delivered the opinion of the court:
The municipal court of Chicago rendered judgment against the Cosmopolitan Eire Insurance Company, plaintiff in error, for $853.54 and costs in a suit brought' by the People of the State of Illinois, defendant in error, under section 230 of the Revenue act, for personal property taxes for the years 1907 and 1908. A writ of error was sued out from the Appellate Court for the First District to obtain a reversal of the judgment, and as the cause related to the revenue and the State was interested as a party, it was transferred, on motion of the defendant in error, to this court. The plaintiff in error thereupon made its motion to re-transfer the cause to the Appellate Court, with directions to consider the cause upon its merits.
Section 23 of the act establishing the municipal court of the city of Chicago provides that a writ of error to review a judgment of that court shall be sued out of this court in all cases in which a franchise, a freehold or the validity of a statute or the construction of the constitution is involved and out of the Appéllate Court in all .other cases. In several cases we have held that section to be in conflict with the constitution and therefore void, and that writs of error in cases relating to the revenue or in which the State is interested, as a party or otherwise, must be sued out of this court under section 118 of the Practice act, (Clowry v. Holmes,
The' first proposition is correct, and the legislature may, in an act establishing a court, provide for a review of its judgments, and the practice on such review, without violating section 13 of article 4 of the constitution, providing that no act shall embrace .more than one subject, which shall be expressed in the title. That was the precise question decided in Fleischman v. Walker,
Under the .second proposition counsel argue that the practice in the Appellate Courts of the State may be as multiform and heterogeneous as the cases to be reviewed and of as many varieties as the number of courts of original jurisdiction whose judgments are under review, provided the practice in each particular case is the same in all the Appellate Courts. It is true that appeals from justices of the peace are tried de novo in the circuit court; that chancery cases are tried differently from actions at law, and in some cases the regularity of proceedings is determined by an inspection of the record certified to the court; but the jurisdiction and practice in the different classes of cases are uniform in all courts of the same class or grade. It does not follow that the legislature would be authorized to provide that an appeal from one justice of the peace or county or probate court should be taken to a court of one class or grade and tried in one way, and that appeals from others justices or county or probate courts should be taken to some other court or tried in some other way. It would be destructive of the provision of the constitution to enact a law providing that if a suit was brought in one court the judgment could be reviewed by one appellate tribunal, but if it was brought in another court the judgment should be reviewed by some other court of appeal.
As to the third proposition, if the municipal court is a city court for the purpose of its creation and to enable it to exist at all it must be regarded as a city court within the terms of the Appellate Court and Practice acts. The legislature did not derive power to create that court from the amendment, which is section 34 of article 4 of the constitution, but from the authority conferred in the constitution to create courts in and for cities and incorporated towns. (Miller v. People,
On the trial the People offered in evidence the assessment rolls for the years 1907 and 1908, showing an assessment by the board of assessors in 1907 of “all other property not enumerated,” $5000, followed in other columns with the full value, $5000, total assessed by board of assessors, $1000, and total assessed value as corrected by board of review, $5886. For 1908 the roll showed an assessment by the board of assessors of “all other property not enumerated,” $40,000, followed in other columns with full value, $40,000, total assessed by board of assessors, $8000, and total assessed value as corrected by board of review, $5714. The collector’s warrants for said years showing the taxes extended upon the assessments and the delinquencies were also offered in evidence. For the company the evidence consisted of the testimony of a general agent who represented it in Chicago that it did not 'have any personal property in Cook county in either of those years. The company was correctly described in the assessment roll for 1907, but in 1908 it was described as Cosmopolitan Insurance Company of New York, omitting the word “Fire” from the name but with a notation of the agency, which identified the company intended. Furthermore, the assessment in 1907 was raised by the board of review and in 1908 was reduced. The presumption always being that officials do their duty, it will be presumed that the plaintiff in error had notice of the increase in 1907 and made application for reduction in 1908, and that there was a hearing before the board of review in each year by the company actually assessed. At any rate, the error in the name did not affect the validity of the tax. (Lyle v. Jacques,
The view of counsel that the tax on net receipts is a license to do business in this State, and not a tax, is erroneous. The net receipts are personal property and are to be listed by the board of assessors and board of review and taxed the same as other property. National Fire Ins. Co. v. Hanberg,
But it is said that there was no assessment of property but only an assessment against the company. Neither an assessor nor board of review can charge a total value of property against an individual without assessing the property. (Carney v. People,
The judgment is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed. .