Fоllowing a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b(l); MSA 28.788(2X1), second-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520c(l); MSA 28.788(3)(1), breaking and entering an' occupied dwelling with intent to commit larceny, MCL 750.110; MSA 28.305, and unlawfully driving away a motor vehicle, MCL 750.413; MSA 28.645. He was sentenced to imprisonment for from 25 to 150 years, from 10 to 15 years, from 10 to 15 years, and from 3 to 5 years for the respective convictions. Defendant now appeals as of right and we affirm.
Defendant’s convictions arose out of an October 19, 1983, incident at the residence of complainant. The victim testified that she stopped home on her way to a business appointment at approximately 5:20 p.m. Defendant was standing in her living room. A struggle ensued and defendant put a knife up to her throat. Defendant asked what time the victim’s husband, "Ron,” got home and then placed a jacket over her face. He proceeded to place his finger or fingers in her vagina and to attempt, unsuccessfully, to insеrt his penis into her vagina. Defendant then took the keys to the car the victim had been driving and drove away.
*391 The Oak Park police inspected the victim’s home, inventoried missing objects and collected fingerprint evidence. The first-floor nursery window, where defendant had apparently entered, was damaged. The cords of both telephones in the house had been removed. A camera and flash, the victim’s briefcase and wallet, her eyeglasses, a gold chain and a tan pair of her husband’s shoes were missing. A latent print taken from a metal box in the den matched defendant’s palm print.
Defendant’s mother, Winnie Dixon, was called as a prosecution witness. She testified that she found a pair of tan shoes, a briefcase and a set of keys in defendant’s room. These items were turned over to the police and were identified as objects missing from the victim’s house. According to Mrs. Dixon, defendant told her that he had purchased the shoes from a friend. He аlso told her that a second person was involved in the incident.
On appeal, defendant urges this Court to recognize a parent-child testimonial privilege and hold that Winnie Dixon was barred from testifying against defendant at his trial. The issue is one оf first impression in this state.
In recent years, the subject of establishing a parent-child testimonial privilege has received considerable scholarly attention. See Coburn, Child-parent communications: Spare the privilege and spoil thе child, 74 Dick L R 599 (1969); Stanton, Child-parent privilege for conñdential communications: An examination and proposal, 16 Fam L Q 1 (1982); Comment, From the mouths of babes: Does the constitutional right of privacy mandate a parent-child privilege?, 1978 BYU L R 1002 (1978); Comment, The child-parent privilege: A proposal, 47 Fordham L R 771 (1979); Comment, Conñden-tial communication between parent and child: A constitutional right, 16 San Diego L R 811 (1979); *392 Note, Recognition of a parent-child testimonial privilege, 23 St Louis U L J 676 (1979); Note, Questioning the recognition of a parent-child testimonial privilege, 45 Albany L R 142 (1980); Note, Parent-child loyalty and testimonial privilege, 100 Harv L R 910 (1987); Comment, Parent-child testimonial privilege: An absolute right or an absolute privilege?, 11 U Dayton L R 709 (1986); Comment, A parent-child testimonial privilege: Its present existence, whether it should exist, and to what extent, 13 Cap U L R 555 (1984); Kraft, The parent-child testimonial privilege: Who’s minding the kids?, 18 Fam L Q 505 (1985); Note, The judicial development of the parent-child testimonial privilege: Too big for its britches?, 26 Wm & Mary L R 145 (1984); Comment, Underprivileged communications: The rationale for a parent-child privilege, 36 Southwestern L J 1175 (1983); Kandoian, The parent-child privilege and the parent-child crime: Observations on State v Delong and In re Agosto, 36 Me L R 59 (1984); Note, Parent-child testimonial privilege: Preserving and protecting the fundamental right to family privacy, 52 Cinn L R 901 (1983).
The parent-child testimonial privilege is currently rеcognized by the federal district court of Nevada and by certain state courts in New York. In Nevada, the privilege was recognized in
In re Agosto,
The vast majority of jurisdictions have rejected the adoption of the parent-child testimonial privilege, however. See
In re Terry W,
59 Cal App 3d 745; 130 Cal Rptr 913 (1976);
Marshall v Anderson,
459 So 2d 384 (Fla App, 1984);
People v Sanders,
99 Ill 2d 262;
We similarly decline to adopt a parent-child testimonial privilege. Initially, we note that the exclusion of evidence by evidentiary privileges is largely governed by statute. See MRE 101, Committee Note. Accordingly, we believe thаt recognition of a new privilege is best deferred to the Legislature.
Perhaps more fundamentally, however, we premise our decision on the notion that "all
privileges .
. .
are exceptional,
and are therefore to be
*394
[discouraged]. . . . The investigation of truth and the enforcement of testimonial duty dеmand the restriction, not the expansion, of these privileges.” 8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev, 1961), § 2192, p 73. As privileges do not further the ascertainment of truth but, rather, permit the concealment of relevant, reliable information, courts havе been reluctant to expand or create new privileges in the absence of compelling reasons.
In re Dinnan,
661 F2d 426, 429-430 (CA 5, 1981), cert den
Defendant’s remaining arguments require only
*395
brief discussion. Defendant claims that Mrs. Dixon’s testimony concerning her identification to police officer Mary Timmons of the items found in defendant’s room constituted inadmissible hearsay. Assuming without deciding that the testimony constituted hearsay evidence, its admission constituted harmless error. The substance of the testimony was cumulative of that given by Officer Timmons. See
People v Prophet,
We also reject defendant’s claim that the trial court erred when it allowed Officer Timmons to testify about the victim’s identification of defendant at a corporеal lineup. Defendant claims that this testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay under MRE 801(d)(1). To the extent that Timmons testified that the victim made her identification "immediately,” defendant’s hearsay challenge clearly fails; that testimony did not repeat an оut-of-court statement. As regards the officer’s repeating the actual words of the victim or reporting her assertive conduct, there is a split of authority in this Court. Some panels have held that while MRE 801(d)(1) allows the declarant (in this case, the viсtim) to testify as to his or her prior identification of a defendant, it does not allow a third , party to testify about the declarant’s identification of defendant; however, it does allow the third party to testify about the facts and circumstances surrounding that prior identification.
People v Turner,
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in instruсting the jury concerning impeachment by a prior inconsistent statement. The court instructed the jury in pertinent part:
During the course of this trial there has been some evidence tending to show that one of the witnesses [the victim] made an earlier statement that was inconsistent with testimony made during the course of the trial. The prior inconsistent statement was regarding who removed her panty hose. This statement is not evidence which you can consider to satisfy or prove any of the elements of the crime charged since it was not made under oath during the course of this trial.
Defendant maintains that this instruction prejudi-cially removed from the jury’s consideration the question whether there was an inconsistency in the victim’s trial testimony and her preliminary examination testimony concerning defendant’s attempt to insert his penis into her vagina. Defen *397 dant’s argument fails for the reason that the record does not support a finding of the existence of a prior inconsistent statement on this point. The victim was unequivocal at both the preliminary examination and at trial that it was defendant’s penis which she felt him try to insert into her vagina. The instruction was proper as given.
Defendant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to give a requested instruction on the cognate lesser included offense of receiving and concealing stolen property worth more than $100, as it applied to Count iii of the information, charging breaking and entering an occuрied dwelling with intent to commit larceny. Where the evidence at trial supports a conviction of a cognate lesser offense, and the defendant requests an instruction on the lesser offense, failure to honor the request constitutеs error requiring reversal.
People v Chamblis,
Finally, defendant challenges his sentence of from 25 to 150 yеars for first-degree CSC. Defendant argues that the sentence imposed exceeded the sentencing guidelines and should shock the conscience of this Court. The guidelines range for defendant’s esc conviction was apparently from 8
*398
to 15 years. In appropriate cases, however, it is within the sentencing judge’s discretion to exceed the guidelines,
People v Kenneth Johnson,
Defendant’s sentence does not shock our conscience. The victim was sexually assaulted and robbed in her home. The trial court properly observed the serious nature of this crime and the fact that the victim suffered a great deal of emotional upheaval as a result. We summarily reject defendant’s suggestions that the assault was somehow less abhorrent because it was accomplished by penetration with his fingers rather than his sexual organ, because it "lastеd for only a period of three to four minutes,” or because her clothing was not cut. We also reject defendant’s contention that the court relied on allegations in the presentence report of a prior rape fоr which defendant was never formally charged. Defendant did not object to the information in the report at sentencing, and there is no indication in the record that the court relied on the challenged information in rendering his sentence. We find no abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.