Defendant appeals by right his jury trial convictions of false pretenses, $1,000 or more but less than $20,000, MCL 750.218(4)(a); false pretenses, less than $200, MCL 750.218(2); two counts of common-law fraud, MCL 750.280; and two counts of larceny by conversion, $20,000 or more, MCL 750.362. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of sixteen to sixty months’ imprisonment for the conviction of false pretenses, $1,000 to $20,000; ninety days in jail for the conviction of false pretenses less than $200; and 23 to 120 months’ imprisonment for the two convictions of common-law fraud and the two convictions of larceny by conversion. We affirm.
Defendant’s convictions stem from his operation of two political action committees (PACs) during the 2000 *370 election campaign and recount. Defendant was the chief of staff of both Friends for a Democratic White House (Friends) and Swing States for a GOP White House (Swing States). Defendant also incorporated PAC Services, with the purpose of providing services to the PACs defendant had formed. Defendant solicited contributions through mailings. A contention at trial was that defendant’s mailing lists were stolen from the Federal Election Commission (FEC) disclosure statements of the 2000 presidential campaigns of both A1 Gore and George W Bush. These statements list the contributors to each campaign and appear on the FEC website, along with a warning that the lists are for informational purposes only and may not be used for commercial or solicitation purposes.
Defendant’s PACs collected about $700,000 in contributions. Three victims of defendant’s solicitation letters testified at trial. All testified that the solicitation letters they received implied an affiliation with either the Bush campaign or the Gore campaign. They also testified that they donated to the PAC that solicited them because the letter led them to believe that their contributions would go to either the Bush campaign or the Gore campaign. They also testified that they would not have given money to the PAC if they had known that the money was not going to either the Bush campaign or the Gore campaign. Defendant’s PACs did give money to Democratic and Republican causes, but checks they attempted to give to the Republican National Committee and the Gore campaign were returned, i.e., those entities refused to accept the donations.
Defendant first argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions. We disagree. The standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence claims
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in criminal cases is “whether the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the people, would warrant a reasonable juror in finding” that all the elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
People v Nowack,
In order to prove false pretenses, the prosecution must show (1) a false representation concerning an existing fact, (2) knowledge by the defendant that the representation is false, (3) use of the representation with an intent to deceive, and (4) detrimental reliance by the victim.
People v Reigle,
There was also evidence that defendant used the representations with an intent to deceive. A defendant’s intent to deceive can be inferred from the evidence,
Reigle, supra
at 39, and minimal circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove a defendant’s intent,
People v Guthrie,
There was also detrimental reliance by the victims. Each victim testified that he or she donated money to *373 one of defendant’s PACs. The victims also testified that they believed that the money was going to either the Bush campaign or the Gore campaign and that they relied on this in sending the donations. The victims also testified that they would not have sent in the donations if they had known that the money was not going to the respective campaigns. In addition, a victim testified that she sent a $200 donation to Friends and that her check was cashed. Another victim testified that he sent a check for $1,000 to Friends because he received the letter in the mail that asked him to assist Gore in his election campaign. And another victim testified that he wrote a check for $100 to Swing States and that check was ultimately cashed.
For these reasons, we find that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find defendant guilty of false pretenses, $1,000 or more but less than $20,000, and false pretenses, less than $200.
Defendant also argues that there was insufficient evidence to find him guilty of two counts of common-law fraud because the Bush and Gore campaigns did not suffer any loss. We disagree. MCL 750.280 defines the crime as the commission “of any gross fraud or cheat at common law. . . .” Defendant’s convictions for common-law fraud were based on the losses suffered by the Bush and Gore campaigns as a result of defendant’s solicitation of Bush and Gore donors. Testimony at trial showed that defendant collected more than $700,000 in donations using the campaign lists of Bush and Gore contributors. There was expert testimony at trial that the repeated use of these lists decreased their value, resulting in the campaigns suffering a loss. There was also testimony from the victims that they believed their donations were going to the Bush campaign or the Gore campaign and that they would not have given to defen *374 dant’s PACs if they had known that the money was not going to the respective campaign. It can be inferred from this that the campaigns suffered losses because the victims wanted their donations to go to the campaigns, but instead the money went where defendant saw fit. As such, we find that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s convictions for common-law fraud.
Defendant also argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions of larceny by conversion because there was insufficient evidence that defendant intended to defraud anyone. We disagree. An element of larceny by conversion is that the defendant must, at the time the property is converted, intend to defraud or cheat the owner of the property.
People v Scott,
Defendant next argues that his convictions should be reversed because they are preempted by federal law. We disagree. Determination of whether state law is preempted by federal law is an issue of statutory construction and an issue of law that is reviewed de novo. See
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Westlake Transportation, Inc v Pub Service Comm,
Congress stated that the provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) “supersede and preempt any provision of State law with respect to election to Federal office.” 2 USC 453. However, federal courts have held that “ ‘courts have given section 453 a narrow preemptive effect in light of its legislative history.’ ”
Karl Rove & Co v Thornburgh,
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by precluding him from presenting an expert witness at trial. We disagree. This Court reviews a trial court’s decision on the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion.
People v Starr,
The witness 2 was to testify about viewing and printing information from a website, <http://www.tray.com>, that also contains the FEC disclosures. The information on that website was in a different form and did not contain the cautionary language against using the information for a commercial purpose. However, the witness viewed the website and made printouts from it in January or February 2001, which was after defendant had mailed the letters in October and Novem *377 ber 2000. Thus, the trial court reasonably determined that this witness’s testimony was not relevant and did not abuse its discretion in excluding this evidence.
Defendant next argues that he was denied a fair trial when multiple witnesses testified about factual and legal conclusions. We disagree. Defendant did not preserve this issue before the trial court by objecting to the testimony on the basis that it involved legal or factual conclusions.
People v Bulmer,
A witness is not permitted to testify on questions of law because it is the trial judge’s responsibility to find and interpret the law.
People v Lyons,
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Defendant next argues that the restitution order entered by the trial court should be reversed. We disagree. We typically review a trial court’s award of restitution for an abuse of discretion.
People v Newton,
Defendant was found guilty of using the Bush campaign’s and the Gore campaign’s mailing lists to collect the contributions to his PACs. The people who gave money to defendant’s PACs testified that they intended for the money to go to the Bush campaign or the Gore campaign. Therefore, defendant collected money that would have likely gone to either the Bush campaign or the Gore campaign, and the campaigns suffered the loss of donations. More importantly, the people who gave money to the PACs also suffered losses because defendant was found guilty of using misrepresentations to obtain the donations. The fact that defendant apparently ultimately donated some of the money he collected to other Democratic or Republican causes does not change the fact that defendant represented to the people who contributed to the PACs that the money would go to the Bush campaign or the Gore campaign or to their legal funds for the recount. None of the money ultimately went to these causes. Additionally, the fact that defendant evidently did not personally benefit to the extent of $536,628.51 does not make that amount
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an invalid amount of restitution. The amount of restitution should be the amount of loss attributable to defendant’s illegal activity.
People v Lueth,
Defendant also argues that he should be resentenced on the basis of
Blakely v Washington,
Additionally, our Supreme Court in
People v Claypool,
Michigan, in contrast [to the sentencing scheme in Blakely], has an indeterminate sentencing system in which the defendant is given a sentence with a minimum and a maximum. The maximum is not determined by the trial judge but is set by law. MCL 769.8.... The trial judge sets the minimum but can never exceed the maximum (other than in the case of a habitual offender, which we need not consider because Blakely specifically excludes the fact of a previous conviction from its holding).
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This Court has concluded that it is bound by this statement by our Supreme Court that
Blakely
does not affect Michigan’s sentencing system.
People v Drohan,
Defendant also claims that he was entitled to a hearing on restitution. However, defendant’s attorney never made a request for an evidentiary hearing on restitution in the trial court, and defendant failed to provide any authority for his argument on this issue on appeal. Therefore we consider the issue to be waived.
Prince v MacDonald,
Defendant also argues that the Legislature did not intend for offense variable 9 (OV 9), MCL 777.39, to include victims who suffered only financial injury, and that the trial court erred by determining that OV 9 should be scored at twenty-five points for defendant’s larceny-by-conversion conviction. We disagree. This Court has previously held that OV 9 includes victims of financial injury.
People v Knowles,
Defendant next argues that his convictions violate his First Amendment rights of free speech and association. We disagree. We review constitutional issues de novo.
People v Haynes,
Defendant also argues that his right to freedom of association was violated by his convictions. Although the First Amendment includes a protected freedom of association,
Griswold v Connecticut,
Defendant also argues that his convictions for common-law fraud and larceny by conversion should be vacated because the statutes are unconstitutionally
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vague. Again, we disagree. Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law that we review de novo.
People v Piper,
“A statute may be challenged for vagueness on the grounds that it
—is overbroad, impinging on First Amendment freedoms, or
—does not provide fair notice of the conduct proscribed, or
—is so indefinite that it confers unstructured and unlimited discretion on the trier of fact to determine whether an offense has been committed.” [Id. at 253, quoting Woll v Attorney General,409 Mich 500 , 533;297 NW2d 578 (1980).]
Defendant first argues that the statute on common-law fraud is overbroad. As discussed earlier, although political speech and expression are at the core of First Amendment protection,
In re Chmura,
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Defendant argues that both the statute on common-law fraud and the statute on larceny by conversion are vague and that an ordinary person must guess at their meanings. We disagree. “ ‘When presented with a vagueness challenge, we examine the entire text of the statute and give the words of the statute their ordinary meanings.’ ”
People v Sands,
Both the common-law fraud statute and the larceny-by-conversion statute provide sufficient warning of what is prohibited by the statute. Although the common-law fraud statute does not define the terms “gross fraud or cheat,” the common meaning of these terms would encompass defendant’s conduct in this case. “Fraud” is defined as “[a] knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to his or her detriment.” Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed). “Cheat” is defined as “ [t]o defraud; to practice deception.” Id. “Gross” is defined as “flagrant and extreme. . . .” Random House Webster's College Dictionary (2000). Evidence presented at the trial showed that defendant used campaign lists from the Bush and Gore campaigns to solicit potential donors with letters implying an affiliation with the campaigns and candidates. Defendant solicited more than $700,000 using the campaign lists and misleading solicitation letters. We find that this clearly fits under a common definition of “gross fraud or cheat.”
The larceny-by-conversion statute also clearly applied to defendant’s conduct in this case. Defendant *384 argues that a reasonable person would not have known that the FEC disclosure lists belonged to the candidates or campaigns and would have thought that the lists were in the public domain. However, a reasonable person would know that the lists came from the candidates or campaigns because the lists were disclosed to the FEC by the candidates or campaigns. Additionally, a reasonable person would know that the lists were not information in the public domain to be used however one saw fit because of the warning on the FEC website that the information may not be used for solicitation purposes. The evidence presented at trial showed that defendant did just that. Therefore, the larceny-by-conversion statute was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant.
Defendant next argues that he was the victim of vindictive prosecution. We disagree. Vindictive prosecution occurs when a defendant is prosecuted for asserting a constitutional right.
People v Ryan,
Defendant next argues that the order of restitution violated his protection against double jeopardy. We disagree. We review an unpreserved double jeopardy issue for plain error.
People v Williams,
Defendant finally argues that he was denied a fair trial because the two counts of larceny by conversion were not severed from the other counts. Defendant did not preserve this issue by raising it at the trial court level, and defendant fails to explain and provide authority for this argument on appeal. As such, we consider the issue to have been abandoned.
People v Harris,
Affirmed.
Notes
Defendant is correct in arguing that false pretenses cannot be based on a misrepresentation of a future event.
People v Cage,
Defendant argues on appeal that the proposed testimony he offered at trial was expert testimony. However, there was no mention of the fact that this witness was an expert at the trial court level.