75 N.Y.S. 350 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1902
Lead Opinion
The determination of this appeal depends upon the constitutionality of the amendments to the Greater Yew York charter enacted by the Legislature of 1901, providing that the city magistrates in the second division of the city of Yew York should be elected instead of being appointed by the mayor.
Under the Greater Yew York charter as originally enacted (Laws of 1897, chap. 378) the city of Yew York was divided into two divisions for the purposes of the administration of criminal justice. The first division comprised the boroughs of Manhattan and the Bronx; the second division comprised the boroughs of Brooklyn, Queens and Richmond. (§ 1390.)
At. the time of the enactment of the original Greater Yew York charter the office of city magistrate already existed in the former city of Yew York, having been established by chapter 601 of the Laws of 1895. The charter provided that the city magistrates in office when it took effect should continue to hold office until the expiration of their respective terms, and should be known as the city magistrates of the first division. It further provided that their successors should be appointed in the same manner as provided in the act of 1895. That act provided that they were to be appointed by the mayor, and should hold office for a term of ten years. The charter conferred upon the city magistrates thus continued in office and their successors the same.power and jurisdiction which they had by law upon December 31, 1897. (§ 1392.)
The charter then proceeded to provide for the office of city magistrate in the second division. The police justices in the former
The powers of the city magistrates whose continuance in office of appointment was thus provided for, were dealt with in section 1396 of the original Greater New York charter in these words: “The said magistrates appointed or continued in office pursuant to this title, shall have and exercise within the said second. division such powers as are conferred by law upon the city magistrates in the city of New York by chapter six hundred and one of the laws of eighteen hundred and ninety-five and the acts amending the same, except as herein otherwise provided.”
There was thus established a uniform system for the selection of city magistrates in both divisions of the Greater New York. After the expiration of the terms of those who were expressly continued in office, their successors were to be appointed by the mayor for terms of ten years each. Generally speaking, their powers were those formerly possessed by police justices in the old city of New York. As has already been seen, the charter referred to their powers as having been conferred upon them by the act of 1895. Referring to that act, we find that section 3 thereof provides as follows : “ On and after the first day of July, eighteen hundred and ninety-five, the city magistrates appointed pursuant to this act shall have and shall exercise all the powers and jurisdiction, not inconsistent with the provisions of this act, which, on the thirtieth day of June, eighteen hundred and ninety-five, shall be vested by law in the police justices, except proceedings respecting bastards.” (Laws of 1895, chap. 601, § 3.) On the date thus specified the general provisions of law in force relating to the police courts and police
This section indicates that a city magistrate was authorized to exercise some functions over and above those of a mere committing magistrate. He could try and determine the guilt of persons charged with intoxication or disorderly conduct, and in case of conviction'impose a fine or sentence of imprisonment. To this extent he exercised the power of a court; and, in fact and law, held a court of inferior criminal jurisdiction within the meaning of the Constitution. It is to be noted that in the New York City Consolidation Act the tribunals over which the police justices presided were denominated “ police courts,” and that in the act of 1895, as well as in the Greater New York charter, the word “court,” as applicable to the tribunal over which a city magistrate presides, frequently occurs. (Laws of 1895, chap. 601, §§ 4, 5, 8; Laws of 1897, chap. 378, §§ 1398, 1400.) Furthermore, in the case of Koch v. Mayor (152 N. Y. 72, 86), in which the Court of Appeals sustained the constitutionality of the act of 1895, which abolished the office of police justice and created the. office of city magistrate in the former city of New York, the tribunal of the city magistrates is spoken of as “ the new court.”
In 1901, when the Legislature came to revise the Greater New York charter (by chapter 466 of the laws of that year), it provided, for the election of city magistrates within the borough of Brooklyn in lieu of their appointment. “ At the general election to be held in the borough of Brooklyn in the year nineteen hundred and one,” says section 1392 of the revised Greater New York charter, “ there shall be elected in each congressional district, as then constituted in said borough, one city magistrate, and in the territory constituting the borough of Brooklyn there shall be- elected two city magistrates at large, and the terms of office of all said city magistrates so elected
Under this provision the election of city magistrates therein provided for took place in 1901; and the result of the canvass showed the election of one magistrate each in the six several congressional districts comprised within the borough of Brooklyn, and two magistrates voted for by the electors in the borough at large. The right of the persons thus chosen was questioned by the city magistrates holding office in the borough of Brooklyn at the time of the election by virtue of appointments from the mayor under the original Greater Hew York charter. The Attorney-General instituted the present action to settle the controversy which arose between the two sets of claimants. Four of the persons who had been appointed city magistrates by the mayor under the. original Greater Hew York charter, Messrs. Dooley, Furlong, Haumer and O’Reilly, interposed an answer setting up the unconstitutionality of the legislation changing the method of selection from the appointive to the elective System. The Attorney-General demurred to their answer, and the ' demurrer has been overruled at the Special Term. From the interlocutory judgment entered upon the decision there, the Attorney-General has appealed to the Appellate Division.
It should be noted here that the four respondents whose contention that the charter amendment is unconstitutional lias been sustained in the court below, were appointed by the mayor under peculiar circumstances. The amendment of 1901 not only provided that city magistrates in Brooklyn should he elected instead of' being appointed, but also assumed to extend the terms of four city-magistrates in office when it took effect. The terms of these officers expired on the last day of April, 1901; but the amendment purported to extend their terms until January 1,1902. (Laws of 1901, chap. 466, § 1392.) This provision was held to be unconstitutional in a mandamus proceeding heard before Mr. Justice Gaynoe, whose decision to that effect seems to have been acquiesced in by all parties concerned. (Matter of Kelly v. Van Wyck, 35 Misc. Rep. 210.) A writ of mandamus was' granted^ commanding the mayor to appoint the successors of the- four persons whose terms expired on April 30, 1901, and, in compliance with the writ, Mayor Van
The constitutional provision which is alleged to have been violated by the enactment of the amendment in question here, is the last clause of section 17 of article 6 of the Constitution of 1894, which reads as follows.: “ The electors of the several towns shall, at their annual town meetings, or at such other time and in such manner as the Legislature may direct, elect justices of the peace, whose term of office shall be four years. In case of an election to fill a vacancy occurring before the expiration of a full term, they shall hold for the residue of the unexpired term. Their number and classification may be regulated by law. Justices of the peace and judges or justices of inferior courts not of record, and their clerks, may be removed for cause, after due notice and an opportunity of being heard, by such courts as are or may be prescribed by law. Justices of the peace and district court justices may be elected in the different cities of this State in such manner, and with such powers, and for such terzns, respectively, as are or shall be prescribed by law ; all other judicial officers in cities, whose election or appointment is not otherwise provided for in this article, shall be chosen by the electors of such cities, or appointed by some local authorities thereof.” The argument is that the city magistrates provided for in the charter are judicial officers in cities whose election or appointment is not otherwise provided for in article 6 of the Constitution ; that hence the command that such judicial officers shall be chosen by the electors of such cities or appointed by some local authorities thereof, becomes applicable; and that where the Legislature determines that the choice shall be made by election, all the electors in the city in which the officers are to exercise jurisdiction must be
It is also argued that the. last clause of section 17 of article 6 of the present Constitution contemplates a. uniform system for the selection of the same, class of judicial officers throughout a single city, and that it is not competent for the Legislature to provide as to a number of judicial officers of the same class that a portion of them in one part of the city shall be selected by appointment, and another in another part of the city be chosen by popular election.
The. phrase “ the electors of such cities ” is a broad one, without qualification or limitation in the clause in which it occurs, and is certainly comprehensive enoiigh to include all the persons entitled to vote within the municipality. I do .not well see how it can be given any effect less than tins without adding to the- Constitution something which we do not find in it. The language is not ambiguous, and there seems no .reason for restricting it or holding that it can apply to the electors of a part only of a city, when, if the intention thus to limit it had existed on the part of the Constitutional Convention, it would have been so easy to express that intention in a manner that would prevent all possibility of doubt on the subject. The purpose in view in framing the clause of section 1Y, under consideration, appears to me to be perfectly plain; it was to entitle all the electors, within the territorial jurisdiction of the city,- judicial officers therein mentioned, to the right to take part in choosing such' officers in casé the Legislature determined that they should be chosen by election", rather than by appointment. If this view is not correct, it is difficult to see why the Legislature might not provide for the election by .the voters in the borough of Richmond alone of city magistrates whose jurisdiction should extend all over the territory of the Greater Hew York.
This construction, however, is assailed on various, grounds. It is suggested, in the first place, that the last " clause of section 17 of article 6 in the. present Constitution has no application at all to the
In Curtin v. Barton (supra), however, the Court of Appeals distinctly refused to determine the question whether the provision of the Constitution under consideration was restricted in its application to tribunals and officers in existence at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, and there is nothing in what was said on the subject in that case to indicate which construction the Court of Appeals-deemed preferable. Under these circumstances, we must determine the question with the aid of the best light we can get, and I am strongly inclined to think that the clause under discussion should be deemed operative not only upon city judicial officers whose offices-were already in existence, but upon those whose offices might thereafter be created. The general rule is that the operation of a Constitution is prospective (Cooley Const. Lim. [6th ed.] 77); and where the courts have held otherwise and given the fundamental law a retrospective effect, or confined its operations only to a condition of things existing at the time of its adoption, this has been, done because the intent thus to limit the effect of the constitutional provision has been clearly manifest either in the instrument itself or is distinctly inferable from the existing conditions with which the framers of the Constitution were attempting to deal. Thus, in the cases of People v. Draper (15 N. Y. 532) and New York Fire Department v. Atlas Steamship Co. (106 id. 566), the constitutional provision under consideration (Const. of 1846, art. 10, § 2) distinguished clearly between officers whose offices then existed “ and all officers whose offices may hereafter be created by law,” so-as to leave absolutely no doubt that the officers referred to in the
■ But it is argued that even if it be conceded that section 17 of article 6 applies to the office of city magistrate, we must read that section in connection with section 18, which, is said to. be in pari materia with it, and that such reading forbids the conclusion reached by the court below. '
Section 18, so far as applicable to the questions under consideration here, provides as follows: “ Inferior local courts of civil and criminal jurisdiction may be established by the Legislature, but no inferior local court hereafter created shall be a court of record, * * * Except as herein otherwise provided, all judicial officers .shall be elected or appointed at such times and in such manner as the Legislature may direct.” City magistrates, we are told, are judges of inferior local courts, created under section 18, and its language, therefore,, applies to them. I agree that the tribunals over which they preside are inferior local courts, within the meaning of section 18 of the Constitution, but it does not follow that they are to be elected or appointed in such manner as the Legislature may direct, under the provisions of the last clause of such, section. That, clause is qualified by the introductory .phrase “ except as herein otherwise provided.” This exception cannot be disregarded, and when we look back we find that so far as judicial officers in cities are concerned, with the exception of justices of the peace and district court justices, the requirement is that they shall be chosen by the electors of such cities or appointed by some local authorities thereof. As was pointed out by Mr. Justice Mabean in the case of People ex rel. Joyce v. Guden (printed in the appeal book" herein), the exception in section 18 excludes the cases provided for in section 17.
Again, it is contended that if the judgment below is correct, the organization of the present Municipal Court in the city of Mew York is unconstitutional, because the justices are elected in specified districts in the city and exercise their functions in various other districts. So, also, it is suggested that the former system of district courts in the old city of Mew York must also, on the same principle, be deem.ed to have been unconstitutional. This argument, I think,
By the Greater New York charter (§ 1345) the City Court of New York was continued,.11 and said court and the justices thereof shall have the same powers and jurisdiction as are now conferred upon them by law.” The justices of this court are chosen only by electors in the territory which comprised the old city of New York before consolidation ; and it is suggested that a construction of the last clause of
This argument I would answer thus: The word “cities,” as employed in that section, refers to municipalities existing as cities at the time provision was originally made by law for the establishment of the court or the creation of the judicial office; and a statute providing for the choice of such judicial officers by the electors throughout the whole, territory of such a city is not rendered unconstitutional by the subsequent incorporation of that city in a larger one, so long as the jurisdiction of the court and its judges remains confined to the territory in which the judges are voted for.
From 1848 until 1873 the police justices of the old city of New York were elected in separate judicial districts and assigned by the common council to sit in the various police courts in rotation. (Laws of 1848, chap. 153, §§ 7, 8.) Their offices were rendered appointive by chapter 538 of the Laws of 1873. In behalf of the appellants it is said that this system of the election of police justices by districts in the old city óf New York must have been null and' void from 1848 to 1873, if the respondents are right in their posh tion. here. "This does not seem to me to be a correct deduction from the facts. During the entire period up to the time when the amended judiciary article of 1869 went into effect, the Constitution of the .State contained the provision already quoted in reference to another point, to the effect that all judicial officers of cities and villages and all such judicial officers as might be created therein by law, should be elected at such times and in such manner as the Legislature "might direct. (Const. of 1846, art. 6, § 18.). This authorized the election of the police justices in the city of New York by districts, and if the system at any time became obnoxious to the fundamental law, it was not until January 1, 1870, when the amended judiciary article of 1869 took effect; and the appointive system, which was substituted therefor, and was clearly constitutional, went into effect shortly after the passage of the act of 1873. (May 17, 1873.) ■
The other provision cited is contained in section 3 of article 12, which relates to thé election of city officers, and the main purpose of which is to regulate the times at which the elections of such officers shall be held. The only portion of the section material to the present inquiry reads as follows : “ All elections of city officers, including supervisors and j ndicial officers of inferior local courts, elected in any city or part of a city, and of county officers elected in the counties of New York and Kings, and in all counties whose boundaries are the same as those of a city, except to fill vacancies, shall be held on the Tuesday succeeding the first Monday in November in an odd-numbered year, and the term of every such officer shall expire at the end of an odd-numbered year.” The phrase part of a city ” in this section is referred to as indicating that the Legislature may authorize the election of judicial officers of inferior local courts in cities for a subdivision of a municipality, and that it is not required where such officers are elected to enable all the electors in the city to participate in the election. Full effect, however, may be given to the phrase by regarding it as a qualification applying only to city officers and supervisors who are chosen in parts of a city; and it should not be regarded as applicable to judicial officers of inferior local courts, in view of the. preceding provision of the Constitution contained in section 17 of article 6 regarding the manner in which judicial officers in cities must be «chosen.
This brings us to another question suggested by the amendatory legislation, the constitutionality of which is here attacked. May mot the Legislature provide for the establishment of inferior local
The congressional districts in the borough of Brooklyn in which the large number of city magistrates of the second division were respectively to be chosen are not recognized territorial divisions of the State forming a part of the system of local government, but are established for Federal purposes; and it seems to me that the power to create an inferior local court for such districts is denied by this decision in the Porter case. It may be that if the Legislature had undertaken to create an inferior local court of criminal jurisdiction for the territory of the Greater New York, bounded by the limits of Kings county, the statute establishing such a tribunal could be deemed constitutional; but this has not been attempted in the present case. There is an intimation that a distinction can be made in regard to the two magistrates elected at large in the borough of Brooklyn, the boundaries of that borough being coterminous with those of the county of Kings; but I think that the provisions in regard to those two magistrates are so interwoven with the éntire scheme as to be indissoluble from it, and that all the legislation on the subject must stand or fall together.
As has already been pointed out, the certificates of appointment held by the four respondents herein, by the terms of the instruments, declared in substance that their offices as city magistrates should terminate on December 31, 1901. This declaration, however, must be regarded as surplusage. The section of the Greater
To sum up the general conclusions reached in this opinion, they may be stated thus: (1) The amendatory legislation contained in the revised Greater New York charter, making the city magistrates of the second division in the borough of Brooklyn elective instead of appointive, is unconstitutional; (2) the repealing clauses which form a part of that amendatory legislation are so connected with it that they are not to be regarded as any more effective than the rest, and, hence, a judgment condemning the substitution of the elective for the appointive system, so far as the borough of Brooklyn is concerned, operates to restore the provisions of the original Greater New York charter in regard to the appointment of magistrates in the territory in question; and (3) the demurrer to the answer of the four respondents herein, on the ground that it was insufficient in law upon the face thereof, was properly overruled.
There is another question discussed in the briefs, the determination of which does not- seem essential upon .this appéal, inasmuch as it does not affect any of the respondents now before the court. Section 1401 of the Greater New York charter (as amd. by Laws of 1901, chap. 466) provides that “ No person shall be appointed to the office of city magistrate unless he shall have been admitted to practice as an attorney and counselor at law in the courts of this State at least five years prior to the date of such appointment, unless he was a police justice in office on the first day of January, eighteen hundred and ninety-fivé.” It is said that three of the defendants in • this action, Messrs. Ingelsoll, Devoy and Brennan, are not lawyers of the requisite standing, and hence were hot eligible for election, As neither of these gentlemen is a respondent hére, and as there appears to be no question about the qualification in this respect of the persons who are respondents, it is unnecessary now to express any opinion upon the point;
For the foregoing reasons, I advise an affirmance of the- interlocutory judgment appealed from.
Concurrence Opinion
I concur in the result reached by Hr. Justice Bartlett, but I am unable to agree with him in so far as he suggests that, under the language of the last clause of section 17 of article 6, the Legislature has no power to provide for the election of police magistrates by districts. Under the Constitution, as adopted in 1846, it was provided by section 18 of article 6, that “All judicial officers of cities and villages, and all such judicial officers as may be created therein by law, shall be elected at such times and in such manner as the Legislature may direct.” Acting under this provision, the Legislature, by chapter 153 of the Laws of 1848, provided for the establishment of the office of police justice, and six police justices were to be elected, one in each of the six districts created by the act. These police justices succeeded by that statute to the powers and jurisdiction which had previously been vested in officers entitled special justices for preserving the peace in the city of Yew York, and their jurisdiction was exclusively, criminal. (Wenzler v. People, 58 N. Y. 516, 521.) Under the amended judiciary article of 1869, it was provided, in section 18 of article 6, that “ Justices of the peace and district court justices shall be elected in the different cities in this State, in such manner, and with such powers, and for such terms, respectively, as shall be prescribed by law,” which vras in effect saying that as to these offices, which were embraced in the general provision for “ all judicial officers of cities and villages ” of the former section 18, the Legislature might continue to provide for their election by districts or by general ticket. The district courts of the city of Yew York were originally created by chapter 153 of the Laws of 1848, which established in each of the six judicial districts, into which, by the act, the city was divided, a court “ to be called the justices’ court of the city of Yew York; ” and in each district there was to be elected a justice to hold the court in said district. These justices’ courts, and the justices thus elected, succeeded to’ the jurisdiction which had belonged to the officers
I am, nevertheless, persuaded that when the Constitution provided for taking these inferior local courts out of the provision which required their election, it imposed the duty upon the Legislature of determining between the policy of election or appointment, and that it-, by necessary implication, denied the power to the Legislature to make use of the elective system in one portion of a municipality and of appointment in another for the same office. The language of section 17 of article 6 of the Constitution of 1894, which is the same as that of the amended judiciary article of 1869 (Art. 6, § 18), in so far as it has any relation to the question now before us, is that “ all other judicial officers in cities * * * shall be chosen by the electors of such cities, or appointed by some local authorities
Dissenting Opinion
I cannot concur hi the conclusion reached in the opinion of Mr. Justice Bartlett. I do not discuss any matters other than such as compel my dissent.
It is well to remember the fundamental law, so often declared, that the Legislature has all power of legislation which the people of the State of- New York can grant, except as it is expressly or impliedly' restrained from the exercise of particular powers by the Constitution. (Rathbone v. Wirth, 150 N. Y. 459, 470; Koch v. Mayor, 152 id. 72, and cases cited.) We have followed those authorities, in McGrath v. Grout (69 App. Div. 314).
In other words, the Legislature has supreme and absolute authority unless it is fettered by constitutional impediments. It is not altogether fanciful to point out the fact that the Constitution itself recognizes this principle when it specifically provides that the enacting clause of all bills shall be “ The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows.” (Art. 3, § 14.)
A second cardinal rule is'declared in People v. Draper (15 N. Y. 532), where, at page 549, the court said: “ When the court
We must, therefore, inquire whether there is any express inhibition in the Constitution against the Legislature’s creating the new office of city magistrate, and providing that the manner of election shall be by electors of congressional districts and of the borough of Brooklyn at large. Section 1392 of the revised charter purports to do this. If the Legislature has such power, the section is constitutional ; otherwise not.
The validity of the section depends chiefly upon the construction to be given to sections 17 and 18 of article 6 of the Constitution. Evidently those sections are interdependent. Section 18 authorizes the Legislature to establish inferior local courts of criminal jurisdiction. There can be no possible question that this relates, though not necessarily exclusively, to courts not in existence at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. It then provides: “ Except as herein otherwise provided, all judicial officers shall be elected or appointed at such times and in such manner as the Legislature may direct.” Here is declaratory expression of plenary power in the Legislature to prescribe the manner of the election; and unless its exercise has been curtailed by some other provision, section 1392 is constitutional and within the power of the Legislature.
It is contended by the respondents that such restriction is found in section 17, which, after providing for the election of justices of the peace and district court justices, adds: “ All other judicial
If it can be said that the last clause of section 17 relates exclusively to existing courts and judicial officers, and that the last clause of section 18 includes courts and officers not existing, there is no lacle of harmony, and the constitutional scheme is evident and consistent and not. redundant. As I read the opinion of O’Brien, J., in the case of Curtin v. Barton (139 N. Y. 505), the Court of Appeals was of opinion that section 18 (now § 17) of article 6 was applicable only to existing courts. (See p. 510.)
Section 17 provides for the election of three classes of judicial officers; first, justices of the peace in towns, who shall be elected by the town electors; second, justices of the peace and district court justices in cities, who may be elected in such manner as is or shall be prescribed by law; and, third, all other judicial officers in cities, who shall be chosen by the electors of such cities, or appointed by some local authorities thereof.
At the time of the adoption of the Constitution of 1894, the first two classes were existing constitutional officers, and the Legislature had no power to abolish them. But the third class includes all other existing local judicial officers throughout the cities of the State, not referred to or specified, for the article speaks of such officers as officers whose election or appointment is not otherwise provided for in article 6. "Tanifestly the use of the verb “ is ” in the present tense excludes all idea of any officers to be thereafter created by the Legislature, else apt words would have'been used to include them. The absence of any such words makes it apparent that the final clause of section 17, “ not otherwise provided for in this article,” points directly to the next section where express power is given to the Legislature to create new courts of civil and criminal jurisdiction and to provide for the manner of election. It seems to me clear that section 17 refers to existing officers, and section 18 includes officers to be thereaftér created by the Legislature. If this construction is correct the section in question is not unconstitutional.
I find confirmation of this view by reference to the Constitution of 1846 and the changes which have been made therein. .The Constitution of 1846, in article 6, section 14, contained a paragraph read
Thus provision was made for the creation of new courts in cities (§ 14) and the election of justices of the peace in towns (§ 17), and a sweeping provision that all existing judicial officers of cities and villages, and all such officers as might thereafter be created, should be elected in such manner as the Legislature might direct (§ 18). If the collocation had been continued the present question could not have arisen for no distinction was made between the method of electing existing judicial officers, in cities and villages and all such judicial officers as might thereafter be created therein by law.
But the subsequent amendments adopted before the present Constitution changed the order. Section 18 took the place of section 17, and there was added to the former section the provision that “ all other judicial officers in cities, whose election or appointment is not otherwise provided for in this article, shall be chosen by the electors of cities, or appointed by some local authorities thereof; ” while a new section (§ 19) was added embodying the cited part of section 14, and adding the clause, “ except as herein otherwise provided, all judicial officers shall be elected or appointed at such times and in such manner as the Legislature may direct.”
Thus for the first time the provisions for the election of justices of the peace in towns, and all other existing judicial officers in . cities, were segregated into section 18, and provisions for new local courts and the election in such- manner as the Legislature might direct of all judicial officers not already provided for, into section 19. I do not see how there could have been a more distinct differentiation of the purpose and intention of the framérs of the Constitution, between existing officers, whether constitutional or already created by the Legislature, on the one hand, and future courts and their judges on the other hand.
The same collocation occurs in the present Constitution. In section
The office of city magistrate is not specified in words in any section of the Constitution. The office of city magistrate in the old’ city of Hew York was created subsequently to the ‘ adoption of the present Constitution. The office of city magistrate in the borough of Brooklyn was created by the Greater Hew York charter. As to this new office of city magistrate, the Legislature had supreme power. It could create it, it could abolish it, it could provide the. method and district of election. There is no provision of the Constitution inhibiting the Legislature from carrying out anew or selecting an established political or territorial district in which the new judicial officer shall be elected, provided the principle announced in the Porter Case (infra) is not violated. The Legislature may have unwisely exercised its power, but with that question wé are not-, concerned.
It is said that the Legislature may not provide for the election of a judicial officer by the electors of a district smaller than the entire territory in which he is to exercise his judicial powers, and that to hold otherwise is to disregard the spirit of our institutions. The Constitution expressly provides for the election of justices of the Supreme Court by the electors of the eight judicial districts into which the State is divided, and these justices exercise their powers in any part of the State. Senators, assemblymen, aldermen and supervisors are similarly elected by districts, and yet legislate for the whole State, or for the city or county. Certainly, there is no greater inharmony in the one case than in the other. The point which I desire to make is that there is nothing in the Constitution which prevents the elec
Neither do I attach significance to the use of the words “ the electors of such cities,” as indicating that this necessarily means all the electors of the city. Such interpretation is not in. accord with the general plan of the Constitution. The spirit of the provision is observed if the choice of the judicial officer is made by electors of cities in any territorial division thereof.
Neither do I think the point well taken that section 1392 of the revised charter is disapproved by the case of People ex rel. Townsend v. Porter (90 N. Y. 68). In that case the court held unconstitutional an act which assumed to create a Police Court for a district not coterminous with the boundaries of any county, town, city or village. But this is not to say that an inferior local court may not be created for a district coterminous with any other political division of the State.
It is true that the court said that the language of section 19 of the Constitution did not “ authorize the legislature to carve out from the territory of the State a district for judicial purposes not bounded by town or county, city or village lines, and erect therein a local court.” But the controversy before the court did not involve nor bring before it the question whether a congressional district was not, equally with those referred to, a recognized territory or political division which could be taken into consideration by the Legislature in the formation of a new judicial district, and the remark is consequently a mere dictum. That august court has not expressed itself upon the question before us.
The congressional district, while not referred to in the State Constitution, is just as much a political or territorial division of the State as a village, town or city, or a ward in a city. Each is created by act of the Legislature. The States have surrendered to the Federal government control over the method of administering Federal legislative affairs, and the Federal Constitution provides that all legislative powers shall be vested in a Congress, to be partly composed of members chosen by the people of the several States, and apportioned among the States according to a fixed ratio of population. The Legislature has divided the State into congressional
So, also, the State Constitution, in dividing the State into senate districts recognizes other divisions than those referred to in the Porter case. Entire wards are sometimes assembled by it into senate districts, and-sometimes new senate districts, as in the case of the districts of the old city of Yew York, are carved out and created without reference to ward lines.
I am constrained, therefore, to believe that the Legislature may just as well create a local court for a district coterminous with a congressional district as one coterminous with the divisions mentioned in the Porter case.
Even if, however, the Legislature is not authorized by article 6 to provide the manner of electing the new judges, it seems to me that such authority is clearly conferred in article 10, section 2, where it is said: “ All city, town and village officers whose election or appointment is not provided for by this Constitution, shall be elected by the electors of such cities, towns and villages, or of some division thereof, or appointed by such authorities thereof as the Legislature shall designate for' that purpose. All other officers whose election or appointment is not provided- for by this Constitution, and all officers whose offices may hereafter be created by law, shall be elected by the people, or appointed, as the Legislature may direct.” The final clause seems to have been intended as an emphatic declaration of an intention on the part of the convention to confide to the Legislature the power to provide the manner of electing new officers.
This is still further emphasized by section 3 of article 12, which clearly authorizes the election of “ judicial officers of inferior local courts ” in any city or fart of a city. I see no escape from the application of this provision to the city magistrates. It is a clear recognition of the authority of the Legislature, all the more that the final clause restates that the section applies to judges and justices of inferior local courts.
In the case at bar, according to the contention of the respondents, the mayor exercised less than his authority. It was clearly his intention to appoint the respondents only for the remainder of the year 1901, and that appointment is a nullity and void. The respondents have no valid title or appointment to office for the year 1902,. and are not in office and cannot, as prayed for by them, be adjudged lawfully entitled to hold office for the term of ten years from the date of their appointment.
Meither do I agree with the conclusion that the provisions in regard to the two magistrates at large are so interwoven with the entire scheme of the section-as to be indivisible from it, and that all the legislation on the subject of city magistrates for the borough of Brooklyn must stand or fall together.
•In Duryee v. Mayor (96 M-. Y. 477) the court said (at p. 491): “ It is Only when the various enactments of a legislative body are plainly dependent upon each other, and so inseparably connected in matter and design that they cannot be divided without defeating the object of the statute, that the invalidity of one provision will entail that of those remaining. If effect can consistently with the general legislative intent be given to such parts of a statute as are not in conflict with paramount authority and are within the authority of the body enacting them, it is the duty of a court, while rejecting its unconstitutional and unauthorized parts, to enforce the remaining provisions, of a law which are within the legislative power of its authors. When part only of a statute or a section -is unconstitutional, that part only is void, unless the other provisions are so dependent and connected with that which is void, that it cannot be
In the light of this authority I do not see why the part of section 1392 of the revised charter which provides for the election of two magistrates at large is not severable from the remainder. The part of the section which we are to construe reads as follows: “ At the general election to be held in the borough of Brooklyn in the year nineteenhiundred and one, there shall be elected [in each congressional district, as then constituted in said borough, one city magistrate, and] in the territory constituting the borough of Brooklyn [there shall be elected] two city magistrates at large.” Striking out the parts in brackets the rest of the sentence is complete in and by itself. It provides a system for the election of two magistrates which is clearly not open to the objections urged as to the election of magistrates by the electors of congressional districts, that is, by all the electors of a city which was in existence when the Constitution was adopted. Under it the electors of the whole borough have elected two city magistrates, the defendants Durack and Ingersoll, and the will of the electors thus expressed ought not to be defeated unless the legislation is clearly unconstitutional and unless such uneonstitutionality is beyond rational doubt. (People v. Draper, supra.)
For these reasons I think that the judgment should be reversed.
Dissenting Opinion
I dissent from the result reached by the majority of the court. My reasons may be briefly expressed. The onus is on those who challenge the constitutionality of an act of the Legislature to point out the precise provision of the fundamental law which is deemed to be infringed. In this case the main contention seems to be that section 17 of article 6 of the Constitution requires all the electors
I find no other case in this State which can be deemed to accord with the respondents’ contention. The contrary has beeffi'héffi'in other jurisdictions in well-considered, cases. Thus in State v. McAlister (88 Tex. 284) it was held that where the Constitution provided that “ all qualified electors * * * within the limits of any city * * * shall have the right to vote for mayor and all other elective officers,” this provision merely secured to the voters of each city the right to cast their ballots for all officers to be elected for the particular subdivision of the city for which such officers are chosen. The court said (p. 288): “ The words 6 all other elective officers,’ mean all such officers of the city as the law might make elective, but this language, when taken in connection with the remainder of the section, does not necessarily mean that every elective officer must be elected by the voters of the entire city.” So in Brown v. Holland (97 Ky. 249), where the Constitution" required the officers of towns and cities to be elected “ by the qualified voters thereof,” it was held, as per the head note, that the General Assembly might lawfully provide “ that councilmen ‘ shall be elected by a majority of the votes cast by the qualified voters of the wards for which they respectively stand,’ it not being necessary that they should be elected by the voters at large before it can be said they are ‘ elected by the qualified voters of the city.’ ”
In order to reach the conclusion that the. Constitution has been violated in this case, it is necessary to import, words into the docu
I vote for reversal.
Interlocutory judgment affirmed, with costs.
Leave will be granted to the appellants to appeal to the Court of Appeals from the order to be entered upon this decision, and the present stay of proceedings continued, provided the appeal is taken within ten days.