15 Cal. 2d 393 | Cal. | 1940
This appeal from a judgment imposing the extreme penalty comes before us pursuant to the provisions of section 1239 of the Penal Code, which section authorizes an “automatic” appeal in all death penalty cases. No brief has been filed on behalf of the defendant, though a “memorandum” has been filed by the attorney-general stating the general nature of the case. An examination of the entire transcript has failed to reveal anything of a prejudicial or reversible character.
It appears that the district attorney of Sacramento County filed an information charging the defendant with the murder of one Lim Ding, a Chinese, on April 19, 1939. Upon his arraignment the defendant entered the dual plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. The trial on the general
As stated, the defendant offered no evidence upon the general issue, and the jury, under the circumstances, returned a verdict of murder of the first degree without recommendation. The trial upon the defendant’s insanity plea then proceeded, as authorized by statute, before the same jury. In view of the ultimate inability of the jury to reach a verdict upon the issue raised by said plea, it was discharged and a new jury sworn to try the sanity issue. At the conclusion of a lengthy trial, wherein evidence making up a transcript of several hundred pages was introduced, the jury returned a verdict finding the defendant sane at the time of the commission of the homicide. Under the verdicts and the law, the trial court had no alternative but to enter judgment imposing the extreme penalty.
The evidence, lay and expert, addressed to the insanity issue, is in sharp conflict and leaves no room for an appellate court to interfere with the finding of the jury thereon. Therefore, it will serve no useful purpose to narrate the evidence in great detail. Suffice it to say that the defendant produced as witnesses his brother, a cousin, a fellow laborer and several inmates of the county jail who occupied the same “tank”
As against this showing of the defendant, the prosecution produced as a witness the deputy sheriff who had charge of the county jail and who over a period of months had opportunity to observe the defendant. He testified that he had never seen anything unusual in the defendant’s conduct and that none of his fellow inmates ever had complained of the defendant’s actions. Without narrating his testimony, another witness, who had been employed by the district attorney to “serve” a term in the county jail in order to observe the defendant, contradicted much of the testimony of the other inmates. The prosecution called as witnesses three medical experts, two of whom had been appointed by
Another expert, a psychiatrist, who had been employed by the district attorney.to examine the defendant, testified that during his examination the defendant stated he had shot the deceased “because he tried to cheat him”. The witness related that the defendant gave no evidence of having any delusions or hallucinations. It was the opinion of the doctor that the defendant knew the difference between right and wrong.
Finally, the prosecution called Dr. Smythe, superintendent of the Stockton State Hospital, who likewise had been appointed by the court to examine the defendant. The witness testified that defendant said he nearly always lost at the gambling house where deceased worked and was shot, and that the defendant appeared to be resentful toward the deceased because he (the defendant) had been called “a cheap gambler” and told “not to come back any more”. As a result of this, the defendant told the witness that “he was angry, very angry”. To this witness the defendant likewise mentioned his use of marijuana and his knowledge of the fact that users of the drug were put in “this here jail”. The doctor expressed the opinion that the defendant “belongs to that class of people who have a constitutional anti-social understanding, and that he did know the difference between right and wrong”.
The foregoing adequately discloses that there is in the record ample evidence of a substantial nature to support the verdict of the jury that the defendant was sane at the time of the commission of the homicide. In view of such verdict and the prior verdict on the general issue finding
The judgment and order denying a new trial are, and each is, affirmed.
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Houser, J., Curtis, J., and Waste, C. J., concurred.