PEOPLE v DENIO; PEOPLE v GILBERT BANKS; PEOPLE v TUCKER
Docket Nos. 105328, 101601, 103191
Supreme Court of Michigan
Argued March 4, 1997. Decided June 17, 1997.
454 Mich 691
Gilbert Banks pleaded guilty in the Muskegon Circuit Court, James M. Graves, Jr., J., of conspiracy to deliver less than fifty grams of cocaine and possession with intent to deliver less than fifty grams of cocaine, and, pursuant to § 7401(3), was sentenced to conseсutive prison terms. The Court of Appeals, D. E. HOLBROOK, JR., J., and SHEPHERD and MARILYN KELLY, JJ., affirmed in an unpublished opinion per curiam (Docket No. 164750). The defendant appeals.
Robert Lee Tucker was convicted by a jury in the Mason Circuit Court, Richard I. Cooper, J., of conspiracy to deliver less than fifty grams of cocaine and delivery of less than fifty grams of cocaine, and, pursuant to § 7401(3), was sentenced to consecutive prison terms. The Court of Appeals, MACKENZIE, P.J., and GRIFFIN and NEFF, JJ., affirmed in an unpublished opinion per curiam (Docket No. 151725). The defendant appeals.
In an opinion by Justice RILEY, joined by Chief Justice MALLETT, and Justices BRICKLEY, BOYLE, and WEAVER, the Supreme Court held:
The Legislature intended the consecutive sentencing provision of
- The term penalty in the conspiracy statute is directed at the sentencing court, the entity that imposes penalties, as is the consecutive sentencing provision of § 7401(3). Thus, § 7401(3) constitutes a penalty as that term is used in the conspiracy statute. Section 7401(3) was intended to deter drug offenses, and the need for deterrence is not diminished when the crime is сonspiracy to commit the enumerated drug offense rather than the drug offense itself. Because § 7401(3) falls within the term penalty in the conspiracy statute, the trial court properly imposed Denio‘s cocaine conspiracy sentence to run consecutively with his marijuana conspiracy sentence.
- The guarantee against double jeopardy protects against multiple prosecutions and multiple punishments for the same offense. The intent of the Legislature is the determining factor under the United States and Michigan Constitutions. The Legislature may determine what activity constitutes a criminal offense subject to criminal penalty. The Double Jeopardy Clauses restrict the courts from imposing more punishment than that intended by the Legislature. Thus, if the Legislature desires, it may specifically authоrize penalties for what otherwise would be the same offense. Cumulative punishment of the same conduct under two different statutes in a single trial does not run afoul of the United States or Michigan Double Jeopardy Clause.
- Under both federal and state analyses, it is clear that the Legislature intended to separately punish a defendant convicted both of conspiracy to commit a drug offense and of the substantive drug offense, even if committed in the same criminal transaction.
Denio, reversed.
Banks, affirmed.
Tucker, affirmed.
Justice CAVANAGH, dissenting, stated that the conspiracy statute provides that a person convicted of a conspiracy shall be punished by a penalty equal to what could be imposed if convicted of the underlying crime. Its reference to the underlying substantive offense is simply a shortcut for allotting prison terms without having to enact separate statutory provisions for conspiracy that merely repeat the allowable prison terms or fines enumerated for
It is indisputable that Denio‘s convictions were obtained pursuant to the conspiracy statute, and, therefore, it is equally indisputable that his sentences were, and could only be, imposed pursuant to that statute. The general reference in the conspiracy statute to the penalty prescribed for the relevant underlying crime is superseded by the specific requirement of § 7401(3) that a mandatory imposition of consecutive sentences applies only when a defendant has a term of imprisonment imposed pursuant to § 7401(3)(2)(a) or § 7403(2)(a)(i), (ii), (iii), (iv). The fact that the mоre specific provision of § 7401(3) was enacted more than a decade after the general language of the conspiracy statute further supports this conclusion.
Justice KELLY concurred with Justice CAVANAGH only in Denio and took no part in the decisions of Banks or Tucker.
214 Mich App 647; 543 NW2d 66 (1995) reversed.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Tony Tague, Prosecuting Attorney, and Kevin A. Lynch and Victor A. Fitz, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for the people in Denio and Banks.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Chris J. Van Oosterum, Prosecuting Attorney, and J. Ronald Kaplansky, Assistant Attorney General, for the people in Tucker.
Jeanice Dagher-Margosian for defendant Denio.
Joan Ellerbusch Morgan for defendant Banks.
State Appellate Defender (by Anne Yantus) for defendant Tucker.
Amici Curiae:
William Forsyth, President, John D. O‘Hair, Wayne County Prosecuting Attorney, Timothy A. Baughman, Chief, Research, Training and Appeals, and Jeffrey Caminsky, Assistant Prosecuting Attor-
Robin M. Lerg for Families Against Mandatory Minimums Foundation and National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
RILEY, J. In People v Denio, we are asked to construe the conspiracy statute,
We hold that the Legislature intended the consecutive sentencing provision of § 7401(3) to fall within the term penalty in the conspiracy statute because § 7401(3), like the conspiracy statute, is directed at the sentencing court, the entity that imposes penalties. We further hold that consecutive sentences for an enumerated drug offense and for conspiracy to commit the enumerated drug offense do not violate double jeopardy, even when the offenses are committed in the same criminal transaction. We base this
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
PEOPLE v DENIO
On August 3, 1994, during trial, Kimber Denio pleaded guilty of conspiracy to deliver less thаn fifty grams of cocaine,
Denio appealed his sentences, arguing that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. The Court of Appeals agreed, remanding Denio‘s case to the trial court directing it to sentence him to concurrent prison terms.4 The Court of Appeals reasoned that the consecutive sentencing provision of § 7401(3)
PEOPLE v BANKS
On April 5, 1993, Gilbert Banks pleaded guilty of conspiracy to deliver less than fifty grams of cocaine,
Banks appealed his sentences, arguing that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that § 7401(3) mandated consecutive sentences.8 On May 24, 1996, we granted Banks’ applicatiоn for leave to appeal.9
On February 14, 1992, following a jury trial, Robert Lee Tucker was convicted of conspiracy to deliver less than fifty grams of cocaine,
Tucker appealed his sentences, arguing that they violated the principle of proportionality. The Court of Appeals disagreed and affirmed the sentences imposed by the trial court.10 On May 24, 1996, we granted Tucker‘s application for leave to appeal.11
I
PEOPLE v DENIO
A
In Denio, we are asked to interpret the conspiracy statute and the consecutive sentencing provision of § 7401(3). Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law, see St George Greek Orthodox Church of Southgate v Laupmanis Associates, PC, 204 Mich App 278, 282; 514 NW2d 516 (1994), which we review de novo. Cardinal Mooney High School v Michigan High School Athletic Ass‘n, 437 Mich 75, 80; 467 NW2d 21 (1991).
The purpose of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. People v Morris, 450 Mich 316, 326; 537 NW2d 842 (1995). If a statute is clear, we enforce it as plainly written. Id. However, if a statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation, we must engage in judicial construction and interpret the statute. Id.; Piper v Pettibone Corp, 450 Mich 565, 571; 542 NW2d 269 (1995). Furthermore, a statute that is unambiguous on its face can be rendered ambiguous by its interaction with and its relation to other statutes. People v Jahner, 433 Mich 490, 496; 446 NW2d 151 (1989), quoting 2A Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 46.04, pp 86-87.
In interpreting a statute, words are to be given their common, generally accepted meaning.
The rule of lenity provides that courts should mitigate punishment when the punishment in a criminal statute is unclear. Jahner, supra at 499-500. This rule, howеver, does not apply when construing the consecutive sentencing provision of § 7401(3) because our Legislature mandated in
B
Turning to the case now before us, Denio argues that § 7401(3) did not authorize the trial court to impose consecutive sentences because he was not convicted of a drug offense enumerated in that section; rather, he was convicted of conspiracy to commit an enumerated drug offense. We are not persuaded.
Denio was convictеd of conspiracy to deliver less than fifty grams of cocaine and conspiracy to deliver marijuana. The conspiracy statute provides that a person convicted of conspiracy
shall be punished by a penalty equal to that which could be imposed if he had been convicted of committing the crime he conspired to commit and in the discretion of the court an additional penalty of a fine of $10,000.00 may be imposed. [
MCL 750.157a(a) ;MSA 28.354(1)(a) (emphasis added).]
A person convicted of delivery of less than fifty grams of cocaine shall be imprisoned for not less than 1 year nor more than 20 years, and may be fined not more than $25,000.00, or placed on probation for life.13 At the time of Denio‘s trial, a person convicted of delivery of marijuana could be punished by
The triаl court sentenced Denio to consecutive terms of imprisonment for his convictions pursuant to § 7401(3), which provides in pertinent part:
A term of imprisonment imposed pursuant to subsection (2)(a) or section 7403(2)(a)(i), (ii), (iii), or (iv) shall be imposed to run consecutively with any term of imprisonment imposed for the commission of another felony.
The parties do not dispute that the conspiracy statute unambiguously mandates that a person convicted of conspiracy must be punished by the same penalty as if he were convicted of the substantive crime he conspired to commit. They also do not dispute that § 7401(3) unambiguously mandates that prison terms for the enumerated drug offenses must run consecutively with sentences imposed for other felonies. The parties differ, however, in their definition of the term penalty in the conspiracy statute. Essentially, Denio argues that the consecutive sentencing provision of § 7401(3) does not fall within the term
This Court interpreted the term penalty in the conspiracy statute in Jahner, supra, where we addressed whether a person sentenced to life imprisonment for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder is eligible for parole consideration under
While the conspiracy statute and the lifer law both address in general terms the punishment of criminal activity and therefore should be read in pari materia, the two statutes address separate and distinct considerations. The conspiracy statute is directed to the trial court and requires that it impose a particular penalty for the offense. However, the statutory command is discharged at the time of sentencing. By contrast, the lifer law is not directed at the
sentencing court, but rather governs the power and authority of the Parole Board to grant parole under certain circumstances. Given the autonomy granted to the Parole Board and the separate function which it serves, we do not believe that the term penalty as it is used in the conspiracy statute encompasses the parole considerations set forth in the lifer law. [Id. at 502.]
Unlike parole considerations direсted to the Parole Board, the consecutive sentencing provision of § 7401(3), like the conspiracy statute, is directed at the sentencing courts. Accordingly, we hold that the consecutive sentencing provision of § 7401(3) constitutes a penalty as that term is used in the conspiracy statute. Thus, being a penalty, the trial court was required to impose Denio‘s sentence for conspiracy to deliver less than fifty grams of cocaine to run consecutively with his sentence for conspiracy to deliver marijuana.
We note that our holding is consistent with the legislative purpose of the consecutive sentencing provision of § 7401(3), which was to deter drug offenses:
The enhancement of punishment through consecutive sentencing is a legislative action taken for the ostensible purpose of detеrring certain criminal behavior. People v Harden, 434 Mich 196, 201; 454 NW2d 371 (1990). With its focus on enhancement of the punishment for commission of certain controlled substance offenses, it is apparent that the aim of § 7401(3) is to deter commission of those offenses by mandating that sentences imposed for the drug crimes enumerated in the statute run consecutively to sentences imposed for other felonies. [Morris, supra at 327-328.]
Furthermore, the need for deterrence is not diminished when the crime at issue is conspiracy to commit the enumerated drug offense rather than the enu-
[C]ollective criminal agreement partnership in crime presents a greater potential threat to the public than individual delicts. Concerted action both increases the likelihood that the criminal object will be successfully attained and decreases the probability that the individuals involved will depart from their path of criminality. Group association for criminal purposes often, if not normally, makes possible the attainment of ends more complex than those which one criminal could accomplish. Nor is the danger of a conspiratorial group limited to the particular end toward which it has embarked. Combination in crime makes more likely the commission of crimes unrelated to the original purpose for which the group was formed. In sum, the danger which a conspiracy generates is not confined to the substantive offense which is the immediate aim of the enterprise. [People v Carter, 415 Mich 558, 570; 330 NW2d 314 (1982), quoting Callanan v United States, 364 US 587, 593-594; 81 S Ct 321; 5 L Ed 2d 312 (1961).]
Finally, the common meaning of penalty suppоrts our holding. The Random House Webster‘s College Dictionary defines penalty as a punishment imposed or incurred for a violation of law [or] rule . . . . A sentencing court imposes punishment. By contrast, the Parole Board relaxes the punishment already imposed by the courts.
Accordingly, because the consecutive sentencing provision of § 7401(3) falls within the term penalty in the conspiracy statute, the trial court properly imposed Denio‘s cocaine conspiracy sentence to run consecutively with his marijuana conspiracy sentence. Thus, we reverse the Court of Appeals decision that reversed the decision of the trial court.
PEOPLE v BANKS AND PEOPLE v TUCKER
A
Banks and Tucker initially argue that their respective sentencing judges erred in imposing consecutive sentences because conspiracy to commit an enumerated drug offensе does not constitute another felony as used in § 7401(3), especially because they committed both the enumerated drug offense and the other felony in the same criminal transaction. We reject defendants’ arguments without further analysis because this Court in Morris, supra, held that another felony includes any other felony violation for which a defendant is being sentenced, id. at 328 (emphasis added), regardless of whether the offenses were committed as part of the same transaction or in different and distinct transactions. Id. at 338.
Defendants also argue that consecutive sentences for an enumerated drug offense and for conspiracy to commit the enumerated drug offense, committed in the same criminal transaction, violate the protection against double jeopardy. This alternative argument prоffered by Banks and Tucker is an issue of first impression. It was left unresolved by Morris.15 We address that issue today, and, for the reasons that follow, find no double jeopardy violation.16
The guarantee against double jeopardy protects against multiple prosecutions and multiple punishments for the same offense.17 At issue in the cases before us is whether a drug offense enumerated in § 7401(3) and conspiracy to commit that enumerated drug offense, when committed in the same criminal transaction, constitutes the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. The intent of the Legislature is the determining factor under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States and Michigan Constitutions. People v Robideau, 419 Mich 458, 485; 355 NW2d 592 (1984). Therefore, the issue, stated more precisely, is whether the Legislature intended multiple punishments at a single trial for persons who commit, in the same criminal transaction, a drug offense enumerated
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the test enumerated in Blockburger v United States, 284 US 299, 304; 52 S Ct 180; 76 L Ed 306 (1932), is to be used to determine legislative intent in analyzing the protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution:
For over half a century we have determined whether a defendant has been punished twice for the same offense by applying the rule set forth in Blockburger v United States, 284 US 299, 304; 52 S Ct 180; 76 L Ed 306 (1932). If the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not. Ibid. In subsequent applications of the test, we have often concluded that two different statutes define the same offense, typically because one is a lesser included offense of the other. [Rutledge v United States, 517 US 292; 116 S Ct 1241; 134 L Ed 2d 419, 426 (1996).]
If the Blockburger test is satisfied, it is presumed that the Legislature did not intend to punish the defendant under both statutes. Whalen v United States, 445 US 684, 691-692; 100 S Ct 1432; 63 L Ed 2d 715 (1980). This presumption is rebutted, however, by a clear indication that the Legislature intended punishment under both statutes. Albernaz v United States, 450 US 333, 340; 101 S Ct 1137; 67 L Ed 2d 275 (1981); Mis-souri v Hunter, 459 US 359, 368-369; 103 S Ct 673; 74 L Ed 2d 535 (1983).
This Court has rejected the Blockburger test in analyzing the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Michigan Constitution, and instead uses traditional means to determine the intent of the Legislature, such as the subject, language, and history of the statutes. Robideau, supra at 486-487. In Robideau, supra at 487-488, we provided some guidance in furtherance of this task:
Statutes prohibiting conduct that is violative of distinct social norms can generally be viewed as separate and amenable to permitting multiple punishments. A court must identify the type of harm the Legislature intended to prevent. Where two statutes prоhibit violations of the same social norm, albeit in a somewhat different manner, as a general principle it can be concluded that the Legislature did not intend multiple punishments. For example, the crimes of larceny over $100,
MCL 750.356 ;MSA 28.588 , and larceny in a building,MCL 750.360 ;MSA 28.592 , although having separate elements, are aimed at conduct too similar to conclude that multiple punishment was intended.A further source of legislative intent can be found in the amount of punishment expressly authorized by the Legislature. Our criminal statutes often build upon one another. Where one statute incorporates most of the elements of a base statute and then increases the penalty as compared to the base statute, it is evidence that the Legislature did not intend punishment under both statutes. The Legislature has taken conduct from the base statute, decided that aggravating conduct deserves additional punishment, and imposed it accordingly, instead of imposing dual convictions.
We do not intend these principles to be an exclusive list. Whatever sources of legislative intent exist should be considered. If no conclusive evidence of legislative intent can
be discerned, the rule of lenity requires the conclusion that separate punishments were not intended.19
In analyzing the intent of the Legislature, it must be remembered that the Legislature‘s authority to define a single criminal act or offense is not diminished by the Double Jeopardy Clause. People v Wakeford, 418 Mich 95, 108; 341 NW2d 68 (1983). The Legislature is free to determine what activity constitutes a criminal offense subject to criminal penalty. Id.; Robideau, supra at 485. The Double Jeopardy Clauses restrict the courts from imposing more punishment than that intended by the Legislаture. Wakeford, supra at 108; Robideau, supra at 469. Thus, if the Legislature desires, it may specifically authorize penalties for what would otherwise be the same offense. People v Sturgis, 427 Mich 392, 403; 397 NW2d 783 (1986). [C]umulative punishment of the same conduct under two different statutes in a single trial does not run afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause in either the federal or state system. Id.
C
Turning to the cases now before us, we conclude that the trial courts’ imposition of consecutive sentences for Banks’ and Tucker‘s conspiracy and drug convictions did not run afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States or Michigan Constitution. Under both federal and state analyses, it is clear that the Legislature intended to separately punish a defendant convicted both of conspiracy to
With regard to the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution, Banks’ and Tucker‘s conspiracy and drug offenses do not constitute the same offense under the Blockburger test because conspiracy requires a combination or agreement and the drug offenses require possession of an illegal drug. Accordingly, defendants’ consecutive sentences, imposed pursuant to § 7401(3), do not violate the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.
The consecutive sentencing provision of § 7401(3) also does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Michigan Constitution. Focusing on the first source of legislative intent enumerated in Robideau, supra at 487-488, harm to society, the crimes of conspiracy and drug possession violate distinct social norms. The crime of conspirаcy is a continuing offense; it is presumed to continue until there is affirmative evidence of abandonment, withdrawal, disavowal, or defeat of the object of the conspiracy. United States v Castro, 972 F2d 1107, 1112 (CA 9, 1992). Accordingly, the crime of conspiracy poses a greater threat to society than the substantive crime forming the object of the conspiracy because each day‘s acts bring a renewed threat of the substantive evil [the legislature] sought to prevent. Toussie v United States, 397 US 112, 122; 90 S Ct 858; 25 L Ed 2d 156 (1970).20 As the New Jersey Supreme Court explained:
The [drug] conspiracy evidenced continuing and prolonged, rather than episodic, involvement in crime. The object of the conspiracy constituted a direct threat to society, as well as the indirect, albeit real, harm to persons who eventually would be mired in drugs. [In re Goldberg, 105 NJ 278, 283; 520 A2d 1147 (1987).]
In contrast to the overreaching and perpetual harm to society сaused by the crime of conspiracy, the specific aim of the Legislature in enacting § 7401 was to curb drug trafficking. As indicated in the legislative analysis:
Some persons claim that the state has failed to stem drug traffic because the penalties for drug dealing are not severe enough, and law enforcement tools are inadequate. They contend that the potential for profit in drug dealing is so great that Michigan‘s present penalties pose little or no deterrent to would-be violators, with lenient probation and parole policies weakening the threat of imprisonment still further. [People v Fields, 448 Mich 58, 64; 528 NW2d 176 (1995), quoting House Legislative Analysis, HB 4190, Third Analysis, May 17, 1978.]
Another distinction between conspiracy and the substantive drug offense is that the conspiracy statute punishes the planning of the offense and the drug statute punishes the actuаl commission of the crime. Carter, supra at 586.
The second source of legislative intent enumerated in Robideau, supra at 487-488, the amount of punishment expressly authorized by the Legislature, is not relevant to the cases now before us because the con-
Finally, the fact that Banks and Tucker committed the conspiracy and the substantive drug offense in the same criminal transaction is of no consequence. We have repeatedly held that conspiracy is a crime that is separate and distinct from the substantive crime that is its object. Carter, supra at 569; People v Tinskey, 394 Mich 108; 228 NW2d 782 (1975); People v Chambers, 279 Mich 73; 271 NW 556 (1937). Furthermore, the crime оf conspiracy does not merge into the offense committed in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Therefore, we hold, on the basis of the intent of the Legislature, that it does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of either the United States or Michigan Constitution to sentence a defendant to consecutive prison terms for conviction of a drug offense enumerated in § 7401(3) and conspiracy to commit that offense, even if committed in the same criminal transaction. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals properly affirmed the trial courts’ imposition of consecutive sentences.22
For the reasons stated above, we reverse the Court of Appeals decision in People v Denio holding that the trial court was without authority to impose consecutive sentences pursuant to § 7401(3). Consеcutive sentences were proper. Furthermore, we affirm the Court of Appeals decisions in People v Banks and People v Tucker. Contrary to defendants’ arguments, their consecutive sentences, imposed pursuant to § 7401(3), did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of either the United States or Michigan Constitution.
MALLETT, C.J., and BRICKLEY, BOYLE, and WEAVER, JJ., concurred with RILEY, J.
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). In Denio, the majority holds that the consecutive sentencing provision of
Section 7401(3) provides, in relevant part:
A term of imprisonment imposed pursuant to subsection (2)(a) or section 7403(2)(a)(i), (ii), (iii), or (iv) shall be imposed to run consecutively with any term of imprisonment imposed for the commission of another felony. [
MCL 333.7401(3) ;MSA 14.15(7401)(3) .]
It is indisputable that Denio‘s convictions were obtained pursuant to the conspiracy statute,
The majority also ignores the black-letter principle that the specific controls the general. The general reference in the conspiracy statute to the penalty prescribed for the relevant underlying crime is superseded by the specific requirement of § 7401(3) that a mandatory imposition of consecutive sentences applies only when a defendant has a term of imprisonment imposed pursuant to subsection (2)(a) [of § 7401(3)] or § 7403(2)(a)(i), (ii), (iii), or (iv) . . . . And the fact that the more specific statutory provision was enacted more than a decade after the general language of the conspiracy statute further supports this conclusion.
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the trial court in Denio and would remand the case for resentencing.
I also dissent in Banks and Tucker because I continue to believe that People v Morris, 450 Mich 316; 537 NW2d 842 (1995), was wrongly decided. See id. at 338-348 (LEVIN, J., joined by CAVANAGH, J., dissenting).
KELLY, J., concurred with CAVANAGH, J., only in Denio and took no part in the decisions of Banks and Tucker.
Notes
Any person who conspires together with 1 or more persons to commit an offense prohibited by law, or to commit a legal act in an illegal manner is guilty of the crime of conspiracy punishable as provided herein:
(a) except as provided in paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) if commission of the offense prohibited by law is punishable by imprisonment for 1 year or more, the person convicted under this section shall be punished by a penalty equal to that which could be imposed if he had been convicted of committing the crime he conspired to commit and in the discretion of the court an additional penalty of a fine of $10,000.00 may be imposed.
(b) Any person convicted of conspiring to violate any provision of this act relative to illegal gambling or wagering or any other acts or ordinances relative to illegal gambling or wagering shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than 5 years or by a fine of not more than $10,000.00, or both such fine and imprisonment.
(c) If commission of the offense prohibited by law is punishable by imprisonment for less than 1 year, except as provided in paragraph (b), the person convicted under this section shall be imprisoned fоr not more than 1 year nor fined more than $1,000.00, or both such fine and imprisonment.
(d) Any person convicted of conspiring to commit a legal act in an illegal manner shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than 5 years or by a fine of not more than $10,000.00, or both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court.
A term of imprisonment imposed pursuant to subsection (2)(a) or section 7403(2)(a)(i), (ii), (iii), or (iv) shall be imposed to run consecutively with any term of imprisonment imposed for the commission of another felony. An individual subject to a mandatory term of imprisonment under subsection (2)(a) or section 7403(2)(a)(i), (ii), (iii), or (iv) shall not be eligible for probation, suspension of that sentence, or parole during that mandatory term, except and only to the extent that those provisions permit probation for life, and shall not receive a reduction in that mandatory term of imprisonment by disciplinary credits or any other type of sentence credit reduction.
Marihuana or a mixture containing marihuana, is guilty of a felony, punishable as follows:
(i) If the amount is 45 kilograms or more, or 200 plants or more, by imprisonment for not more than 15 years or a fine of not more than $10,000,000.00, or both.
(ii) If the amount is 5 kilograms or more but less than 45 kilograms, or 20 plants or more but fewer than 200 plants, by imprisonment for not more than 7 years or a fine of not more than $500,000.00, or both.
(iii) If the amount is less than 5 kilograms or fewer than 20 plants, by imprisonment for not more than 4 years or a fine of not more than $20,000.00, or both.