76 Cal. App. 2d 701 | Cal. Ct. App. | 1946
Having been accused by information of stealing a white-faced heifer, defendants were all convicted by the court, trial by jury having been expressly waived. Inasmuch as Lloyd Davis failed to prosecute his appeal, for convenience his eodefendants only will be hereinafter referred to as appellants. They now urge the (1) insufficiency of the evidence, (2) want of proof of the corpus delicti and (3) failure to make a finding of grand theft as grounds for reversal.
In answer to the questions of the officer, Lloyd admitted ownership of the gun but denied knowledge of the knives or of the origin of the blood and hair on them. He asserted that he had picked up two sailors who had driven while he slept, only suddenly to awake to find that he was parked alone in a field. Officer Stephens, with Moody and John Meders, ranch superintendent of the Albertson Company, owner of the calf, then drove three miles over the course driven by Lloyd in his flight and discovered the hindquarters. The brand was identified by Meders and Mr. Albertson. Officer Poye proceeded then with Lloyd to the jail at Ventura, observing the boy’s clothing covered with blood.
About 3:45 a. m. on Highway 101 Poye saw appellants hitchhiking, their trousers wet to the thighs. Having been apprehended at his radioed suggestion, they were immediately brought into consultation with their codefendant, Under-sheriff Suytar and deputies of the district attorney. Their statements were taken on a recording machine. Lloyd stated that after the heifer had been killed and the three were load
The foregoing is substantially the total of the evidence received at the examining trial, no objection having been interposed to any portion thereof. Bach defendant stated to the court that he had no witness to testify in his behalf and did not desire to take the stand. Thus the evidence of their theft was complete in that it established their felonious taking of the personal property of another. (Pen. Code, § 484.) They were armed with a gun capable of killing a bovine and with knives of sufficient strength and sharpness to dissect its body. They drove in the nighttime into a rural region, the desolation of which was marred only by the victim of Donald’s gun. They killed it and near midnight were surprised in the act of loading its hinder parts into a vehicle whereby they might speedily depart from the scene of their crime. Such facts, unsupported by a confession, evince a felonious intent to steal. However, they were emphasized by the voluntary statements made to the officials.
Appellants now contend that the animal was killed while they were hunting and the crime was therefore only a misdemeanor under section 384e, Penal Code. But that statute is a part of title X, having to do with ‘1 Crimes against the Public Health and Safety.” Its purpose is to prevent the killing, maiming, or wounding of animals “while hunting upon the inclosed lands of another.” Appellants were not hunting upon inclosed lands or at all. They were driving along an open country road at night when they deliberately killed the calf with gunfire and disemboweled and halved it on the spot.
Clearly the authors of the information accusing appellants had in mind the language of Penal Code, section 487. While section 484 makes it a theft to take the chattel of another with felonious intent, section 487 provides that if the
The assignment is made that the court erred in not requiring the introduction of the records of defendants’ statements taken by the undersheriff and the prosecuting attorney. That question was not presented to the trial court. It cannot therefore be criticized for failing to do what it was not asked to do. The only evidence received by the trial court was that introduced in the justice’s court. After the record made by the examining magistrate was by stipulation submitted to the superior court the latter could in no respect modify such record. It was as complete as appellants desired it to be. No law is known to this court which requires that the recording of an extrajudicial statement of an accused person be either transcribed or introduced. The testimony of competent witnesses to such utterances is sufficient to prove the fact.
Judgments affirmed.
McComb, J., and Wilson, J., concurred.