delivered the opinion of the court:
On November 3, 1975, defendant, Douglas B. Dunn, was issued a traffic citation and complaint alleging that he had cоmmitted the offense of failure to signal when required in violation of section 11 — 804(b) of the Illinois Vehicle Cоde (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 95/2, par. 11 — 804(b)). Defendant subsequently entered a plea of not guilty to this charge and requested to be tried by the court.
A bench trial followed on December 17, 1975. After hearing the evidence, thе trial court found the defendant guilty of the offense charged. The court then proceeded tо impose a sentence of 2 years’ probation. Conditions attached to this probation by thе court included a provision that the defendant serve 3 days in the county jail and a provision that defendant “keep a personal appearance (including hair length and clothes) approved by the Probation Officer.”
After imposing the above sentence, the trial court then ordered defendant to get a short haircut and return to the court before noon on that same day. Defendant complied and the trial judge reduced the condition of 3 days in jail to 1 day. A mittimus was issued, but was stayеd by the trial judge pending appeal. This court later granted defendant’s motion to stay that portion of the probation order requiring defendant to keep a personal appearance approved by the probation officer and requiring him to have a short haircut.
On appeal defendant asserts that he was denied the right to be represented by counsel at trial and аt the sentencing hearing. He also raises a number of issues concerning sentence.
The People have confessed error as to defendant’s contention that he was denied the right to be rеpresented by counsel at trial. We agree. (See Argersinger v. Hamlin (1972),
Defendant further argues that the cause should not be remanded to the trial court. We do not agree. Where an accused hаs been denied a constitutional right, the proper remedy is to grant him a new trial. (People v. Nelson (1960),
Finally, defendant has raised questions concerning the sentence imposed by the trial court. More particularly, hе asserts that the trial judge improperly ordered him to get his hair cut, and imposed as a condition оf probation the requirement that he maintain the length of his hair, and his appearance, in a mаnner approved by his probation officer. Because this question is likely to reoccur, we will сonsider it.
Section 5 — 6—3 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 1005 — 6—3) provides the conditions which may be imposed when a sentence of probation is ordered. Without setting forth this entire section, suffice it to say that none of the conditions include the regulation of the length of the person’s hair or his personal appearance. While the section does appear to provide for conditions other than those specifically listed (see section 5 — 6—3(b)), there must be some connection between the condition and the crime charged. (People v. Brown (1971),
• 3 Furthermore, the supreme court has recently considered the propriety of the imposition of penalties not prescribed by the General Assembly. In Peoplе v. Breen (1976),
“In imposing sentence, a judge should follow the law and should not compel persons brought before him to submit to some act or discipline without аuthority of law, whether or not he may think it would have a beneficial corrective influence. He should endeavor to conform to a reasonable standard of punishment and should not seek popularity or publicity either by exceptional severity or by undue leniency.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110A, par. 61(c)(18).)
We therefore conclude that the trial court was without authority to impose conditions of probation concerning defendant’s hair length and personal appearance.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Woodford County is reversed and the cause is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
CRAVEN, P. J., and GREEN, J., concur.