*1 were summary judgment the court The essential issues before bought he when inexperienced unlicensed and was whether Waldemar it? know Grayboy have reason to and, so, if did motorcycle, his summary judgment for at the motion Conflicting presented facts to drive a valid license Waldemar held a trial. While show the need for to not hold a license that he did automobile, an there was evidence regularly Grayboy that evidence operate motorcycle. There was also riding experi- buyers’ licensing status prospective into inquired testimony that Waldemar had Further, deposition ence. there was a street small, motorcycles purchased he operated off-road motorcycle Grayboy, operated that he had never from but that motorcycles Finally, road. there was evidence sports especially powerful motorcycle purchased Waldemar was an per hour attaining topa of 160 to 180 miles capable speed model easily fact finder could infer standing start. A within 10 seconds of knowing that powerful motorcycle to Grayboy that sold a Waldemar unlicensed, operate to inexperienced incompetent he was and thus open such a vehicle on the road. apply to stated in Seward to majority
Because the failed law Grayboy and because there evidence that knew was incompetent operate motorcycle purchased, Waldemar was genuine and remand. issues of material fact exist. would reverse ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. C. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF SEAN DONNELLY, Defendant-Appellant.
Third District No. 3 - 01-0336 Opinion February filed
HOLDRIDGE, J., dissenting. Hammel, Offices, Joliet, PC., Ted R of of Hammel Law and Terrence J. Wallace, ano, Hills,, Doherty, appellant. of Far & of Wallace Palos for (John Tomczak, Attorney, Nancy
Jeff of Joliet X. Breslin and Rink Carter, Office, counsel), Attorneys Appellate both of State’s Prosecutor’s for People. opinion
JUSTICE SLATER delivered the court: defendant, Donnelly, driving The arrested for under Sean C. was 2000)) (625 501(a)(2) (West on the influence of alcohol ILCS 5/11 — January summarily suspended was based 2001. His driver’s license summary the arrest. defendant filed motion to dismiss his appealed. suspension, which was denied. The defendant We affirm. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss his began. 14, 2001, day suspension on March motion, alleged that the defendant In his method of service. indicate the because it did not report was defective March 2001. motion on on the defendant’s hearing A was held report. the sworn hearing, presented the defendant At the summary suspen- his served notice of the defendant was indicated that on the However, neither the box January sion on personal notice served the defendant was with which indicated served defendant was that the which indicated suspension nor the box marked. suspension by mail was notice Trooper State Police testimony of Illinois presented the The State trooper testified defendant. The Shrake, who arrested the the officer of his defendant with notice that he served the driving under the influ- the defendant for on the date that arrested on the regarding method of service ence. He did not mark either box attempt amend the report, nor did he ever bottom of the sworn State’s office. report after it submitted to the was not Judge Dunn found that the officer’s sworn was Thomas motion. defective and dismissed the defendant’s 19, 2001, filed a motion to strike of On March the defendant grounds it filed in accor that was not ficer’s sworn statement (155 137). hearing After Supreme Court Rule 137 Ill. 2d R. dance with Judge denied the argument, Raymond Bolden *3 defendant’s motion.
The
the dismissal of both his motions.
appeals
defendant now
argues
statutory
The defendant first
that his
police
report was
should be dismissed because the
officer’s sworn
jurisdiction over him.
deprived
defective and this defect
the court of
law,
driving
the
if a driver is arrested for
under
Under Illinois
suspended.
influence,
summarily
625 ILCS
his driver’s license is
5/11—
501.1(c) (West 2000).
statute,
begins
days
46
after
By
suspension
suspended. 625
that his license will be
the defendant
receives notice
(West 2000).
cita
a
a
501.1(g)
police
When
officer writes
ILCS 5/11 —
influence,
required
is
to serve the
also
driving
tion for
under the
summarily
625
suspended.
notice that his license will be
driver with
(West 2000).
501.1(f)
report
a
police officer files
sworn
The
ILCS 5/11—
Secretary of
content
the
indicating the defendant’s blood-alcohol
with
2000).
501.1(d) (West
report
Once this
625
office.
ILCS 5/11 —
office,
confirms the
Secretary
that office
by
is received
the
of State’s
a notice
suspension by mailing the defendant
statutory summary
501.1(h) (West
suspension.
the
date of the
626 ILCS
effective
5/11 —
2000).
report when the de
an officer fails to indicate in the sworn
If
suspension,
statutory summary
served with notice of
fendant was
1104
report
is defective and
is deprived
jurisdiction.
the court
People
Palacios,
(1994).
341,
266
App.
Ill.
3d
The relying Palacios, on contends that the report sworn was defective because it did not indicate whether he was served in person or argues mail. He that this deprived ju- defect the court of risdiction and rendered his summary suspension void. Palacios,
In
the defendant was arrested for driving under the
influence. The
report completed by
sworn
police
officer did not
indicate either the day that notice was served or how the defendant
Nevertheless,
was served with notice.
Secretary
office,
of State’s
upon receipt
report,
of the
assumed that the
given
defendant was
no
tice on the
date
report.
arrest
listed on the
The Secretary of State’s of
fice notified the defendant
that his
suspended.
license would be
The
suspension,
defendant contested the
arguing
given
that he was not
no
tice
summary suspension.
appellate
court held that a sworn
report that did not indicate when the defendant was served
no
with
tice of the statutory summary suspension
Palacios,
was defective.
App.
Ill.
3d
The instant is Here, case from Palacios. unlike Palacios, the sworn report indicated that the defendant was served with notice his statutory summary suspension January 28, 2001, the date of his arrest. The of State’s office had a sufficient basis for suspending driving privileges. Therefore, we agree with the trial court that the sworn was not defective and jurisdiction the court had over the defendant. argues defendant next that his should be
dismissed because the comply sworn did not Supreme Court Rule 137. This rule requires pleadings, that all motions and papers” signed “other filed in the by party court be or a party’s at torney. 155 Ill. 2d R. required comply 137. The State is with this just rule like other litigant. 155 Ill. 2d R. 137. asserts, Palacios,
The defendant
citing
in a statutory sum
mary suspension proceeding,
acts like
complaint
in a
in that it
civil case
initiates the defendant’s driver’s
Palacios,
suspension.
license
Ill.
3d
App.
1105 be report sworn requires that attorney’s signature lack of an stricken. persuasive. is not argument
The defendant’s
action
is an administrative
suspension of a driver’s license
summary
off
keep dangerous drivers
to
Secretary of State’s office
by
taken
(1995).
80,
For the County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
McDADE,J., concurs. HOLDRIDGE, dissenting;
JUSTICE
denying
in
find that the trial court erred
would
Court
pursuant
Supreme
to
report
motion to
the officer’s sworn
strike
respectfully
Ill. 2d R.
therefore
dissent.
Rule 137. 155
137.1
Badoud, 122 Ill. 2d
upon People
the defendant relies
v.
appeal,
On
(1988),
Palacios,
App.
Ill.
3d
and
People
In the the officer’s sworn proceeding. The of- jurisdictional step in civil *5 agent Illinois, ficer was an of the State of represented by which is office of the State’s Attorney. The officer’s sworn is plead- statement ing, motion, or other paper party represented of a by At- State’s torney. Therefore, 137,1 under Rule would pleading, find that this mo- tion, or other paper signed by must be Attorney a State’s may or it be stricken.
I do not requiring believe that the State’s Attorney sign an of- ficer’s sworn represents statement an onerous burden on law enforce- ment officers. already Rule 137 requires the officer to submit a copy of the sworn statement to the circuit court of venue State. I plain language would hold that the requires of Rule 137 pleading, motion, or paper other in a civil matter to signed by be attorney record, Attorney, who is the being submitted to the circuit court.
I note that Rule permits attorney’s 137 also the absence of an signature motion, pleading, paper or other to be cured prompt signature of attorney of record as soon as the omission is brought to the attention of that attorney. In this I would reverse the denial the defendant’s motion to strike and remand the matter to the circuit court with instructions that Attorney may the State’s promptly sign the officer’s sworn statement as as soon this omission is brought to Attorney’s the State’s attention. reasons,
For foregoing I would reverse the ruling the Will County circuit court and remand the matter with directions. therefore dissent. ILLINOIS,
THE PEOPLE OF Plaintiff-Appellee, THE STATE OF TORRES, Defendant-Appellant. ANTONIO Fifth District No. 5 - 00-0315 Opinion February filed