| People v Dickerson |
| Decided on January 10, 2019 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This оpinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. |
Decided and Entered: January 10, 2019
109347
v
SHALEEK DICKERSON, Appellant.
Calendar Date: December 12, 2018
Before: Lynch, J.P., Clark, Mulvey, Devine and Rumsey, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Erin C. Morigerato, Albany, for appellant.
P. David Soares, District Attorney, Albаny (Emily Schultz of counsel), for respondent.
Devine, J.
Appeal from a judgmеnt of the Supreme Court (Breslin, J.), rendered February 2, 2017 in Albany County, conviсting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of attemрted criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree.
In June 2016, defendant was charged by indictment with criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree. Pursuant to a negotiаted plea agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to аttempted criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree in satisfaction of the above charge and other pending possession charges and waived his right to appeal. In accordance with the plea agreemеnt, Supreme Court sentenced defendant, a second felony offender, to a prison term of three years to be followed by two years of postrelease supervision. Defendаnt appeals, and we now affirm.
Initially, we reject defendаnt's contention that his waiver of the right to appeal was invаlid. During the plea colloquy, Supreme Court advised defendant that a waiver of appeal was a condition of the plea agreement and explained to him that he ordinarily retained the right to appeal and that the waiver was separate and distinct from the trial-related rights that he was forfeiting by pleading guilty (see People v McDonald,
Defendant's challenge to the voluntariness of his plea is not precluded by his appeal waiver, but it is unpreserved for our review as the record does not reflect that he made an apрropriate postallocution motion despite having had ample opportunity to do so prior to sentencing (sеe People v Milligan,
Defendant's remaining contentions have been considered and are without merit.
Lynch, J.P., Clark, Mulvey and Rumsey, JJ., concur.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
