THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROYCE D. EARNEST, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 2-23-0390
Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District
January 23, 2024
2024 IL App (2d) 230390
JUSTICE JORGENSEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Hutchinson and Birkett concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lake County, Nos. 22-CF-157, 23-CF-266, 23-CF-938; the Hon. James K. Booras, Judge, presiding.
Patrick Delfino and David J. Robinson, of State‘s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor‘s Office, of Springfield, for the People.
¶ 1 Defendant, Royce D. Earnest, requests that we vacate the circuit court‘s order granting the State‘s verified petition to deny him pretrial release pursuant to article 110 of the
I. BACKGROUND
¶ 3 On February 12, 2023, defendant was charged in Lake County case No. 23-CF-266 for attempted possession of a controlled substance (
¶ 4 Defendant was incarcerated in the Lake County jail but ordered released with the condition of a $200,000 bond. On September 21, 2023 (three days after the Act became effective), defendant, who remained detained, moved pursuant to sections 110-7.5(b) and 110-5 of the Code (
¶ 5 Six days later, the State filed a verified petition to detain, arguing that the charges in case Nos. 23-CF-266 and 23-CF938 were detainable offenses pursuant to section 110-6.1 of the Code (
¶ 6 On October 2, 2023, the circuit court held a hearing, first addressing defendant‘s motion to strike. Defendant argued that the State‘s petition to detain was untimely since more than 21 days had passed since his arrest. He also asserted that he had not been arrested for any of the enumerated detainable offenses under the Act‘s dangerousness standard. The State conceded this point, and the dangerousness argument was stricken. The court then found that the State‘s petition was timely because the Act had just become effective.
¶ 7 The court then proceeded with the State‘s petition to detain. The State noted “for context” that there was an underlying petition to revoke defendant‘s probation in case No. 22-CF-157 because defendant had been subsequently charged in case No. 23-CF-266. It asserted, twofold, that it was seeking to revoke because of defendant‘s subsequent arrests or, alternatively, detain defendant because there was a risk of flight evidenced by case No. 23-CF-938, where defendant fled on foot after leading police on a vehicle chase. Defense counsel objected to the State‘s request for relief based on an alleged violation of probation without “additional filings by the State” and, instead, asserted that the only proper issue before the court was the State‘s petition to detain based on the risk of willful flight.
¶ 8 The court found that it could sua sponte detain defendant “in a situation where the defendant is on probation and gets arrested for a Class A or greater [offense].” Additionally, the court determined that, based on the State‘s proffer, defendant‘s running from police officers, his previous failures to appear, and the fact that he was on probation and incurred new felony offenses, it would detain defendant due to his risk of willful flight. The court also concluded that the evidence and presumption were great that defendant committed the alleged offenses, there was no condition or combination of conditions that would mitigate the threat defendant posed to the community, and there were specific and articulable facts that indicated that defendant would engage in willful flight from prosecution.
¶ 9 Repeatedly, defense counsel noted that the violation of probation was not addressed in the petition to detain; the court had not been given a proffer on the State‘s petition regarding the facts supporting detention, the applicable law, or the willfulness standard; and the State had not filed anything in this case regarding the alleged violation of probation. Moreover, counsel addressed the court‘s failure to hear a proffer by the defense before issuing its ruling. Overall, the court concluded that the State‘s petition, in combination with defendant‘s violation of probation, supported detention. The court entered a written order reflecting that defendant was ordered detained because of his risk of willful flight. Counsel‘s motion pursuant to section 110-5 was never addressed.
¶ 11 On December 8, 2023, defendant filed a memorandum in support of his appeal, and on December 26, 2023, the State responded.
II. ANALYSIS
¶ 13 Defendant argues that the circuit court erred in granting the State‘s petition to detain because the Code does not contemplate the State‘s filing of such petitions against incarcerated defendants who were ordered released but subsequently held on the condition of depositing financial surety. Rather, he contends, the court should have held a hearing under section 110-5 of the Code concerning his conditions of release.
¶ 14 As for the standard of review, we employ a bifurcated standard, in which the court‘s factual findings are reviewed under a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard and the court‘s ultimate findings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v. Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d) 230317, ¶ 13. A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only where the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent or if the finding is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented. In re Jose A., 2018 IL App (2d) 180170, ¶ 17. An abuse of discretion occurs only when the circuit court‘s decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the circuit court. People v. Williams, 2022 IL App (2d) 200455, ¶ 52. Additionally, to the extent our consideration involves the Code‘s construction, our review is de novo. People v. Kurzeja, 2023 IL App (3d) 230434, ¶ 10.
A. Forfeiture
¶ 16 As a threshold matter, we note that defendant moved to strike the State‘s petition to detain in the circuit court but on a different basis from that presented here. To evade forfeiture, defendant frames his first issue as ineffective assistance of counsel or second-prong plain error. Additionally, the State responds that all defendant‘s claims are forfeited because the notice of appeal was insufficient, as it did not indicate the grounds for relief. Of course, ” ‘forfeiture is
¶ 17 We do not think it unreasonable that defendant did not raise his arguments below, given that the State and defendant filed their petitions when the procedures and provisions at issue were recently enacted (indeed, the Act became effective mere days earlier), the cases now relied on by the parties were not yet decided, and defendant quickly initiated this appeal. Thus, we do not think applying forfeiture here serves the interest of creating or maintaining a sound body of precedent. We are inclined to relax forfeiture in this case, as it raises important issues in the developing body of law under this new statutory regime. See id. However, regardless of forfeiture, defendant‘s statutory-authority claim fails because, as the following will show, there is no error. See People v. Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d 52, 65 (2008) (noting that the first step in a plain-error analysis is to determine whether error occurred at all, because if there was no error, there can be no plain error); People v. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d 307, 329 (2000) (“[I]t is not incompetence of counsel to refrain from raising issues which, in his or her judgment, are without merit, unless counsel‘s appraisal of the merits is patently wrong.“); see also People v. Ivory, 217 Ill. App. 3d 619, 625 (1991) (finding no ineffective assistance of counsel because there was no error).
¶ 18 Moreover, the State‘s claim that defendant simply checked boxes in the notice of appeal and did not support his claims for relief with facts or argument is disingenuous. Defense counsel provided an addendum to the notice of appeal that provided facts, arguments, and citations of case law that supported defendant‘s grounds for relief.
B. The State‘s Statutory Authority to Petition to Detain
¶ 20 Defendant argues that the State did not have the authority, under the Code, to petition to detain him and, thus, the court‘s order detaining him should be vacated. Defendant asserts that his situation is addressed in section 110-7.5 of the Code. See
¶ 21 Defendant cites Rios, 2023 IL App (5th) 230724, as authority. There, the defendant similarly remained in detention after the effective date of the Act subject to the condition of
¶ 22 Here, defendant moved to remove the financial surety as a condition of his pretrial release and requested the consideration of alternative conditions for release, if necessary.
C. Defendant‘s Pretrial Detention Hearing
¶ 24 Defendant next argues that the circuit court erred in denying him pretrial release. He contends that the State provided an inadequate proffer to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that he had a high likelihood of willful flight and contends that he was denied a fair hearing because he was not provided an opportunity to be heard. Moreover, he asserts the State failed to present evidence, and the court failed to make findings, regarding the imposition of alternatives to pretrial detention that could have mitigated defendant‘s risk of flight. We agree. Accordingly, we vacate the court‘s detention order and remand this cause for a new hearing on defendant‘s motion to remove financial conditions.
¶ 25 The Act amended the Code by abolishing traditional monetary bail in favor of pretrial release on personal recognizance or with conditions of release.
¶ 26 Here, the State sought to prove defendant should not be released under section 110-6.1(a)(8)(B) (willful flight) of the Code (
¶ 27 Our analysis here is simple, as the State did not present any evidence (and the circuit court did not make any findings) regarding whether any condition or combination of conditions would mitigate defendant‘s risk of willful flight. At the hearing, the State provided “context,” not a proffer,4 which failed to address its burden of proof, the class of the qualifying offense, any repeated instances to evade prosecution, or evidence showing that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate defendant‘s risk of flight from prosecution. Instead, the State merely indicated that there was a pending petition to revoke in case No. 22-CF-157 because, while defendant was on probation in that case, he was charged in case No. 23-CF-266. It also stated that defendant was a flight risk because, in May 2023, while he was still on probation, he was charged in case No. 23-CF-938 after he fled a traffic stop. The record also shows that the petition to revoke was not included in the State‘s petition to detain, and any failures to appear included in the public safety assessment were not admitted. There was also no discussion of conditions of release other than detention or argument indicating why conditions of release would be inappropriate.
¶ 28 Based on the State‘s “context,” the court found that it could sua sponte detain defendant because he was on probation and was arrested for an offense greater than a Class A misdemeanor. The court repeatedly reiterated that it detained defendant on this basis (presumably pursuant to section 110-6(a) (
¶ 29 On remand, the record should reflect that defendant filed the originating motion to reconsider conditions of release. See
¶ 30 In making its determination, the circuit court should consider the many overlapping factors discussed in sections 110-5(a) and 110-6.1(g), including (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged; (2) the weight of the evidence against the defendant; (3) the history and characteristics of the defendant5; (4) the nature and seriousness of the specific, real, and present threat to any person that would be posed by the defendant‘s release; (5) the nature and seriousness of the risk of obstructing or attempting to obstruct the criminal justice process; (6) the age and physical condition of the complaining witness; (7) whether defendant is known to possess or have access to any weapons; (8) whether, at the time of the offense at issue or arrest, defendant “was on probation, parole, aftercare release, mandatory supervised release or other release from custody pending trial, sentencing, appeal or completion of sentence for an offense under federal or state law“; and (9) any other factors that have a reasonable bearing upon defendant‘s propensity or reputation for violent, abusive, or assaultive behavior or lack of such behavior.
¶ 31 If the court concludes that detention is appropriate, it must make written findings summarizing the court‘s reasons for detention, including why less restrictive conditions would not avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community,
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 33 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is vacated and the cause remanded for further proceedings in compliance with the foregoing procedures.
Order vacated; cause remanded.