delivered the opinion of the court:
In thе circuit court of Clay County defendant, Gary Easley, was charged by information with attempted murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, pars. 8—4, 9—1), reckless conduct (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 12—5(a)), aggravated assault (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 12— 2(a)(1)), and unlawful use of weapons (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 24—1(a)(4)). A directed verdict was entered in favor of defendant on the charge of attempted murder, and he pleaded guilty to the charges of reckless conduct, aggravated assault and unlawful use of weapons.
The appellate court found that because defendаnt’s current sentence was entered by a different judge than the one who presided at the trial, the sentencing procedure did not comply with section 5 — 4—1(b) of the Uni- . fied Code of Cоrrections (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1005—4—1(b)). Nevertheless, the appellate court upheld defendant’s current sentence, finding the pertinent provision of section 5 — 4—1(b) unconstitutiоnal. (
The judge who presided at the trial, who directed the verdict regarding the attempted murder charge, and who accepted defendant’s guilty pleas regarding the related charges sentenced defendant (in June 1985) to 12 months’ probation and 60 days’ imprisonment. Subsequently, on December 16, 1985, defendant appeared for a probation violation hearing, which was conducted by a judge other than the one who рresided at the trial. The judge who presided at the trial was no longer sitting as a judge in the Clay County court; he had been assigned elsewhere in the circuit pursuant to a rotation schеdule. The judge presiding at the probation revocation hearing revoked defendant’s initial probation and, in a subsequent sentencing hearing, sentenced him to 24 months’ probatiоn plus 14 months’ periodic imprisonment. The judge imposing this latter sentence later modified it to 12 months’ probation and 12 months’ periodic imprisonment.
Defendant contends that his modified sentence following probation revocation must be vacated. Defendant argues that, since the trial judge was at all relevant times still sitting in the circuit (though not in Clay County), he was requirеd, pursuant to section 5 — 4—1(b) of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1005— 4—1(b)), to preside over the sentencing hearing.
Section 5 — 6—4(3)(h) of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1005—6—4(3)(h)) provides that sentencing after probation revocation shall be governed by section 5— 4 — 1(b) of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1005—4—1(b)). The portion of section 5 — 4—1(b) on which defendant relies states that at a sentencing hearing following a determination of guilt, “[t]he judge who presided at the trial or the judge who accepted the plea of guilty shall impose the sentence unless he is no longer sitting as a judge in that court.” The appellate court accepted defendant’s construction of the quoted portion of section 5 — 4—1(b) but found that the provision, as so construed, violates the separation of powers principle embodied in the Illinois Constitution of 1970. Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, §1.
We find it unnecessary to address the constitutionality of the sectiоn 5 — 4—1(b) provision that the trial judge conduct the sentencing hearing, since the provision has no application to the instant case. The disputed portion of section 5 — 4—1(b) states only that the judge shall conduct the sentencing hearing if he is then still sitting “in that court.” As we construe this language, it refers to the particular division of the particular county court in which the trial was held. Since the judge presiding at defendant’s trial was no longer sitting in the Clay County court when the post-probation-revocation sentencing hearing occurred, he was not rеquired to conduct the sentencing hearing.
Although defendant argues that the disputed provision clearly refers to a circuit court, he cites no authority for this position and we hаve found none. The statute is, in fact, ambiguous, and we therefore rely on certain well-established rules of construction in ascertaining the General Assembly’s intent. In determining that intent we nоte that where, as here, a statute admits of more than one construction, a court may properly consider the consequences of alternative constructiоns, as well as the nature and objects of the statute itself. Andrews v. Foxworthy (1978),
Defendant advocates a construction the consequences of which would substantially disrupt efficient сourt administration. His construction would dictate that the judge who conducted the trial, but who has since moved to the court of a different county within the same circuit, must travel perhaps many miles for the sole purpose of conducting a single sentencing hearing. Similarly, trader defendant’s construction a judge who conducted a criminal trial, but who has since mоved to a different division of either a single or multiple cotraty circuit, would be required to disrupt his schedule to handle a matter wholly unrelated to the type of cases ovеr which he is then presiding. Thus, defendant’s construction would result in substantial inconvenience.
It is well established that a particular statutory construction which would result in great inconvenience or absurd consequences should be avoided unless the General Assembly clearly intended such a construction. (Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co. (1943),
The provision's legislative history also supports our construction. In ascertaining legislative intent, courts may examine the history of the legislatiоn and the course it has taken. (Acme Fireworks Corp. v. Bibb (1955),
We do not dispute that routinely in the circuit courts of this State sentencing is imposed by the same judge who conducted the trial. However, this practice (of which the statute is a codification) has never been invariable and has certainly never dictated that a trial judge return from a distant county or a different division in the same county for the sole purpose of conducting a single sentencing hearing. Consequently, we believe that the General Assembly, in codifying the former practice, did not intend to require a circuit judge to return to a county court or a particular division in which he formerly presided solely to conduct a sentencing hearing.
Wе strictly limit our holding to the construction of the statutory provision in issue here, which deals only with sentencing. We do not address whether the provision is mandatory or permissive, nor do we аddress whether the provision is constitutional. (See People v. Davis (1982),
We find no error in the fact that defendant’s sentence was imposed by a judge other than the judge presiding at his trial. Accordingly, while we hold that the apрellate court should not have addressed the constitutionality of section 5 — 4—1(b) of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1005—4—1(b)), and thus vacate that portion of the decision, we agree with the appellate court’s conclusion that defendant’s sentence must be affirmed.
Affirmed in part; vacated in part; sentence affirmed.