112 Mich. App. 589 | Mich. Ct. App. | 1982
Lead Opinion
In 1973, defendant pled guilty in Eaton County Circuit Court to a charge of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317; MSA 28.549. He was subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment. On September 29, 1980, defendant filed a motion for resentencing with the trial court alleging the trial judge had considered previous felony convictions of defendant at which defendant was not represented by counsel. The trial judge acknowledged that he was in error at the time of sentencing by considering a previous conviction on the defendant’s record
On December 12, 1980, the trial court informed the parties that he had decided at the time of the previous day’s sentencing to impose a sentence of from 20 to 40 years but that in actually pronouncing the sentence he misspoke himself and stated the sentence incorrectly. Defendant appeals by right from the sentencing of December 12, 1980.
"The Court: Mr. Dotson, you are here, not at the motion of the prosecutor or of your attorney, but on my motion to correct a misstatement which I made in sentencing you yesterday.
"During our discussion in chambers, it was directed at reducing your sentence from life to a maximum of 40 years and a minimum of 20 years. I did this with the idea in mind that the minimum of 20 years would make you eligible for parole in the area of somewhere in 10 years. But when I got in the courtroom, I misspoke myself. I sentenced you to a maximum of 20 years and a minimum of 10 years, and I’m here to correct that statement.
"Now I’ll listen to anything your attorney may want to say on your behalf.
"Mr. Stiles?”
Under the facts of the instant case, the interests of justice will not be thwarted by allowing the trial judge to correct a mistake, honestly made, in pronouncing sentence.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the constitution does not require that
There is also no statutory prohibition to the actions taken by the trial judge herein. In the absence of any constitutional or statutory prohibition, the case law must be examined.
As a general rule of law, once a sentence has been imposed and the defendant placed in the custody of the proper authorities, the court loses its power to resentence that individual. People v Meservey, 76 Mich 223; 42 NW 1133 (1889), In re Richards, 150 Mich 421; 114 NW 348 (1907). The action taken by the trial judge herein did not constitute a resentence. The judge did not call defendant to his courtroom to impose a new and different sentence based upon events transpiring subsequent to the original pronouncement. Meservey, supra. His actions merely reflect a recognition on his part that he had misspoken himself and an attempt to impose a sentence which was at all times the sentence intended.
The record reflects that a discussion was held in chambers between the judge and counsel for both parties on the day defendant was sentenced. Defendant’s counsel was also present at the time sentence was pronounced and on the following day when the judge corrected his earlier misstatement. The judge stated that he had indicated his intent during the in-chambers discussion to impose a prison term of from 20 to 40 years. At no time, either before the trial judge or now on appeal, did counsel indicate or even imply that the trial judge incorrectly related the substance of that discussion or that the 20- to. 40-year term was not, in fact, the intended sentence.
Defendant was convicted properly in 1973 of second-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. After his resentencing, he remained in prison. The judge recognized his misstatement on
The record sufficiently demonstrates that the trial judge simply made an honest mistake in pronouncing sentence and that the sentence subsequently pronounced merely corrected that misstatement. The record also sufficiently demonstrates that the 20- to 40-year sentence was that which the trial judge, at all times, considered to be a fair and just term of imprisonment and which he intended to impose.
Affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. I am convinced that the trial judge in fact did make an honest mistake, and I accept as truth the explanation given by the judge. I find, however, that as a matter of policy I am reluctant to accept this type of correction because it would open the door to possible abuse in future cases and would undermine the finality of sentencing.
Accordingly, I would reverse the resentencing of from 20 to 40 years and reinstate the 10- to 20-year sentence.