The PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v DAYSHAWN CROOKS, Appellant.
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Third Department
2015
11 NYS3d 709
In January 2013, defendant was charged with two counts each of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminally using drug paraphernalia in the second degree after police officers executing a search warrant at his apartment in the City of Albany discovered, among other things, a quantity of crack cocaine. After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of both counts of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. County Court thereafter sentenced defendant—as a second felony offender—to an aggregate prison term of eight years followed by three years of postrelease supervision. Defendant now appeals, and we affirm.
Initially, we agree with County Court that a Darden hearing was not necessary inasmuch as probable cause for the search warrant was established, in part, by the independent observations of the police (see People v Farrow, 98 NY2d 629, 630-631 [2002]; People v Darden, 34 NY2d 177, 181-182 [1974]; People v Sudler, 75 AD3d 901, 903-904 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 956 [2010]). The search warrant at issue stemmed from two con-
Nor are we persuaded by defendant‘s contention that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. “Such review entails weighing the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony while viewing the evidence in a neutral light and giving deference to the jury‘s credibility assessments” (People v Gibson, 121 AD3d 1416, 1418 [2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 1119 [2015] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348-349 [2007]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Inasmuch as a different verdict would not have been unreasonable, we evaluate whether each element of the crimes charged was proven beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d at 348-349; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d at 494-495). As is relevant here,
During the trial, Gregory Mulligan, also a police officer with the City of Albany Police Department, testified that, as several of his colleagues entered defendant‘s apartment through the front door, he and two detectives—Wood and Scott Gavigan—were observing the rear of defendant‘s building. As they watched, defendant was observed throwing a bag—which was later determined to contain one piece of crack cocaine weighing 69 grams, which is nearly 2 1/2 ounces—out of the rear window of his second-floor apartment. Upon entry into the apartment, defendant was the only person found inside.
In support of his contention that the People did not meet their burden of proving the element of possession, defendant points to minor inconsistencies in the trial testimony of the police officers. Although it is true that the testimony of Mulligan and Wood as to their recollections of the details of this event varied at times—for example, with respect to how far away from the building they were standing or whether defendant‘s window was already open before the bag was thrown—we note that both officers consistently testified to witnessing the bag containing the drugs being thrown from defendant‘s apartment window. Additional testimony revealed that defendant was the only person found inside that apartment at the time. Evaluating the evidence in a neutral light and according deference to the jury‘s credibility determinations, we find the jury‘s conclusion that defendant possessed the drugs to be supported by the record. Further, despite the uncontradicted evidence that the crack cocaine discovered was in one single piece rather than packaged into smaller amounts consistent with resale at the street level, the jury was permitted to infer, based on the substantial weight of it, that defendant intended to sell it, rather than keep it for his own use (see generally People v Salaam, 46 AD3d at 1131; People v Wright, 283 AD2d at 713). Thus, we do not find defendant‘s convictions to be against the weight of the evidence.
Finally, with regard to defendant‘s claim that his sentence is
McCarthy, J.P., Egan Jr. and Devine, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.