Defendant and appellant Mark Cosgrove appeals a trial court's judgment finding him to be a mentally disordered offender (MDO) under Penal Code section
During incarceration with the Department of Corrections, defendant engaged in delusional and violent behavior. Thus, he was transferred to a prison psychiatric hospital. At the hospital, it was determined that defendant met the MDO criteria. Therefore, he was placed under the jurisdiction of the State Department of Mental Health, and defendant was eventually transferred to Patton State Hospital.
During defendant's second annual MDO evaluation, the Board of Prison Terms (BPT) concluded that he met the criteria for continued treatment. Defendant requested a jury trial on that finding under section
After the close of evidence, the People moved for a directed verdict under Code of Civil Procedure section
If a prisoner disagrees with the BPT determination, the prisoner may file a petition for a hearing under section
*1270"A prisoner who disagrees with the determination of the Board of Prison Terms that he or she meets the criteria of Section
2962 , may file . . . a petition for a hearing on whether he or she as of the date of the Board of Prison terms hearing, met the criteria of Section2962 . . . . The hearing shall be a civil hearing; however, in order to reduce costs, the rules of criminal discovery, as well as civil discovery, shall be applicable. The standard of proof shall be beyond a reasonable doubt, and if the trial is by jury, the jury shall be unanimous in its verdict. The trial shall be by jury unless waived by both the person and the district attorney."2 (Italics added.)
After the People presented their experts and defendant rested without presenting any evidence, the prosecutor moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the MDO proceeding was a civil hearing. Defendant objected, arguing that a directed verdict would "circumvent" his right to a jury trial under both state and federal constitutions.
Relying on Seling v. Young,4 People v. Superior Court (Myers),5
and section
The Myers court found that "the MDO provisions are neither punitive in purpose nor effect and their procedural safeguards do not require us to transform the hearing into a criminal trial. [Citation.]"10 In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that "[t]he purpose of the MDO statutory scheme is to provide mental healthtreatment for those offenders who are suffering from presently severemental illness, not to punish them for their past offenses."11
Thereafter, People v. Robinson also analyzed whether the MDO law is civil or penal.12 The Robinson court stated that a United States Supreme Court case, Kansas v. Hendricks,13 supported the decision rendered in Myers.14 In Hendricks, "the United States Supreme Court decided the constitutionality of Kansas's Sexually Violent Predator [SVP] Act, a law which established civil commitment procedures for repeat sexual offenders."15 The defendant argued that since he was convicted before the law was enacted, application of the law violated the federal constitutional ban on ex post facto statutes. The defendant "asserted the act established criminal proceedings and hence was punitive. [Citation.]"16 The Supreme Court decided that the Kansas Legislature intended the act to establish a civil proceeding — the Legislature described the act as creating a "civil commitment procedure" and placed it in the state's probate code.17 Moreover, the Supreme Court noted that the act did not implicate either of the two primary objectives of criminal punishment — retribution or deterrence.18
After analyzing Hendricks, the Robinson court noted that "Hendricks' analysis of the noncriminal features of Kansas's sexually violent predator law applies equally to California's MDO law. The features of the law analyzed in Hendricks are substantially similar to the features of the MDO law [citation], except that the MDO law governs the mental health treatment of a different type of offender and is placed in the Penal Code instead of a *1272 civil law code."19 The Robinson court, however, noted that "the scheme's placement in the Penal Code is not a material feature in differentiating it from the mentally ill offender scheme in Hendricks," in light of the Legislature's express declaration that the MDO law "provides prisoners with a `civil hearing' to determine whether they meet the criteria of the MDO scheme. [Citations.]"20 Another case, Peoplev. Otis, followed Robinson and did not "dispute that an MDO proceeding is civil, rather than a criminal, matter. [Citation.]"21
Moreover, in Seling v. Young,22 the United States Supreme Court addressed whether Washington State's SVP commitment proceeding was civil or criminal. The Supreme Court stated:
"[W]e proceed on the understanding that the Washington Act is civil in nature. [It] is strikingly similar to a commitment scheme we reviewed four terms ago in Kansas v. Hendricks [citation]. . . . In Hendricks, we explained that the question whether an Act is civil or punitive in nature is initially one of statutory construction. [Citation.] A court must ascertain whether the legislature intended the statute to establish civil proceedings. A court will reject the legislature's manifest intent only where a party challenging the Act provides the clearest proof that the statutory scheme is so punitive in either purpose or effect as to negate the State's intention."23
The Supreme Court further stated that, while states may provide procedural safeguards in these commitment proceedings similar to those afforded to defendants in the criminal context, that does not alter the civil character of such schemes.24 Hence, simply because California elected to provide petitioners certain procedural safeguards at MDO hearings, such safeguards do not transform what the Legislature expressly determined to be a civil hearing into a criminal prosecution.
We recognize that in Kansas v. Crane,25 the United States Supreme Court recently reconsidered the constitutionality of the Kansas SVP Act that was at issue in Hendricks. The majority of the court held that the United States Constitution does not permit a civil commitment under Kansas' SVP Act *1273 without any lack of control determination being made.26 Crane, however, did not alter the test for weighing the civil or punitive nature of those proceedings. Moreover, in contrast to the Kansas SVP Act, California's MDO statutory scheme already requires a finding that "by reason of his . . . severe mental disorder the prisoner represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others."27 Hence, the deficiency found by the Supreme Court in Kansas' SVP Act does not apply to California's MDO law.
Furthermore, in a case published on July 11, 2002, People v. Beeson, we held that "on a petition for continued treatment under section
Therefore, we hold that, consistent with the cases cited above, MDO hearings are civil in nature. Our analysis, however, does not end here. Even if MDO hearings are considered to be civil in nature, we must next determine whether the trial court properly granted the People's motion for a directed verdict, notwithstanding the language of the statute that a jury must unanimously decide defendant's case unless the jury trial is waived by both defendant and the People.
Although defendant argues that the trial court's decision to "take the case away from the jury" implicates the
In Montoya, we considered the issue of waiver of a jury trial in the context of a petition for involuntary commitment of a prisoner as an MDO, under *1274
section
Because defendant's right to a jury trial is statutory and not constitutional, we need not address defendant's constitutional challenge to the trial court's granting of a directed verdict. Instead, we must look to the statute and determine whether the trial court had the authority to make a determination in a case where neither the defense counsel nor the defendant waived defendant's right to a jury trial.
"`In interpreting statutes, we follow the Legislature's intent, as exhibited by the plain meaning of the actual words of the law, "`"whatever may be thought of the wisdom, expediency, or policy of the act."'"' [Citation.] We give the words of the statute `"their usual and ordinary meaning."' [Citations.] `"Words must be construed in context, and statutes must be harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent possible." [Citation.] Interpretations that lead to absurd results or render words surplusage are to be avoided. [Citation.]' [Citation.] `If there is no ambiguity in the language of the statute, "then the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the language governs." [Citation.] "Where the statute is clear, courts will not `interpret away clear language in favor of an ambiguity that does not exist.' [Citation.]"' [Citation.]"36 Finally, courts "`"read every statute `with reference to the entire scheme of law of which it is part so that the whole may be harmonized and retain effectiveness.' [Citation.]"'"37
Under section
In this case, defendant did not waive his right to a jury trial. Hence, the trial court improperly granted the People's motion for a directed verdict — which essentially converted defendant's jury trial into a bench trial without defendant's waiver.
In People v. Epps, the California Supreme Court determined whether the harmless error analysis applied to the trial court's failure to give the defendant a jury trial of the prior conviction allegations.41 The California Supreme Court stated that "`[a]n error that violates a defendant's rights under the federal Constitution requires automatic reversal if it constitutes a `structural defect' in the trial. [Citation.] On the other hand, if it represents `simply an error in the trial process' [citation], it is subject to harmless error analysis under the standard the high court announced in Chapman v. California (1967)
As discussed above, a defendant's right to a jury trial in an MDO proceeding is statutory.44 Hence, the trial court's granting of a motion for directed verdict is subject to harmless-error analysis underWatson — whether it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to defendant would have been reached absent the error.45
Applying the Watson test to this case, we conclude that it is not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to defendant would have been reached if the jury, instead of the court, had tried the issue of whether defendant met the criteria of an MDO.
Here, the evidence to support an MDO finding was overwhelming. The People presented two experts who opined that defendant met the MDO criteria set forth under section
During the cross-examination of the two expert witnesses, defense counsel attempted to discredit their testimonies. The effect of the cross-examination, however, was minimal. The witnesses' qualifications as experts were not questioned. The witnesses' assessment of defendant was not challenged. The testimony given by the experts during cross-examination simply provided more information regarding defendant's attendance at "AA/NA" meetings, defendant's participation in the "ward government," defendant's failure to show any active signs of violence toward any of the staff members, and defendant's receipt of a "grounds' card" which is "given to patients who have earned that privilege by not acting out, not having behavior problems or severe, acute psychiatric problems that endanger themselves or other people on the hospital grounds." Despite the experts' knowledge of these facts, the experts opined that defendant met the MDO criteria.
In light of the unrefuted testimony of the two experts, the trial court's error could not possibly have affected the result. Therefore, we hold that the trial court's error was harmless. *1277
We concur:
MCKINSTER, ACTING P.J.
RICHLI, J.
"(a) . . . after all parties have completed the presentation of all of their evidence in a trial by jury, any party may, without waiving his or her right to trial by jury in the event the motion is not granted, move for an order directing entry of a verdict in its favor.
"(b) If it appears that the evidence presented supports the granting of the motion to some, but not all, of the issues involved in the action, the court shall grant the motion as to those issues and the action shall proceed on any remaining issues.
"(c) If the motion is granted, unless the court in its order directing entry of the verdict specifies otherwise, it shall operate as an adjudication of the merits."