THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v BENJAMIN DICKSON-EASON, Appellant.
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Third Department
143 AD3d 1013 | 38 NYS3d 637
Garry, J.
Following the denial of his motion to suppress statements made to police, among other evidence, defendant pleaded guilty to burglary in the second degree pursuant to a plea agreement that included a waiver of appeal. The sentence was capped at 10 years to be followed by five years of postrelease supervision. Supreme Court denied defendant‘s subsequent motion to withdraw his guilty plea,* following a hearing, and imposed a prison sentence of 10 years with five years of postrelease supervision, as a second felony offender. Defendant thereafter moved pursuant to
Initially, defendant‘s challenge to the denial of his motion to suppress his statements to police is precluded by his knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of appeal (see People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; People v Kemp, 94 NY2d 831, 833 [1999]; People v Zippo, 136 AD3d 1222, 1222 [2016], lv denied 27 NY3d 1141 [2016]; People v Cooper, 126 AD3d 1046, 1047 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 966 [2015]). During the plea allocu
Defendant also argues that his plea was involuntary due to the ineffective assistance provided by former counsel prior to and at the time of the plea, and that his motion to vacate his plea should have been granted. At the hearing on that motion, defendant testified that counsel misled and misinformed him regarding his likely sentencing status, among other things, and failed to disclose evidence to him, and he claimed that he was innocent and only pleaded guilty to avoid a life sentence. Supreme Court discredited these allegations based upon, among other factors, the transcript of the plea allocution and former counsel‘s contrary hearing testimony. The record reveals that defendant was adequately advised that persistent felony offender sentencing was possible, not mandatory, if he were convicted.
Notably, “[i]n the context of a guilty plea, a defendant has been afforded meaningful representation when he or she receives an advantageous plea and nothing in the record casts doubt upon the apparent effectiveness of counsel” (People v Briggs, 138 AD3d 1355, 1356 [2016] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted], lv denied 28 NY3d 927 [2016]) and the decision “[w]hether to permit a defendant to withdraw his or her plea of guilty is left to the sound discretion of [the trial c]ourt, and withdrawal will generally not be permitted absent some evidence of innocence, fraud or mistake in its inducement” (People v Farnsworth, 140 AD3d 1538, 1539 [2016] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). Deferring to the court‘s credibility determinations (see People v Eggsware, 125 AD3d 1057, 1058 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1162 [2015]), which are supported by defendant‘s sworn statements during the plea allocution and counsel‘s testimony, we are persuaded that defendant‘s guilty plea was a “knowing, voluntary and intelligent choice among alternative courses of action” (People v Conceicao, 26 NY3d 375, 382 [2015] [citation omitted]; see People v Fiumefreddo, 82 NY2d 536, 543 [1993]). Further, in denying his motion to withdraw his plea, the court was entitled to rely on the record (see People v Khan, 139 AD3d 1261, 1263
Finally, Supreme Court did not err in denying defendant‘s motion to vacate the judgment of conviction. Most of the issues raised on his motion concern claims that former counsel provided ineffective assistance, which were raised (and rejected) or could have been raised on his direct appeal, as “sufficient facts appear on the record” to permit adequate review thereof and, thus, these claims are not the proper subject of a motion pursuant to
Peters, P.J., McCarthy, Clark and Aarons, JJ., concur.
Ordered that the judgment and order are affirmed.