishing and/or аdministering heroin must also be reversed. Although defendant did not specifically request an instruction that he could not be convicted of furnishing if he and Rogers were copurchasers, “‘[i]t is settled that in criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, the trial court must instruct on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. [Citations.] The general principles of law governing the case are those principles closely and openly connectеd with the facts before the court, and which are necessary for the jury‘s understanding of the case.’ (People v. St. Martin (1970) 1 Cal.3d 524, 531 [83 Cal.Rptr. 166, 463 P.2d 390].)” (People v. Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 715.) As should be apparent from what has already been said, the holding in Mayfield, that mere copurchasers are not guilty of furnishing to one another, is a principle closely and openly connected with the facts of this case and one necessary for the jury‘s understanding of the case. Under these circumstances, the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that defendant was not guilty of furnishing if he and Rogers wеre copurchasers.
There was sufficient evidence to support a conviction of furnishing and/or administering based on a theory that defendant furnished the heroin to Royce and Mullican or that defendant aided and abetted Mullican in administering the heroin to Rogers. A conviction based on either of these theories would not be affected by the trial court‘s instructional error. However, because we cannot determine on this record whether the jury verdict was based on one of these theories or on a theory that defendant furnished the heroin to Rogers, the judgment must be reversed. (See People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 69-71 [164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468].)11
an instruction on involuntary manslaughter, we need not and do not decide whether in the absence of such a request, the trial court would have had a duty to give the instruction sua sponte.
Although defendant‘s convictions cannot stand, it does not necessarily follow that the judgment must be unconditionally reversed. “‘An appellate court is not restricted to the remedies of affirming or reversing a judgment. Where the prejudicial error goes only to the degree of the offense for which the defendant was convicted, the appellate court may reduce the conviction to a lesser degree and affirm the judgment as modified, thereby obviating the necessity for a retrial. (See
Defendant requested an instruction on involuntary manslaughter and the record establishes his guilt of that offense as a matter of law. Moreover, during oral argument defense counsel stated that defendant was not аsking to be “let off” but only that his conviction be reduced to involuntary manslaughter.12
However, although defendant has thus consented to modification of the judgment, the People have expressed no view on the matter. (Cf. People v. Bailey (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 693, 700 [113 Cal.Rptr. 514].) Because, notwithstanding the trial court‘s instructional errors there was sufficient evidence to support convictions of furnishing and second degree murder, the People are entitled to retry defendant on these charges, should they so choose. On the other hand, the Peоple may well be satisfied with obtaining convictions of involuntary manslaughter and unlawful heroin use. Because we do not know which option the People would prefer, our disposition should preserve both options. (People v. Garcia (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 639, 648 [104 Cal.Rptr. 69].)
The judgment is reversed with directions as follows: If the People do not bring defendant to trial within 60 days after the filing of the remittitur in the trial court pursuant to
Mosk, I., Kaus, J., Broussard, J., Reynoso, J., and Lucas, J., concurred.
Notes
“Furnish,” as used in
The second case to which the trial court was alerted was People v. Wong (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 812 [111 Cal.Rptr. 314]. In Wong, the defendants were charged with furnishing heroin to a minor, a felony, and murder in connection with the fatal heroin overdose of a minor girl. The jury convicted the defendants of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, a misdemeanor, and involuntary manslaughter. Significantly, the trial court in Wong had instructed the jury that if the defendants aided and abetted the victim in her use of heroin, they would be guilty of contributing to the delinquency of a minor and, consequently, would be guilty of involuntary manslaughter. (Id., at p. 835, fn. 2.) The Court of Appeal opinion in Wong refers, at least three different times, to the fact that the defendants’ convictiоns could properly have been predicated on a finding that they aided and abetted the victim in her use of heroin. (Id., at pp. 832, 835-836.)
In light of the fact that the trial court was alerted to the holdings in Mayfield and Wong and indicated that it had read both cases, defendant‘s failure to articulate a specific theory to support his request for an instruction on involuntary manslaughter is not controlling. We note that the trial court made a conscientious effort to determine whether there was any basis for giving the requested instructiоn and we do not fault the court for failing to recognize in the midst of trial what, in hindsight, seems to be the clear significance of the holdings in Mayfield and Wong. Nonetheless, under the facts of this case, defendant was entitled to an instruction on involuntary manslaughter and the trial court was presented with both sufficient evidence and sufficient authority to support defendant‘s request.