174 Mich. 214 | Mich. | 1913
The respondent was convicted in the Ingham circuit court for selling, giving, and furnishing lager beer to three persons, Weaver, Watkins, and Hasbrook, in violation of the so-called local-option law.
It was the claim of respondent throughout the trial that he simply acted as an agent for Weaver in obtaining the beer; that when the order was accepted by the brewing company, and delivery of the beer was made to the railway company in Toledo, the title to the two cases passed to Weaver, and that he had no interest in the beer other than to accommodate his neighbor. The entire defense of respondent was made along these lines, and his counsel endeavored by appropriate requests to get his case submitted to the jury upon this theory. The trial court refused the requests, and upon his own motion charged the jury upon this phase of the case that:
*216 “ Now, gentlemen, I charge you that if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Driver took George Weaver’s order for beer, and whether the money was paid then or afterwards makes no difference, and that Byron Driver ordered this beer from the brewing company in Toledo, using his own name, and that the beer was shipped over the line of the railroad to Byron Driver in the name of Mr. Driver, and that Mr. Driver afterwards received this beer from the railroad company, signing his name to the receipt, and that either then and there or afterwards at his home furnished the beer to George Weaver or Ray Watkins or Clifford Hasbrook or any of them, he was the agent of George Weaver — that is, he was the active intentional means of supplying this beer to George Weaver or Ray Watkins or Clifford Hasbrook or any of them — and then, in that case, he should be deemed to be the furnisher of the beer, and did furnish it against the terms of the statute without regard to the amount paid or where paid. If you find these facts beyond a reasonable doubt, Mr. Driver is guilty, and you must return that verdict.”
The course adopted by the respondent in ordering beer for himself was not in violation of the local-option law. People v. Brewing Co., 166 Mich. 292 (131 N. W. 557, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 981). This is on the theory that the contract is executed where the order is received, and where the sale may be lawfully made. It has been held by this court that one may go into another county, purchase liquor, and bring it into a local-option county for another without incurring the penalty of the law. People v. Tart, 169 Mich. 586 (135 N. W. 307).
Had respondent driven to Toledo and purchased the beer, and brought it home in his wagon and delivered it to Weaver, we would have the exact legal situation that was presented by Tart’s Case. If one may bring beer into a local-option county for another without violating the statute, it does not occur to us why he may not send for it for another, providing, of course, that it is done in good faith, and with no interest in the beer other than a desire to serve his neighbor or as a carrier. If the testimony offered on behalf of the respondent was true, the
Some of the testimony bearing upon the agency and good faith of respondent was in conflict, and his guilt was, therefore, a question for the jury to determine under all the testimony.
The conviction will be set aside, and a new trial granted.