People v. DixonPeople v. Dixon
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- Steigmann
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court:
In Nоvember 1998, a jury convicted defendant, Lawrence C. Dixon, of burglary and theft of property having a value less than $300 (
I. BACKGROUND
The evidence at defendant’s trial showed the following. Around midnight on August 5, 1998, Brian Huhnke and Josh Monterastilli, two employees of Stanley Steemer’s carpet cleaning service, were cleaning Buster’s restaurant in Pontiac, Illinois. When they werе almost finished, they went out to a van parked about 10 feet from the front entrance to do some paperwork. Huhnke and Monterastilli used a metal box with a clipboard writing surface on top. The box contained the keys to Buster’s, a calculator, some Stanley Steamer documents, a pack of cigarettes, a lighter, and a pen. Approximately 15 to 20 feet from the van, a man walked by and said “Hey, what’s up,” then continued on his way. Huhnke and Monterastilli did not see the man very well. They left the box on the passenger seat of the unlocked van and went back inside Buster’s to close up. About five minutes later they returned, discovered that the box was gone, and called police. Huhnke found a Stanley Steamer log sheet by a nearby Dumpster.
Officer Bradley Woolford and two other officers responded. The two other officers made inquiries at the Super 8 motel located behind Buster’s and then radioed Woolford to meet them at Room 125 of that motel. Woolford brought Huhnke and Monterastilli with him. When Woolford arrived, the two other officers, defendant, Lisa Brown (his friend), and Brown’s baby were already at the room.
Huhnke told Woolford that defendant fit the description of the man who had walked past the van, and defendant admitted that he had done so. Defendant consented to a search of the room, and the officers found the box and all of its contents, except the cigarette lighter. Woolford testifiеd that defendant’s demeanor during the search bordered on “overly cooperative.” Less than 30 minutes had elapsed between the discovery that the box was missing and the search of defendant’s motel room.
Defendant told the officers that the items they found belonged to his roommate, Glen Sharp, and that he had not seen Sharp for several days. Defendant also offered to pay for any missing items.
Sharp testified that he left Pontiac between noon and 2 p.m. on August 5, fоr Pekin, Illinois, and did not return until August 7, 1998.
Outside the jury’s presence, the prosecutor sought a ruling on whether the trial court would permit the State to use defendant’s prior burglary convictions to impeach him in the event defendant testified. Those prior convictions occurred in 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1995. Defense counsel argued that the nature of the felonies was not relevant to defendant’s credibility and that revealing it to the jury would be more prejudicial than probative. The court ruled as follows:
“The сourt finds to admit the evidence of prior burglaries would have a prejudicial effect that would outweigh any value of impeachment. And so the State will be restricted to inquiring into whether or not the defendant has prior felonies. And the State can use the plural of that.”
Defendant testified, and during his direct testimony his attorney asked the following question: “Now, you have suffered several felony convictions, prior in your life, have you not?” Defendant answered, “Yes.”
Defendant testified that in August 1998 he was living temporarily at the Super 8 motel and working for Caterpillar. On the night in question, he had gone out to get milk and was on his way back to his room when he passed the Stanley Steamer van and greeted Huhnke and Monterastilli. After that, he ran into a couple of his coworkers— backing a truck out of the parking lot — who happened to have a bag of his laundry. When he returned to his room and opened the laundry bag, he discovered the box inside. He later told the poliсe he had not seen any of his coworkers for a couple of hours because he thought that they were looking for stolen goods and he wanted to cover for his friends.
During cross-examination, the State did not bring up defendant’s prior convictions. During closing argument, the prosecutor once referred to the defendant’s “background” and told the jury that his prior felonies could be considered only as evidence of his believability as a witness.
Defendant was convicted, and the trial court ordered a presentence investigation. Before this court, defendant asserts that the presentence investigation report indicated that defendant was taking Amitriptyline, an antidepressant, “while incarcerated at Livingston County.” However, the presentence investigation is not included with the record on appeal. The court sentenced defendant, and this appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Defendant’s Single Subject Rule Challenge
Defendant first argues that because the trial cоurt knew at the sentencing hearing that he was taking a psychotropic drug, the court was statutorily required to have a hearing on his fitness to stand trial. Although he acknowledges that Public Act 89 — 689 purportedly repealed this statutory requirement, he contends that the repeal was of no effect because Public Act 89 — 689 violates the single subject rule of the Illinois Constitution and is therefore void. We disagree.
Before Public Act 89 — 689 took effect, section 104 — 21(a) of the Code entitled а defendant on psychotropic medication to a fitness hearing before trial and sentencing.
(We note, for the purpose of providing an accurate history, that a prior amendment to
The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law subject to de novo review. People v. Fisher,
The single subject rule states: “Bills, except bills for appropriations and for the codification, revision or rearrangement of laws, shall be confined to one subject.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. iy § 8(d). The rule is liberally construed in favor of upholding legislation, and the term “subject” is comprehensive in its scope and may be as broad as the legislature chooses. Arangold,
1. The Provisions of Public Act 89 — 689 and Their Relationship to Each Other
Dеfendant first contends that Public Act 89 — 689 violates the single subject rule because several of its provisions have no natural and logical connection to each other. See Johnson,
2. The Provisions of Public Act 89 — 689 and Their Relationship to a Single Subject
Defendant next contends that Public Act 89 — 689 violates the single subject rule because some of its provisions do not have a natural and logical connection to the subject of the Act. The State responds that all of the Act’s provisions pertain to the criminal justice system. We agree with the State.
The title of Public Act 89 — 689 is “An Act in relation to public safety.” Pub. Act 89 — 689, eff. December 31, 1996 (1996 Ill. Laws 3775). Citing Johnson,
We conclude that Public Act 89 — 689 addresses the single subject of the criminal justice system, and as such encompasses the substantive criminal law as well as the administration of the criminal justice system. The “administration of the criminal justice system” includes criminal procedure, law enforcement, the Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC), the juvenile court system, and matters of criminal court administration. All 19 sections of Public Act 89 — 689 comply with the single subject rule in that they all concern the criminal law or the administration of criminal justice, as we have defined that term.
Seven sections of Public Act 89 — 689 amend the Unified Code of Corrections (
Three sections of Public Act 89 — 689 amend the Criminal Code of 1961 (
Two sections of Public Act 89 — 689 amend the Code (
Two sections of Public Act 89 — 689 address the juvenile justice system: section 75 amends a Counties Code (
Section 85 of Public Act 89- — 689 amends the Criminal Identification Act (
While the remaining sections of Public Act 89 — 689 do not amend criminal codes, they nevertheless relate to either the creation or enforcement of criminal laws. Section 55 amends the Humane Care for Animals Act (
We hold that all the provisions of Public Act 89 — 689 are related to the criminal justice system. “The single[ ]subject rule is not a limitаtion on the comprehensiveness of a subject, which may be as broad as the legislature chooses,” and a statute may include “all matters not inconsistent with, or foreign to, the general subject of the act.” People v. Dunigan,
B. Defendant’s Claim that the Trial Court’s Use of the “Mere-Fact” Impeachment Method Was Plain Error
Last, defendant argues that, in light of People v. Atkinson,
A trial court’s decision to allow impeachment by a prior conviction should not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. See People v. McKibbins,
Under the mere-fact method of impeachment, the jury hears only about the existence of a prior conviction and not the specific crime of which the defendant was convicted. People v. Holloman,
In Atkinson, the defendant was on trial for burglary when the State sought to impeach him with evidence of two prior burglary convictions. The dеfendant asked the trial court to use the mere-fact method, but the court declined to do so and admitted the evidence over defense objection. Atkinson,
According to defendant, had the trial court in this case conducted the Montgomery balancing test in the manner required by Atkinson— that is, had it not considered mere-fact impeachment as an alternative — the evidence of his prior convictions would not have been admitted because its probative value was outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice it presented.
Assuming arguendo that the supreme court intended its decision in Atkinson to have retroactive effect as to cases on appeal at the time it was decided, it would still provide no aid to defendant. We notе that in Atkinson, the precise question before the supreme court was not, as here, whether a trial court abuses its discretion by allowing the mere-fact method of impeachment, but the opposite inquiry — that is, whether a trial court abuses its discretion by not considering the mere-fact method as part of its Montgomery analysis.
We acknowledge that the supreme court’s discussion in Atkinson provides defendant with an argument that a trial court does abuse its discretion by allowing merе-fact impeachment. However, we need not decide that question because, in this case, defendant seeks reversal on the basis of plain error. Plain error occurs only in those cases where the evidence is closely balanced or the error is of such magnitude that the defendant was denied a fair trial. Holloman,
Had defendant’s case been tried in accordance with Atkinson, the trial court, in its discretion, might well have permitted the jury to learn that defendant’s four prior convictions were for burglary, one of the crimes for which defendant was then standing trial. See Atkinson,
The State also argues that “an accused may not ask the trial court to proceed in a certain manner and then contend in a court of review that the order which he obtained was in error” (People v. Lowe,
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Affirmed.
KNECHT, EJ., concurs.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
In Atkinson, the Supreme Court of Illinois clearly stated that “[t]he issue before this court is whether the mere-fact method of impeachment should be adopted in Illinois.” Atkinson,
The supreme court went on to explain:
“Fotential prejudice to the defendant also supports rejection of the mere-fact approach. Under the mere-fact approach, the jury hears direct proof that the accused has been convicted of a felony, the exact nature of which is excluded from the jury. This bare announcement unavoidаbly invites jury speculation about the nature of the prior crime. There is a potential danger that the jury would speculate that the defendant was previously convicted of a more serious crime. Consequently, the mere-fact approach may result in unfair prejudice to the defendant arising from jury speculation as to the nature of the prior unnamed crime.” Atkinson,186 Ill. 2d at 459 ,713 N.E.2d at 536-37 .
Further, in Atkinson, Justice Rathje recognized the majority’s position in his dissent: “I fail to see the basis for the majority’s conclusion that, as a matter of law, it always is improper to use the mere-fact approach to impeach a testifying defendant.” Atkinson,
The majority in this case, however, finds that the use of mere-fact impeachment did not constitute plain error because the evidence was neither closely balanced nor did the error deprive defendant of a fair trial. I disagree.
“Had defendant’s case been tried in accordance with Atkinson, the triаl court, in its discretion, might well have permitted the jury to learn that defendant’s four prior convictions were for burglary, one of the crimes for which defendant was then standing trial.”308 Ill. App. 3d at 1018 .
See also Atkinson,
In this instance, the trial court, in fact, used the Montgomery balancing test and found that the danger of unfair prejudice outweighed the probative value of admitting the рrior convictions. Since the court did in fact engage in that balancing test and found that it would not admit those prior convictions, the use of the mere-fact approach was error as a matter of law, and the defendant has been denied a fair trial. Defendant suffered clear prejudice here when the trial court allowed the mere-fact use of “several” felonies, as opposed to completely barring the use of the actual conviсtions.
Moreover, the majority, contrary to the record states:
“Assuming arguendo that the supreme court intended its decision in Atkinson to have retroactive effect as to cases on appeal at the time it was decided, it would still provide no aid to defendant.”308 Ill. App. 3d at 1018 .
However, Atkinson does in fact apply retroactively. Supreme court decisions apply to all pending cases unless it directs otherwise. As stated in a recent fifth district case citing People v. Linder,
“The supreme court specifically held in Linder that its decision would be applied retroactively and that, as a general rule, supreme court ‘decisions apply to all cases that are pending when the decision is announced, unless [the supreme court] directs otherwise.’ Linder,
The supreme court did not indicate that the Atkinson holding should not be applied retroactively. Moreover, this court has previously recognized this doctrine in People v. Corrie,
“The supreme court’s decisions generally apply to all cases that are pending — including pending on appeal — when the supreme court announces its decisions, unless the supreme court directs otherwise.”
I would therefore reverse pursuant to the supreme court’s rejection of the use of the mere-fact method of impeachment with prior convictions.