Lead Opinion
AFTER REMAND
This matter returns to us following our remand to the sentencing court to determine in light of People v Sanders,
Defendant’s sentence arose from his guilty plea to a charge of obtaining a controlled substance by fraud, MCL 333.7407(l)(c). He was sentenced to one to four years’ imprisonment and $1,000 in court costs, as well as other costs and fees. In keeping with our remand order, the sentencing court held a hearing and received еvidence that the average actual court cost for criminal cases in the Allegan Circuit Court is $1,238.48. On the basis of that figure, the sentencing court held that there was a reasonable relationship between the $1,000 in imposed court costs and the actual costs incurred. Defendant does not challenge that finding on appeal.
Instead, defendant contends that the sentencing court erred by (1) including in its calculation the expenses associated with maintaining governmental agencies and (2) failing to calculate the particular costs incurred in this case. We disagree with both of defendant’s contentions.
The controlling law establishes that a sentencing court may consider overhead costs when determining the reasonableness of a court-costs figure. In this case, the sentencing court imposed costs under MCL 769.1k, which provides, in relevant part:
(1) If a defendant enters a plea of guilty .. . both of the following apply at the time of the sentencing or at the time entry of judgment of guilt is deferred pursuant to statute or sentencing is delayеd pursuant to statute:
(a) The court shall impose the minimum state costs as set forth in section lj [MCL 769. lj] of this chapter.
(b) The court may impose any or all of the following:
(i) Any fíne.
*221 (ii) Any cost in addition to the minimum state cost set forth in subdivision (a).
(Hi) The expenses of providing legal assistance to the defendant.
(;iv) Any assessment authorized by law.
0v) Reimbursement under section If [MCL 769.If] of this chapter.
In People v Sanders,
Sanders also establishes that a sentencing court need not calculatе particularized court costs in every criminal case. In the initial Sanders opinion,
[W]e would be hesitant to uphold an approach that would take into аccount whether the case was resolved by a plea or by a trial. If we embraced defendant’s argument that costs should be less in a case resolved by a plea that only took “25 minutes of court time” rather than by a trial, there would be a realistic concern that we would be penalizing a defendant for going to trial rather than pleading guilty. That is, a system where greater costs were imposed on a defendant who went to trial rather than plead guilty or nolo contendere would create a financiаl incentive for a defendant to plead rather than face the possibility of*222 even greater court costs being imposed for exercising his or her constitutional right to a trial. [People v Sanders (After Remand),298 Mich App 105 , 108;825 NW2d 376 (2012).]
In sum, we find no error warranting reversal in the sentencing court’s assessment of costs in this case.
Affirmed.
Fitzgerald, EJ., concurred with O’Connell, J.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). The majority follows People v Sanders,
In People v Dilworth, our Court considered whеther “overhead” charges, i.e., the costs of operating a court system regardless of the filing of the single case at issue, could be assessed as court costs incurred in prosecuting the defendant. We held that such an assessment was improper:
When authorized, the costs of prosecution imposed “must bear some reasonable relation to the expenses actually incurred in the prosecution.” People v Wallace,245 Mich 310 , 314;222 NW 698 (1929). Furthermore, these costs may not include “expenditures in connection with the maintenance and functioning of gоvernmental agencies that must he borne by the public, irrespective of specific violations of the law.” People v Teasdale,335 Mich 1 , 6;55 NW2d 149 (1952). (some emphasis added). [Dilworth,291 Mich App at 401 ].
Dilworth went on to distinguish between “apрropriate charges, such as expert witness fees” which are incurred on a case-by-case basis as opposed to “impermissible charges, such as . . . wages, which were set by a
In Sanders, this Court addressed the same question under MCL 769.1k, which allows, but dоes not require, a sentencing court to assess “[a]ny cost in addition to the minimum state cost” of $68.00 if the defendant is convicted of a felony. Directly contrary to Dilworth, Sanders held that “ovеrhead” costs may be imposed as long as they bear a “reasonable relationship between the costs imposed and the actual costs incurred by the trial court.” Sanders,
Sanders essentially ignored the holding in Dilworth by which it was bound. Both cases allowed for the assessment of the costs of prosecuting a convicted criminal defendant. Dilworth held that such costs are limited to those specifically incurred because of the individual case, not a “share” of the overall cost of having courts and prosecutors. Sanders concluded that costs of the court may include the general costs of maintaining the judicial branch of government.
The Sanders panel also rejeсted a holding of the Michigan Supreme Court. It concluded that it need not follow
shall not be confined to or governed by the laws or rules governing the taxation of costs in ordinary criminal procedure, but may summarily tax and determine such costs without regard to the items ordinarily included in taxing costs in criminal cases and may include therein all such expenses, direct and indirect, as the public has been or may be put to in connection with the apprehension, examination, trial and probаtionary oversight.... [1931 PA 308 , § 17373(3); 1948 CL 771.3(3) (emphasis added)].
Thus, Teasdale’s bar against costs for the overall operation of the courts was set out in the context of a statute that was far more consistent with such assessments than were the later amendments, which now control and which were likely a codification of the Teasdale holding.
Notes
The Sanders panel also failed to address other cases predating Dilworth, but consistent with it. See, e.g., People v Newton,