The principal issue on this motion is whether a police officer may briefly detain a person on the basis of information that another officer seeks to question the person about a recent homicide. The arresting officer in the present case received such information about two of the defendants and undertook to detain them. His actions resulted in the discovery of a loaded revolver on the floor of a vehicle in which all four defendants had been sitting. Indicted for criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (Penal Law, § 265.02, subd [4]; § 265.15, subd 3), the defendants seek suppression of the gun.
The circumstances which led to the defendants’ arrests, as established by the credible evidence at the suppression hearing, were as follows:
In the early hours of September 27, 1975, police officer Anthony Grant was on foot patrol on the Upper West Side of Manhattan. At approximately 1:00 a.m., he observed an automobile occupied by the defendants standing in a crosswalk at Broadway and 107th Street. Intending to issue a summons for
Moments later, while Cortes was standing next to the vehicle, a man (hereinafter referred to as the "informant”*) approached the officer. Pointing to Cortes and to the defendant Ferreira, who was sitting in the back of the car, the informant stated that both men were being sought for questioning by a homicide detective about a fatal shooting in the area one or two days earlier, the victim of which was the informant’s friend. In connection with this statement, the informant produced a printed business card bearing the detective’s name and his homicide command. On the back of the card was a handwritten number which, according to the informant, was the case number assigned to the investigation.
The informant’s bearing was a mixture of anger and agitation. His behavior toward Ferreira in particular revealed a strong belief that Ferreira was involved in his friend’s death. He even suggested to the officer that Ferreira might be armed. At no time, however, did the informant state that he had witnessed the homicide or that he had seen a gun in the hands of any of the defendants. When asked by the officer to identify himself, the informant wrote his name and address on a piece of paper.
After speaking with the informant, the officer told Ferreira to step out of the automobile. As Ferreira emerged, the officer shone a flashlight into the rear of the car and observed a gun on the floor. He immediately seized the weapon and placed the defendants under arrest.
The first question of law raised upon these facts is whether the officer acted lawfully when he directed the defendant Cortes to produce his license and registration. In People v Ingle (
A second issue concerning the defendant Cortes is whether the officer acted lawfully in directing him to step out of the vehicle. In this connection, it must be noted that a police officer is empowered to arrest a person for any traffic infraction committed in the officer’s presence (CPL 140.10, subd 1, par [a]; Vehicle and Traffic Law, § 155), even though the courts have expressed a preference for the use of an appearance ticket in such situations (e.g., People v Copeland,
It is evident from the foregoing analysis that none of the facts which supported the brief detention of Cortes provided any grounds for detaining Ferreira. The sole basis for the officer’s decision to detain that defendant was the information conveyed by the informant. Since the gun came into view only after Ferreira stepped out of the car, the court must determine if such information was sufficient to justify the officer’s actions with respect to Ferreira.
The right of a police officer to arrest or otherwise detain a person in the absence of a warrant derives from three sources, two of which are codified. CPL 140.10 (subd 1, par [b]) permits a police officer to arrest a person upon reasonable cause to believe that the person has committed a crime. Where the officer lacks probable cause but does have a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed, is committing or is about to commit a crime, CPL 140.50 permits him to stop and question such person. Both statutes apply only to situations in which police officers encounter persons who are suspected of criminal activity. Neither statute has any application to the present
The third source of a police officer’s power to detain persons without a warrant is his general authority, derived from common law, to investigate criminal activity (People v Rosemond,
Recognizing that interrogation of witnesses is indispensable to effective investigation, courts have consistently acknowledged the general right of police officers to put questions to persons who may possess information about a particular crime (Miranda v Arizona,
Applying these principles to the present case, the court finds that police officer Grant’s detention of Ferreira was a legitimate exercise of his common-law authority to investigate crime. The informant furnished the officer with detailed information about a recent homicide and the ensuing investigation. His possession of the business card was evidence that a homicide detective regarded him as a source of information about the case and contemplated further communication with him. Additional indications of the informant’s reliability in this instance were the fact that he readily identified himself and the fact that he was subject to arrest for falsely reporting an incident if his information were not true. In light of all these circumstances, the officer had a reasonable basis to
The next issue is whether the officer acted properly in directing Ferreira to step out of the vehicle. As in the case of Cortes, once Ferreira was legally detained, it was immaterial whether he was directed to remain sitting in the vehicle or directed to stand near it; neither alternative was more intrusive upon Ferreira’s freedom than the other (cf. People v Perel,
The final issue is whether police officer Grant acted unlawfully in shining his flashlight into the rear of the vehicle. Provided that an officer is standing in a place where he has a legal right to be, his act of shining a flashlight into an automobile does not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and any contraband revealed by the beam of light may be lawfully seized (People v Hoffman,
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to suppress is denied in all respects.
Although the informant did not testify at the hearing, his identity was disclosed to defense counsel and his existence is not in dispute.