46 A.D.2d 829 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1974
Appeal from a judgment of the 'County Court of Ulster County, rendered March 13, 1974, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crime of robbery in the second degree. The defendant, William Dibble, was arrested on March 27, 1972 for operating a car without a license pursuant to section 501 (subd. 4, par. a) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. Dibble was taken into custody, photographed and fingerprinted. One of the pictures taken was identified that day by Cornelius Salata as the man who had robbed his store on March 9, 1972. Dibble was arrested for armed robbery before he was released from jail. At the trial, Salata made an in-court identification of the defendant, as he already had at a Wade hearing and at the first trial (the first trial ended in a jury disagreement). Salata testified that on March 9, 1972, about 8:30 P.M., a white male entered his store in Eddyville, walked to the counter where the cash register was located, pointed what appeared to be a pistol at him, and demanded the money in the register. Salata complied with the robber’s request. He testified that he got a good look at the robber in his well-lighted store. He also got a look at the rear of the robber’s car, described as “ a yellowish car with rectangular tail lights”. The defendant’s defense consisted of an alibi to the effect that he was home in bed with an illness at the time of the robbery. This defense was supported by three witnesses and was controverted by the prosecution through rebuttal testimony. Upon this appeal the defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error by admitting into evidence a photograph taken pursuant to his initial arrest for driving a car without a license, and evidence of the subsequent identification by the victim of the defendant from such photograph as the photograph was either the fruit of an illegal arrest or because photograph identification should not have been permitted when a lineup identification was possible. The defendant also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in limiting his cross-examination of a prosecution witness in regard to the witness’s mental capacity as related specifically to the use of drugs. Upon this record, it does not appear that the demeanor of the witness at the trial was such as to have raised some issue as to his then mental capacity, and it is readily apparent that at most the testimony sought to be elicited on cross-examination would relate solely to the credibility of the witness. While cross-examination of a witness should not be unduly limited (People V. Carr, 23 A D 2d 670; People v. Phonveille, 22 A D 2d 814) even if error were com