161 Mich. 45 | Mich. | 1910
Respondents were informed against for the crime defined in 3 Comp. Laws, § 11484, were convicted and sentenced to prison for life. The exceptions, relied upon will be noticed in the order of their presentation in the brief for respondents.
“In that connection let me say that the defendants have taken the stand in their own behalf, as it was their legal right to do. You, as sole, exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses, may, if you want to, believe them; but I feel it is my duty to say to you that, because they are the defendants, they are under strong inducement to tell that story which will most redound to their advantage.
“ Now, in determining what amount of credence you are to give to the story of any particular witness, you should, as reasonable men, consider the reasonableness of the story told, and you should, as far as their antecedents appear in evidence, consider their antecedents as bearing; upon their credibility. It goes without saying, that you are to consider the fact that a man has hitherto been convicted of a crime, and has served time for the commission of crime, as bearing upon his credibility; as bearing upon the amount of credence you want to give to his statements under oath.”
No reference was made in the charge to the position of the witness Rankowsky as an accomplice in the commission of crime. It does not appear that Rankowsky had been promised or that he expected immunity. He had been returned to Jackson prison to serve out an unexpired sentence. He admitted having given to the officers the information that respondents participated in the commission of the crime, stating as well that he had nothing to do with it, admitted having had trouble with one of the respondents about a week after the rob
It is the long settled rule in this State that the credibility of an accomplice, like that of any other witness, is a question exclusively for the jury. And while there have been intimations, rather than rulings, to the effect that it is proper, or is not improper, especially in cases where an accomplice is the sole witness upon a material point, for the trial court to direct the attention of the jury to the circumstance and invite the exercise of caution upon the part of the jury, we know of no decision of this court in which it is held or intimated that the failure of the court to indulge in voluntary comment is ground for reversal. The difficulties which are liable to attend upon comments upon testimony are illustrated in People v. Murray, 72 Mich. 10 (40 N. W. 29), and in People v. Clarke, 105 Mich. 169 (62 N. W. 1117). It is true that in People v. Jenness, 5 Mich. 805, 330, it is spoken of as a duty of the court. The question was not involved, and the language was employed to indicate the limit of comment rather than to state a duty. In People v. Hubbard, 92 Mich. 322, 325 (52 N. W. 729), reference is made to People v. Jenness in ruling that a specific request should have been given. The general subject was discussed in the opinion in People v. Wallin, 55 Mich. 497, 505 (22 N. W. 15), in connection with a general request made by the defense to the trial judge that he point out to the jury the circumstances tending to discredit a witness which the court refused to do. It was said:
“We repeat that instructions respecting the credibility of witnesses, which involve no question of law, are not matter of right. The judge is under no obligation to comment upon the facts; he may, if he chooses, confine himself strictly to laying down such rules of law as must guide the action of the jury, and leave the facts to them*49 without a word of comment. In many cases this is no doubt the desirable course. And it is always within the discretion of the judge to adopt it.”
This contention of respondents is overruled.
There is no error, and the judgment is affirmed.