Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of uttering and publishing a forged instrument, MCL 750.249; MSA 28.446, and conspiracy to utter and publish a forged instrument, MCL 750.157a; MSA 28.354(1). He subsequently pleaded guilty of being an habitual offender, third offense, MCL 769.11; MSA 28.1083. Defendant was sentenced to seven to twenty-eight years’ imprisonment for the convictions. He appeals his convictions and sentence as of right. The peoрle cross appeal the sentence by delayed leave granted. We affirm in part and remand in part.
Defendаnt first contends that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to impeach defendant with evidence of a рrior unarmed robbery conviction. The record indicates that the court’s ruling on the admissibility of the conviction was made on April 6, 1989. Because defendant has not provided a transcript of the April 6 proceedings, we deem the issue abandоned.
People v Dwight Johnson,
Defendant’s next claim, that the jury’s verdict was against the great weight of the evidence, is likewise not preserved for аppellate review because defendant did not move for a new trial.
People v Richard Johnson,
Defendant also claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict because the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. When reviewing a challenge to the
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sufficiency of the evidence, this Court views the evidence in a light most favorable to thе prosecution to determine if a rational trier of fact could have found that the elements of the crime werе proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
People v Hampton,
Viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence in this сase indicated that Cherie Skeens obtained the complainant’s checkbook without his consent and gave it to Jimmy Williаms. Williams, in turn, approached defendant about a stolen check. Defendant agreed to cash the check оffered by Williams, and the two went to a bank. There, defendant presented to a teller a $200 check payable to dеfendant and drawn on the complainant’s account, and the teller cashed it. Defendant and Williams each kept $100.
The elements of uttering and publishing require that the defendant knew the instrument was false, that he had an intent to defraud, and that he prеsented the forged instrument for payment.
People v Hammond,
Defendant’s remaining arguments concern his sentence of 7 to 28 years or 84 to 336 months. Defendant’s claim, that this’ sentence was an abuse of disсretion under
People v Milbourn,
435 Mich
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630;
Defendant further claims that the court’s articulation of the reasons for the sentence wаs insufficient. In light of the court’s expressed reliance on the guidelines’ recommendation, we reject this claim. Id.
The people contend that the trial court erred in ruling that defendant’s sentence could not run consecutively to an existing sеntence defendant was serving for possession of a short-barreled shotgun. We agree.
The instant uttering and publishing offenses were committed on February 8, 1988. Approximately one year earlier, defendant had pleaded guilty of possession оf a short-barreled shotgun. Sentencing was delayed, and defendant was released on bond. Defendant absconded, and bоnd was revoked in December 1987, approximately two months before the instant offenses. Defendant was ultimately sentenced for the shotgun offense in April 1988, approximately two months after he committed the offenses at issue here.
*267 At sentenсing in this case, the people requested the court to make defendant’s sentence consecutive to his sentеnce for the shotgun offense. The judge declined to do so, because he believed that the consecutive sentencing statute, MCL 768.7b; MSA 28.1030(2), applied only to persons who committed a subsequent offense while on bond for a pending offense.
We agree with the people that the trial court erred in failing to recognize that it had the discretion to impose a consecutive sentence. At the time the instant offenses were committed, MCL 768.7b; MSA 28.1030(2) authorized consecutive sentencing, at the discretion of the trial court, where a felony offense was committed "pending the disposition” of a prior felony charge. The statute did not require that the defendant be on bond for the prior offense when the subsequent offense toоk place. A case is "pending disposition” until the defendant is sentenced for the offense. See
People v Smith,
Because the trial judge failed to recognize that he had the discretion to order the sentence in this casе to run consecutively to defendant’s existing sentence, we remand for a determination whether, in the court’s discretion, defendant’s sentences should be served consecutively.
Affirmed in part and remanded in part. We retain no further jurisdiction.