*1 of the State The PEOPLE Petitioner,
Colorado, CUNEFARE, Respondent.
Harold
No. 03SC782. Colorado,
Supreme Court
En Banc. 30, 2004.
Nov. Rehearing on Denial
As Modified
Dec.
KOURLIS, Justice. Cunefare,
In
v. Harold
August
victim
that
asserted
requested
defendant had contacted her and
Background
of Section 18-8-707
sign
her to
and forward the letter
companion
case of
Attorney
up
District
but that she had torn it
03SC559,
Yascavage, No.
signing
opined
it. The victim
that
without
(Colo.2004),
WL 2711049
we concluded
signed
had
her name on the
the defendant
general assembly
intended section 18-8-
Attorney's
and sent it to the District
range
a whole to criminalize a
wide
jury
guilty
office. The
returned verdiets of
activities related to interference with a wit
charges.
on both
ness or victim of a crime. We also held
appeal,
argued that
On
presents
each subsection of
an in
18-8-707
prosecution
present
failed to
sufficient evi-
dependent
objective prohibited under
prove beyond a
dence to
reasonable doubt
Therefore,
Tampering
statute.
sustain
tampering
that he committed
with a witness
conviction under section
the sub
appeals agreed.
forgery.
The court of
ject of the defendant's influence must be a
tampering charge,
As to the
the court held
person encompassed by
introductory pro
prove
attempt
that "the
an
must
objective
vision
defendant's
must be
testimony,
interfere with actual
which is an-
(c)
(1)(a), (b),
prohibited in subsection
trial,
ticipated
hearing,
at a
be offered
section 18-8-707.
proceeding,"
although
other
and that
the vie-
given
prosecu-
tim had
a "statement" to the
A "witness" covered
the statute is not
defendant,
prior
tor
to her contact with the
just
subject
legal process.
someone who is
there was no evidence that
the statement
Rather,
any
person:
"witness" means
natural
was sworn or otherwise constituted testimo-
(a) Having knowledge
the existence or
ny.
forgery charge,
As to the
the court
relating
any
mon-existence
of facts
prosecution
pres-
concluded that the
failed to
crime;
ent sufficient evidence that
the letter to the
(b) Whose declaration under oath
re-
prosecutor
was
document
affected
as evidence for
ceived or has been received
right
some
or status sufficient to fall within
any purpose;
statute. The court of
(c)
reported any
Who has
crime to
therefore vacated both convictions.
peace officer,
officer,
judi-
correctional
granted certiorari on the issues identi-
We
officer;
cial
that the
fied above and now conclude
subsec-
(d)
subpoena
tampering
tion of the
statute under which
Who has been served with
merely requires
authority of
court in
charged
Cunefare was
evi-
issued under the
state,
jury,
state,
grand
and also related the
any other
or of the
defendant's
this
States;
attempt
to influence her not to do so.
Id. at
United
charge
790-91.
trial court
dismissed the
(e)
by any
reason-
Who would
believed
cause,
probable
lack
and this court
described
person to be an individual
able
reversed,
(d)
concluding that the
(a), (b), (c),
statements at-
this
paragraph
"designed
tributed to the defendant were
subsection
justice
obstruct
and were within the ambit of
18-8-702(2)
added). Therefore,
§
the statute."
Id. at 792.
introductory portion of the statute con-
require proof
limitation that would
tains no
Scialabba,
charged
the defendant was
the witness or victim be under
against
pro
with assault
victim
and was
process.
*4
communicating
hibited from
with her.
55
then creates three dis-
Section 18-8-707
P.3d at 208. The evidence established he
tampering,
tinct forms of witness
each with wrote a letter
it
and mailed
to the victim's
required for a conviction.
different elements
Although
address.
the defendant used a dif
18-8-707(1)(a) prohibits
the defen-
Section
(which
ferent name for
victim
the
he had
inducing
attempting to induce a
dant from
or
past),
used in the
believed the
she
letter was
"testify falsely
or victim to
or unlaw-
witness
intended for her.
Id. The letter stated that
any testimony."
fully withhold
Section 18-8-
appear
if she were not to
in court on the
707(1)(b) prohibits the defendant from induc-
charges,
charges
assault
would be
ing
attempting
or
to induce
witness or
dropped,
thereby "making things good" with
any proceed-
victim to "absent himself from
later,
him.
AId. month
the defendant asked
summoned;"
ing
legally
to which he has been
his mother to contact the victim and tell her
18-8-707(I)(c) prohibits the de-
and section
appear
not
to
in court.
Id. at 211. The
in-
inducing
attempting
from
or
fendant
tampering
added a count of witness
legal pro-
or victim to "avoid
duce a witness
jury
and the
returned a verdict
summoning
testify."
him
cess
guilty
ap
on that count. The defendant
pealed, arguing
pertinent part
that he
Requirement
'Actual
2.
Testimo-
should have been entitled to an abandonment
ny"
tampering charge.
instruction on the
Id. at
requires
question
Our
on certiorari
us
appeals disagreed, holding
210. The court of
prosecution must
to determine what
tampering
that the crime of
is an intentional
prove to sustain a conviction under subsec
witness,
attempt
with a
without
to interfere
(1)(a)
ap
The court of
tion
of the statute.
regard to the success or failure of the at
peals
evidence
Therefore,
concluded
there must be
complete
tempt.
the crime was
attempt
"an
to interfere with actual testi
attempt
when the
was made.
testimony
mony," which it defined as
"antici
Scialabba,
wit-
Moyer
In both
and
trial,
hearing,
to be offered at a
or
pated
However,
actually
is
nesses
testified.
there
proceeding where witnesses would be
other
nothing
requires
in either case that
such
Cunefare,
P.3d at 596. In reach
sworn."
85
tampering. To
testimony as an element of
conclusion,
court of
re
this
contrary,
precept
both cases reaffirm the
People Moyer,
4. Section testimony support from Ms. Cunefare's 707(1)(a) statutory requirement that at the time of actions, jury defendant's he believed that vic- tampering charge, was On testify crime be called to instructed that the elements of the tim/witness were: intentionally attempted case and he to cause testify falsely. defendant, victim/witness
1. 2. in the [Tlhat State Colorado, place at or the date and about presented We conclude that the evidence charged, intentionally, attempts, 4. with- 8. jury was sufficient to sustain the tam- threats, bribery 5. to a wit- out induce pering conviction. victim, or a he ness or believes testify as a witness or vietim to be called Forgery B. Conviction to, testify proceeding 6. official falsely unlawfully toor withhold testi- Background mony. Additionally, People charged the de- offered at trial evidence fendant with under section 18-5- pending against were
that assault 102(1)(c), (2004), sending C.R.S. the Au- as which Ms. was Cunefare gust prosecutor's letter to the office recant- given victim. the named Ms. Cunefare had *6 ing pur- the initial statement of events and police concerning the statement to the porting signature. to contain the victim's charges. charges pending, were While those and con Cunefare contacted Ms. Cunefare The defendant was convicted under the sign vinced her to a letter to the District forgery provides: section of the statute that Attorney April recanting on 6 if, person forgery, A commits with intent stating evening that "the events of that defraud, makes, falsely person such 21, happened." on March never 1998[sicl alters, completes, or utters a written in- Ms. Cunefare testified that she felt under be, purports strument which is or or is letter, sign duress from Cunefare to that that represent calculated to become or to occurred, actually the events had and that (c) ... ... completed: instrument [an] fur the recantation was therefore false. She evidence, create, may which does or trans- August, again ther testified that in Cunefare fer, terminate, a or otherwise affect attempted persuade contacted her and her interest, right, obligation, or status. sign Attor a second letter to the District 18-5-102(1)(c) (emphasis § ney restating the false recantation. At that time, sign she declined to the letter. whether, question before us is forged assuming evidence to sustain the the vic
Such is sufficient it tampering. August Ms. was tim's name on the letter and sent conviction Cunefare Attorney pro- in the assault to the District in an effort to secure the named victim/witness charges, consti ceeding. It is reasonable to conclude from dismissal of the such conduct forgery the statute.4 tutes under her earlier statements that defendant at- respect may with finder infer the intent to defraud where 4. No issue is raised here law, passed defendant's intent. As a matter of the crime an instrument he knows to be guilty forgery complete when the act and Brown, 120, 122, v. 193 Colo. 562 false. People knowledge coincide with the intent to defraud. (1977). Where material 754, P.2d 755 por- 675 60, v. 166 Colo. 441 P.2d Gentry People, including name or instrument, tion of the (1968). necessary It re- is not signature, forgery is fictitious a conviction actually ceiving de- instrument be 122, Id. at 562 P.2d at be sustained. 755. complete crime. Id. The fact frauded to 308 1971, differing degrees. into Colo.Sess. Law Interpretation 18-5-102
2. Section 121, § at 484. The 1971 amend ch. 40-5-108 im questions of law There are two phrases arguably intend ment also included analysis: the first is whether the plicit flexibility applying allow more ed to is an instrument under 1998, gen forgery crimes.6 statute evi is whether it "does the second assembly again forgery eral amended create, transfer, terminate, dence, or other degree for merging statute first and second interest, legal right, obligation, affect a wise interpret that we gery into the broad statute § C.R.S. or status." 1998, 822, § today. Law ch. 18- Colo. Sess. an The definitions section of the statute 1975, 5-102, Specifically, question first for us. swers the 18-5-101(9), (2004), defines C.R.S. case, Until this Colorado courts have dealt "any paper, part instrument in written involving primarily forgery convictions document, containing or other negotiable guid This lack of instruments.7 equivalent printed written or matter or the precedent led the court thereof, purposes reciting, em used for could conclude that a conviction conveying, recording informa ploying, only where the interest or status con stand Avila, tion." also 770 P.2d See financial, testamentary templated relates to (Colo.App.1988) (holding computer 1330 However, property interest.. ized driver's records constitute "written Medina, (Colo.App.1996), instrument"). the defendant was convicted of after presenting prescription pharma to a false more diffi The second issue is the Ill.App.3d Merchant, cist. also See plain language of the statute cult one. The (sug 283 N.E.2d 63 only refers not to instruments that create a gesting although pharmacist suf would legal right encompasses also those that but loss, forged prescription pecuniary fer no may otherwise interest or sta affect pharmacist "intended to cause the to assume general assembly has not defined tus. right dispense prescription he had the interest, obligation, un legal right, or status drug to the defendant" was sufficient evi der section 18-5-102. Because the statute is uphold dence to conviction under the Illinois face, not clear on its we must turn to other statute). construction, including legislative tools of his *7 tory. jurisdictions Although no other have inter- precise language 'legal right, early forgery preted
An
the
of
version
Colorado's
status,"
interest,
jurisdic-
obligation, or
some
provides insight into what traditional
statute
forgery. §
tions
statutes similar to Colorado's have
ly constituted the crime of
with
(1963).
necessarily
presented
forgery
That
an
concluded that
should not
8 CRS.
statute
crimes,
including
affecting pecuniary
forgery
list of
be limited
instruments
exclusive
State,
handwriting
In
v.
309
287,
578,
ple Hagan,
The court of
v.
145 Ill.2d
164
apply.
Id. at 435.
Ill.Dec.
introductory pro
disagreed,
interpreting the
le.8
See
Gaul-Alexan
118,
536,
(2002),
264 Ill.Dec.
§ determining 170.10 N.E.2d at 1236. the court held that telephones sentencing judge whether "cloned" cellular fit with while the was free to exer description forged defendant, in the broad sentencing instru cise discretion in ments, which is identical to Colorado's for he was bound to consider all evidence and gery parties ag the court concluded that both concerning information from the phones gravation mitigation during sentencing. the carrier and lawful user of the "legal unique have a right interest" numbers Id. The letter "could have altered his Pena, identify phones. People obligation impose proper used sentence." 169 Misc.2d 642 N.Y.S.2d 810 Id. Therefore, capable it was an instrument Therefore, (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1996). having contemplated by "cloned" effect as phones cell were instruments within statute. meaning of the statute. Id. Because the reach of the statute is broad *8 specifically
Illinois has addressed whether and includes instruments that affect or interest, forged legal legal right, obligation letters have effect. Al- affect a status, though liberally. Illinois' statute is written somewhat we construe the statute Colorado's, differently though property than Even transfer of both include or mone- broad, language regarding tary gain may objec- catchall the cre- be the most common rights obligations. forgery, ation of the first tives of we do not conclude our case, objectives, by altered a from his statute defendant is delimited The personal give language apply only banker to false information on of the statute does not financial, affecting property, the balances of several bank accounts. to instruments Peo- determination, making troductory interpret provision 8. the statute we its Alabama of interpreted only introductory provision today. Although court was ul- in Evans (1)(a)(2) timately convicted under subsection 13A-9-3, of section Ala.Code 1975 which states "(a) forgery A commits the crime of in by public employee," false filed degree if, defraud, the second with intent to he on the intent to defraud the court focused rather makes, falsely completes a written or alters in- than the form of the document. virtually strument .. ." is identical to the in- This by victim of a purporting to be authored applies rather to legal matters but justice. interest, It crime hinder the administration right, obligation or status. legal statutory principle of con- a fundamental IH. Conclusion every give that we must effect struction Legal the statute. "status" is one word of expan Tampering includes an The statute those words. of victims and witnesses and sive definition prohibited conduct three sub delineates Application Forgery C. Statute 18-8-707(1)(b) dis sections. Unlike section jury that the elements The was instructed 03SC559, People Yascavage, No. cussed were: (Colo.2004), 1090,2004 WL defendant, 2. in the State [TJhat under which Cunefare was the subsection Colorado, place date and at or about the charged requires neither evidence that defraud, 4. false- charged, 3. with intent to legally or victim has been summoned witness makes, ly completes or utters a written require proceeding to an official nor does it instrument, be, purports 5. which is or actions are in evidence that the defendant's repre- of which is calculated to become case, testimony. terfering with actual In this completed an instrument which sent there was sufficient evidence Cunefare evidence, create, transfer, ter- does or pivotal attempted to influence a witness to minate, legal right, or otherwise affect testimony. testify falsely or withhold interest, or status. respect forgery charge, With Cunefare's People presented evidence objec- 18-5-102 is not limited to the by August letter was authored the defen monetary gain property transfer or tives by him victim's signed dant and with the through the use of false instruments. sent it name-and further that the defendant any legal applies of the statute Attorney the intent of to the District interest, obligation right, or status-inelud- securing of the assault dismissal a letter with the intent secure against him. pending charges. criminal dismissal although That evidence is sufficient to sustain prosecutor, letter to the Cunefare's forgery. effect, independent legal conviction for Cunefare's letter in- it had no was prosecutor was intended to defraud the impact legal status as a tended to Cunefare's prosecutor and could have affected his proceeding. in a criminal Because defendant pending in a eriminal presented against status as was the evidence Cunefare obligation prosecutor prosecution, to sustain a conviction under see- sufficient pursue charges, and the inter- ap- the assault tion we reverse the court of Although est of the victim. a letter to the peals regard decision with to the alone, standing prosecutor has no conviction as well. We reinstate both the clearly this letter was an effort to influence tampering convictions and re- thereby impact affect prosecutor mand to the courts of for consider- pending judge case. as the in Muz- any remaining Just ation of issues. zarelli could have been influenced false decision, making sentencing BENDER, ILA.,
information concurs in Part Justice prosecutor on the ILB., too could the have relied so to Part and dissents in but dissents considering false letter when whether to dis- part judgment, and Justice charges against the defendant. The miss the joins in MARTINEZ the concurrence *9 obligation prosecutor has an to determine dissent. moving probable cause exists
whether
before
BENDER, concurring in Part
Justice
with a case.
If the sole witness
forward
II.B.,
II.A.,
dissenting to Part
but
or is reluctant
recants her version of events
judgment.
in
dissenting
part to the
testify,
prosecutor may be inclined to
majority affirms Cunefare's conviction
charges.
prosecutor
would
The
dismiss the
felony forgery
for
under
section 18-5-
likely rely
making
on the letter
this deter-
in
102(1)(c), C.R.S.2004,
falsely writing and
prosecutor
for
Forged
mination.
letters to the
signature,
ambiguous.
equally
a letter
It
sending, under his wife's
is
unclear as
remains
interest,
attorney claiming
legal right,
obligation,
to the district
that his
whose
or
previously alleged
charge
assault
wife's
example, by
status must be affected. For
view,
my
influencing
attorney
against
proge-
him never occurred.
district
to not
18-5-102(1)(c)
cute,
letter,
Cunefare's,
forged
a
plain language of section
such as
having indirectly
be
ambiguous
as to whether the
stat-
could
viewed
affected
is
both the outcome of the case and the Peo-
encompasses
ute
such a letter within its am-
ple's legal
seeking justice.
in
Applying
statutory
traditional
rules of
interest
Even
bit.
forged
impact
to determine the
As-
letter had no
on the
construction
General
intent,
People's
prosecute
sembly's
liability
I conclude that
for
decision to
because this
solely
felony forgery
strictly
is
to those in-
decision rests
within the discretion of
limited
attorney,
pertain
prop-
to financial or
the district
it could still
con-
struments
directly,
erty
legal efficacy
having
indirectly,
matters or have
in and
strued as
either
or
prosecutor's legal obligation
affected the
Because
themselves.
Cunefare's
letter
prosecutor
clearly
is
not
in-
consider the contents of the letter in
one
these
reach-
struments,
hand,
respectfully
I
would
that decision. On the
dissent and
other
might
judgment
affirm the
of the court of
letter
have had no effect-direct
or
'prosecute.
on this issue.
the decision to
De-
indirect-on
termining whether to include
let-
Cunefare's
Discussion
ter in
types
prescribed
.in
instruments
18-5-102(1)(c)
section
ques-
thus becomes a
18-5-102(1)(c),
per-
Pursuant
to section
a
determining
tion of
how far the
undefined
if,
may
felony forgery
son
be convicted of
terms in that statute should be stretched and
defraud,
with intent to
such
falsifies a
they
applied.
to whom
should be
is,
be,
purports
written instrument which
reading
plain
Because
represent
or is calculated to become or to
"deed, will, codicil, contract,
18-5-102(1)(c)
assignment,
section
does not resolve the
instrument,
note,
promissory
commercial
ambiguity
in
present
it is neces
check, or other
instrument which does or
sary
statutory
to consult rules of
construc
evidence, create,
transfer,
terminate,
or
statutory
tion. The first
relevant
tool of
interest,
legal right,
otherwise affect a
obli-
principle
ejusdem gen-
construction is the
eris,
gation,
pre-
or status." The statute thus
which embodies the rule that "when a
specific
eight
types
scribes
of instruments
general
phrase
spe
or
word
follows
list of
qualify
forgery liability.
persons
things,
general
cific
or
word or
Cunefare's
prosecutor
letter
does not fit within
interpreted
only,
will be
to include
phrase
types
of these
of instruments.
persons
things
type
or
of the same
as those
Sandstrom,
v.
listed." Davidson
83 P.3d
ambiguity
the statute lies
(Colo.2004)
(quoting
Black's Law
language, "or other instrument which
does
(7th ed.1999)).
Dictionary 535
legal right,
... otherwise affect a
inter-
est, obligation,
specific types
or status." The term "affect"
Each of the
of instruments
18-5-102(1)(c)
is broad
and of itself.
Its
definition
listed in
is either an
section
precise
proper
made even less
because the
a financial or
General
affects
i.e.,
matter,
deed, will, codicil,
Assembly
"legal
ty
failed to define the terms
commer
interest,"
instrument,
note,
check,
right," "legal
"legal obligation,".
promissory
cial
"legal
instru-
status." Whether
the written
is an instrument
has some
itself, 4:6,
directly affect,
indirectly affect,
assignment.1
ment
a contract or
must
standing
re,
clearly
or status He
interest,
legal right,
obligation,
does
prior
check);
I
that it is
our
Colo-
note
consistent with
166 Colo.
Gentry
People,
(1968) (false
check);
interpret
date on bank
rado
law on
instruments to
case
McDonald,
18-5-102(1)(c)
only
apply
53 Colo.
transfer C.R.S.2004, offense Standing the misdemeanor defines property matters. financial or falsifying of degree forgery as the efficacy in and of second alone, no this letter has "of a kind not described letter, simple two a written instrument consisting of The of itself. By creating this ...." never oc in section 18-5-102 alleged events that the statements offense, Assem having any the General curred, as "catchall" lesser be construed cannot forgery to degree bly intended for second anyone. The letter binding legal effect on that were cover all written instruments part required transaction was not provisions describ transfer, purport specified in the or even otherwise and does not kind crime of for affect, At the the more serious felonious any legal right or interest. By forcing the fit of Cunefare's letter most, plea seeking gery. is a written the letter specified in the instruments a man it claims into the class of sympathies for prosecutor's statute,2 majority felony forgery broad wrongfully accused. is of instruments that the General ens the class letter had fact been Even Cunefare's Assembly in that statute and prescribed wife, it would written the defendant's thereby the misde renders section of her earlier represent the wife's recantation statute, nullity. catchall meanor it is allegations against the defendant. While majority's of section 18-5- construction abuse for victims of domestic not uncommon 102(1)(c) principle that runs afoul of the trial, before recant their initial accusations a whole statutory should be read as scheme for the not uncommon it is likewise meaningless. as not to render a statute so cireum- prosecution under such continue with ultimately attor the district stances because principles of support for these two Further else, makes the decision ney, no one construction, dictate that statutory which prosecutor, of prosecute. whether prohi from the letter be exeluded Cunefare's course, in deter significant discretion retains statute, felony forgery comes bition of our prosecute, what erimes to mining who to lenity, statutory construc rule of from the request the dismissal charge, and whether recently em principle tion which this Court Ct., charges. People v. Dist. 632 pending Co., Inc., v. Thoro Products braced (Colo.1981) 1022, (holding P.2d (Colo.2003). In Thoro 70 P.3d prosecutor's discretion broad nature Products, it "axiomatic recognized we is intervening judiciary from generally bars the sufficiently clear that criminal law must be it); also limit control see or otherwise know what the law such that a citizen will 1008 (Colo.2003). Sepulveda, any ambiguity in a criminal and that forbids" Hence, whether a letter such meaning therefore be inter statute's must effect, much less a here had the one Id. The preted in the defendant's favor. effect, beyond this decision lies binding on notes, majority agree, I that section 18- our review. 5-102(1)(c) Maj. "not on its face." clear 18-5-102(1)(c) majority resorts to an op. at 308. That the to ex- Interpreting legislative include, the statute's histo clude, examination of than Cunefare's letter rather meaning the ambi ry decipher its shows principle that a with the is also consistent 18-5-102(1)(c) and guity present in section interpreted in a man- not be statute should this statute the need to construe statutory pro- therefore render another ner that would If must of the defendant.3 the Court favor Terry, 791 P.2d superfluous. People v. vision "[ujntil interprets fact, example, majority while the acknowledges this 3. For majority apply statutory "legal to Cune- term status" to case, primarily have dealt Colorado courts pending position in a crimi- fare's as a defendant involving negotiable instru- convictions maj. at it is not evident case, nal op. Maj. op. at ments." meaning. Assembly intended such General any ambiguities construing in favor of Perhaps, noted, Assembly prescribed a the General 2. As with the class of and consistent 18-5- specific i.e., instruments in section class of specified those in the instruments te., 102(1)(c), affecting property or finan- having property affecting matters or financial or themselves, having legal in and the General effect in and of cial matters f Assembly "legal to one's status" to refer intended themselves. *11 sonal, any legislative history to determine the or transfer or of mon- consult assurance stock, chattels, ey, goods, proscription, proper- a criminal statute's or other sweep of ordinary ty whatever. surely -the citizen could not then
possibly expected to know what the stat- be 111, 21, 40-6-1, § See ch. see. 1968 Colo. should, then, under the rule ute forbids. We Sess. Laws 828-29 lenity, any ambiguity construe of view, my In supports this earlier statute 18-5-102(1)(c) in of the favor accused is, interpretation felony forgery that find that Cunefare's letter does not constitute been, always apply only has intended to felony forgery. affecting those instruments financial property having legal or or matters effect majority early construes an of version standing alone. statute, 111, 21, § forgery our ch. see. 40-6- 1, 828-29, support 1963 Colo. Laws Sess. disagree I majority's also state holding falsifying that of a document its ment that the 1971 to the for amendments affecting legal proceeding constitutes for- ie., gery phrases, statute included "other maj. gery. op. (citing See at 308 the statuto- instrument," an which evidenced intent "to "Every falsely ry language, person who shall flexibility applying allow more the statute make, alter, forge any acquittance, ... re- Maj. op. crimes." at action, lease, suit, discharge or ... demand statute, language which contains identi ..."). construction, disagree I with such a cal to that at here in section 18-5- issue however, majority key because the leaves out 102(1)(c), instrument," but, refers to "other language early reaching statute in above, from the as discussed "other instrument" must interpretation. extracting quoted i.e., objects, its specific refer to the class of statute, language majority from the does affecting property financial or matters themselves, directly having legal both state or effect in and of quoted language statutory provision. before and after the refers in the same described only affecting provided to instruments financial or The 1971 also for amendments property having legal matters or documents misdemeanor catchall offense. Ch. § efficacy in see. and of themselves: Colo. Sess. discussed, interpreting Laws 435. As make, Every person falsely who shall al- apply any "other instrument" of kind ter, any forge, or counterfeit record or meaningless renders the General nature, public other authentic matter of a Assembly's of the misdemeanor of inclusion charter, deed, lease, any patent, or letters fense. indenture, will, writing obligatory, testa- ment, codicil, bond, covenant, annuity, describing the 1971 amendments as re- or, statute, treasury codifying the earlier the ma- United States note United note, note, bond, post jority legislature "preserv[ed] or States bank bill states explicitly examples appeared several that had draft, contract, exchange, or of check bill note, bill, Maj. op. promissory payment due for the in section 40-6-1 ...." at 308. money money property, receipt or for or There is no indication in the earlier statute any Assembly giving property, power attorney, warrant was "ex- General money types instruments payment amples" for the at the state of falsified treasury, any forgery. held for county order or accountable for which liable one Rather, any request as in section 18-5- receipt, or order or warrant or in that 102(1)(c), money delivery Assembly prescribed payment for the or the the General kind, instruments, speci- it from this goods any specific or or for the chattels Assembly's writing ficity glean I delivery instrument of the General release, felony forgery acquittance, receipt money intent to restrict to falsified for release, goods, any acquittance, affecting property financial or instruments debt, action, account, discharge having matters or and of them- suit, demand, thing per- or other real or selves. trustee, beneficiary, assignee,
position offer- ee, etc.
314 not, view, language forgery my support at issue here in statute does in
Because the
see
18-5-102(1)(c)
used,
in
tion
has thus been
proposition
the inference or
that a
such
form,
types
ie,
identical
since 1971 to define the
Cunefare's,
as
an instrument with no
may
of instruments for which a defendant
be
alone,
standing
also
should
be so
criminally
felony forgery,
held
liable for
see
included.
121,
1, §
ch.
see.
1971 Colo. Sess.
Parenthetically,
limiting
I note that
section
388, 484-35, it
that our
Laws
is instructive
18-5-102(1)(c)
only
those
af
instruments
concerning
prior case law
this statute has
fecting
property
financial or
matters or hav
only
fi
affecting
involved
instruments
those
legal efficacy in
and of themselves
is
property
or documents
nancial or
matters
efficacy
demonstrating legal
interpretation
in and of thems
consistent with the
of this stat
elves.4
by
appeals.
People
ute
the court of
See
v.
594,
Cunefare,
(Colo.App.2003).
85
597
P.3d
Lastly,
majority
I note that while the
re
majority
While the
characterizes the court of
heavily
jurisdictions
on
lies
cases from other
appeals' holding
stating
forgery
that a
as
support
reading
forgery
in
of its broad
of our
only
statute,
conviction
stand
where the contem
my
in
inapposite
view these cases are
plated
interest or status relates to a "finan
because,
inquiry
except
People
our
for
v.
Pena,
366,
169 Misc.2d
642
807
N.Y.S.2d
cial,
interest,"
testamentary
property
maj.
(N.Y.Sup.Ct.1996), they
308,
involve statutes with
op.
appeals'
at
it omits the court of
language significantly distinct and different
complete holding that
the instrument must
18-5-102(1)(c).5
maj.
from section
See also
"financial,
testamentary,
relate
to a
real
op.
jurisdictions
(stating
at 308
that "no other
property, personal property,
privilege
in
interpreted
precise language
have
of 'le
Cunefare,
terest."
felony forgery for all types of Assembly specific listed
The General for which
instruments *13 felony forgery, and Cunefare's liable for
held them.
letter is not one of state that Justice
I am authorized to joins in this concurrence and
MARTINEZ
dissent. The PEOPLE of
Petitioner: Colorado, State MELENDEZ, Jorge
Respondent: E. Jr.
No. 03SC494.
Supreme Court of Colorado.
Dec.