Defendant, Charles Demers, was arrested and charged with breаking and entering with intent to commit a felony or larceny pursuant to CL 1948, § 750.110 (Stat Ann 1962 Bev § 28-.305). The crime took place November 26, 1964, in thе city of Benton Harbor.
Upon arraignment, December 4, 1964, tо answer an information charging him with the ofíense, defendant, unrepresented by counsel, pleaded guilty and later was sentenced to 3 to 10 years in prison.
Defendant appеals on various grounds, all of which are directed toward stаtutory and constitutional issues arising from arraignment.
To go to the heart of defendant’s appeal, we set forth the rеlevant part of GCB 1963, 785.3(1), supplying emphasis where it bears on this appeal:
“Arraignment. If the accused is not represеnted by counsel upon arraignment, before he is required tо plead, the court shall advise the accused that hе is entitled to a trial by jury and to have counsel, and that in cаse he is financially unable to provide counsel the сourt will, if accused so requests, appoint counsel fоr him.”
Following is the relevant portion of the record on arraignment:
*240 “Court. It carries a maximum penalty of 10 years in the penitentiary. You are entitled to a trial to determine whether or not you are guilty of this charge. You are entitled to counsel to defend you; of yоur own choosing if you have sufficient funds to employ counsel, and, if.not, then appointed by the court at the expense of the people. You also have a right to plead to it if you wish. What is your desire ?
“Defendant.. Plead guilty.”
Defendant has assigned as error the fact that he was not apprised of his right to jury trial on arraignment—and indeed he was not, a fact concеded by the prosecution.
Defendant submits a number of subjective reasons why he was prejudiced by this failure to inform him of his right to jury triаl: that the court and prosecutor were not clearly divorced in his mind, that the judge in the instant case failed in convеying the idea of impartiality to him, that all those present were interested in his sentencing and that he consequently pleaded guilty.
The people, as appellees, conversely use subjective arguments to say that this was not prеjudicial error, specifically by the statement from their brief: “Query: Does the average person, uninformed as to the law, associate a trial with a jury? Submitted that he definitely doеs so. In fact, appellee respectfully submits that appellant also understood that his right to a trial meant a trial by jury, and challenges him to show otherwise.”
The problem, it seems to us, is not what was in the mind of the defendant, the prosecutоr, or the judge, but whether the court rule was complied with.
Problems arising from GrCK 1963, 785.3, have come to this court in its brief existence with increasing-frequency. See
People
v.
Hunn
(1965), 1 Mich App
*241
580;
People
v.
Atkins
(1966),
It is not necessary to assume thе role of a martinet to state that GCR 1963, 785.3(1), was not complied with here, specifically in that defendant was not told of his right to a jury trial.
A trial court need not be avuncular in its compliance with GCR 1963, 785.3(1), but all its mandates must be observed. Five minutes invested in a thorough compliance with the rule could yield untold benefits for all concerned with a criminal prosecution.
Reversed and remanded.