THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MALIK DAVIS, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 2-24-0663
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS SECOND DISTRICT
January 17, 2025
2025 IL App (2d) 240663-U
JUSTICE MULLEN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices McLaren and Jorgensen concurred in the judgment.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kane County. No. 23-CF-2564. Honorable David P. Kliment, Judge, Presiding. NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
¶ 1 Held: The trial court did not err in granting the State‘s petition to deny defendant pretrial release and ordering him detained.
¶ 2 Defendant, Malik Davis, appeals from orders of the circuit court of Kane County granting the State‘s verified petition to deny him pretrial release pursuant to article 110 of the
I. BACKGROUND
¶ 3
¶ 4 On November 28, 2023, defendant was charged by indictment with 8 counts of first-degree murder (
¶ 5 Also on January 3, 2024, the State filed a verified petition to deny defendant pretrial release. In its petition, the State alleged that defendant was charged with detention-eligible offenses and he posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community. The State attached to its petition a sworn synopsis drafted by the arresting agency in this case. A public safety assessment (Assessment) completed on January 4, 2024, scored defendant at a one
¶ 6 At the March 15, 2024, hearing, the State initially submitted four exhibits: (1) a discharge report for M.D. dated February 9, 2021, from Advocate Children‘s Hospital; (2) a skeletal imaging survey of M.M.D. dated March 12, 2021; (3) a report of postmortem examination of M.M.D.; and (4) the sworn synopsis drafted by the arresting agency.2 The State then proffered that M.M.D. and M.D. were born healthy twins in November 2020. Through February 2021, M.D. was twice admitted to the hospital and diagnosed with subdermal hematomas at different stages of healing, a fractured clavicle, and fractured ribs. On the morning of March 8, 2021, defendant called 911, saying that he had performed cardiopulmonary resuscitation on M.M.D. because he had gone limp. Defendant was allegedly calm when the police and the paramedics arrived, and he did not appear at the hospital until an hour after M.M.D.‘s arrival. M.M.D. ultimately died from his injuries,
¶ 7 The State further proffered that the police examined defendant‘s cell phone and discovered numerous Google searches. In December 2020, when neither child was in the hospital, defendant‘s phone was used to search “small bump on one-month-old head” (searched six times) and “head injury baby” (searched twice). On February 10, 2021, one day after M.D. was released from the hospital, there were 17 searches for “infant spiral fracture,” though M.D. had not been diagnosed with that injury. In the following days, there were searches for “symptoms of being strangled” (searched seven times), “symptoms of being strangled infant” (searched three times), “choking treatments” (searched one time), “infant broken neck symptoms” (searched five times), “poisoned infant” (searched three times), “child abuse found years later” (searched six times), “side effects of air deprivation” (searched three times), “signs of poisoning” (searched three times), “infant broken neck” (searched five times), and “child abuse, no evidence” (searched three times). Five days before M.M.D. was hospitalized, there were searches for “child abuse, no death” (searched five times) and “child abuse Illinois” (searched five times). Shortly after M.M.D. was admitted to the hospital, there were searches for “child abuse 2021,” “child abuse 2021 Illinois,” “child abuse first offense,” “arrested for child abuse,” “SIDS [sudden infant death syndrome],” “infant dies do you get charged,” “can you go to jail for accidentally killing your baby,” “can you go to jail if child dies, no proof,” “death of infant labeled as abuse no proof,” and “SBS [shaken-baby syndrome] infant.” The day after M.M.D. was admitted to the hospital, there were additional searches, including the phrases “if hospital says shaken baby syndrome, do you go to jail,” “fastest way to commit suicide,” “how long does it take you to go to jail after infant dies,” and “how bad is jail really.”
¶ 9 Defense counsel responded that M.M.D. and M.D. were not born healthy and the injuries could have been from problems during childbirth or other non-abusive means. He noted that the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) had been involved after M.D.‘s initial hospitalization, but the safety plans were terminated because the allegations of abuse were “unfounded.” Defense counsel did not dispute that the offenses with which defendant is charged are detainable, but contended that defendant did not pose a threat. Defense counsel emphasized that defendant, who was 23 years of age, had no criminal history, had no history of violence, has worked consistently from January 2016 through June 2023, and has siblings and parents in the area who are supportive. Defense counsel argued that there are less restrictive conditions than detention. Defense counsel posited that, if released, defendant could live in Illinois with his father, continue to work at his most recent job (a delivery driver), be ordered to have no contact with minors, and be monitored by GPS. Alternatively, defendant could reside with his mother in Missouri.
¶ 10 In reply, the State noted that defendant was “indicated” by DCFS after M.M.D. passed away. The State also maintained that electronic home monitoring is not the least restrictive means
¶ 11 The court granted the State‘s petition to detain defendant and issued a written order summarizing its findings. The court found that the proof is evident and the presumption great that defendant committed a detainable offense. The court also found that defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community. The court acknowledged defendant‘s history and characteristics, including “his complete lack of criminal history” and “his apparent nonviolent nature,” but noted that it also had to look at the allegations in the case. The court observed that defendant is charged with “numerous non-probationable violent offenses against infants.” The court pointed to the “profound injuries” to the two infants, one of whom died. The court noted that defendant did not make any statements, but found that the content of the Google searches showed “consciousness of guilt, that [defendant] knew he did something wrong.” The court found that defendant “exhibited extreme violence to the minor children” and that “should there be contact” by defendant with M.D. or any other minor, the child “would be at risk in this defendant‘s presence.” The court concluded that there are no conditions that can mitigate the real and present threat posed by defendant to M.D. or the public because GPS and electronic home monitoring “cannot guarantee any person‘s safety if the defendant chooses to commit future violent acts.”3
¶ 13 The court denied defendant‘s motion. The court observed that there were two victims with numerous traumatic injuries and the acts were violent. The fact that M.D. and her mother had moved to Texas did not persuade the court that the surviving child was not at risk or that, should defendant be around other minors, “that they would not then also be at risk.” Consequently, the trial court reaffirmed its earlier ruling that there are no less restrictive means than detention to protect the public and M.D. from the threat posed by defendant. At a subsequent hearing, defense counsel indicated that defendant wished to appeal, but was now indigent. The court appointed the Office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD), and defendant filed a notice of appeal on October 9, 2023. See
II. ANALYSIS
¶ 14
¶ 15 On appeal, defendant contends that given his lack of criminal history and the unlikeliness that he would reoffend, the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community and that no conditions of release could mitigate any alleged threat.
¶ 16 Article 110 of the Code, as amended by the Acts, abolished traditional monetary bail in favor of pretrial release on personal recognizance or with conditions of release.
¶ 18 Defendant first contends that the State did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that he posed a real and present threat to M.D. such that he should be incarcerated. In support of this contention, defendant notes that the allegations in this case stem from 2021, but he was not charged until late in 2023. In the interim, M.D. has been safe and healthy and now resides with her mother in Texas. Defendant further cites his lack of a criminal record and observes that no criminal allegations have been made against him following the dates of the allegations in this case through the date of his arrest. Defendant posits that the lengthy time without criminal activity is evidence that he is unlikely to reoffend. Defendant also maintains that he does not pose a real and present threat to the community in general because he does not regularly interact with children and “child abuse cases are not correlated with an increased risk to the public.” Defendant asserts that the question before the court was whether he posed a “real and present” threat, not a speculative threat
¶ 19 In considering whether a defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community, the Code provides that the trial court may consider evidence or testimony concerning factors that include, but are not limited to (1) the nature and circumstances of any offense charged, including whether the offense was a crime of violence, involved a weapon, or was a sex offense; (2) the history and characteristics of the defendant, including the defendant‘s prior criminal history indicative of violent, abusive, or assaultive behavior or lack of such behavior and the defendant‘s psychological history or lack of such history; (3) the identity of any person to whom the defendant is believed to pose a threat and the nature of the threat; (4) any statements made by or attributed to the defendant, together with the circumstances surrounding the statements; (5) the age and physical condition of the defendant; (6) the age and physical condition of any victim or complaining witness; (7) whether the defendant is known to possess or have access to any weapons; (8) whether at the time of the current offense or any other offense, the defendant was on probation, parole, or other form of supervised release from custody; and (9) any other factors, including those listed in section 110-5 of the Code (
¶ 20 The record in this case establishes that the trial court clearly assessed the statutory factors and found that they weighed in favor of a finding that defendant posed a real and present threat to M.D. and the public at large. In this regard, the court acknowledged defendant‘s “complete lack of criminal history” and “his apparent nonviolent nature.” Nevertheless, the court noted that it had
¶ 21 Nevertheless, defendant insists that he is unlikely to reoffend. In support, defendant emphasizes his lack of criminal history, the fact that no criminal allegations have been made against him following the dates of the allegations in this case and his arrest, and M.D.‘s living arrangements. Defendant also insists that he does not pose a real and present threat to the
¶ 22 Defendant also contends that, even if the State proved that he posed a threat, the State failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that any alleged threat could not be mitigated by
¶ 23 In determining whether a specific threat can be mitigated through the imposition of conditions of pretrial release, the trial court considers: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged; (2) the weight of the evidence against the defendant; (3) the history and characteristics of the defendant; (4) the nature and seriousness of the real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community that would be posed by the defendant‘s release; and (5) the nature and seriousness of the risk of obstructing or attempting to obstruct the criminal justice process that would be posed by the defendant‘s release.
¶ 24 Here, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate the real and present threat posed by defendant. We cannot find that a conclusion opposite that of the trial court‘s is clearly apparent. The victims in this case were both infants, a particularly vulnerable subset of the community needing protection. The proffer made at the detention hearing suggests that the violent acts committed against the infants were not singular events. M.D. was admitted to the hospital on more than one occasion and was diagnosed with severe injuries, including subdermal hematomas and broken bones. M.M.D. was diagnosed with similar injuries when he was hospitalized. The postmortem skeletal survey demonstrated that M.M.D.‘s injuries were compatible with nonaccidental trauma. Given the tender age of the victims, the numerous injuries sustained by the victims, and the violent nature of their injuries, the court concluded that the conditions for release suggested by defendant would not mitigate the real and present threat posed by defendant to M.D. or the public. The court expressly rejected GPS and electronic home monitoring because such tools “cannot guarantee any person‘s safety if the defendant chooses to commit future violent acts.” Indeed, while GPS or electronic home monitoring would indicate defendant‘s location, it would not show if defendant was in the presence of a minor. Considering the foregoing, we cannot say that the trial court‘s finding that no condition or combination of conditions can mitigate the real and present threat to the physical safety of any person or persons or the community was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 26
¶ 27 For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County.
¶ 28 Affirmed.