Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Broome County (Smith, J.), rendered March 7, 2000, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (two counts) and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree.
Following a criminal investigation of defendant and pursuant to three search warrants which authorized the search of defendant, his residence and his motor vehicle, on June 10, 1999 police located and attempted to stop defendant’s vehicle. At the time, Gerald Graven was driving the vehicle while defendant rode in the passenger seat. Graven, disregarding traffic signals and stop signs, led police on a high speed chase through residential neighborhoods in the City of Binghamton and the Village of Johnson City, Broome County, forcing other vehicles — including a school bus — off the road. During the chase, two eyewitnesses observed a plastic bag containing over two ounces of cocaine thrown from the passenger-side window of defendant’s vehicle. When ultimately the vehicle crashed, defendant fled on foot, but he was located by police with canine assistance in a nearby building and arrested. On the same day, the police searched defendant’s home and seized a digital scale which contained a trace amount of cocaine and seven “corner wraps” of crack cocaine.
On July 23, 1999, a grand jury indicted defendant for the crimes of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree, two counts of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree and conspiracy in the second degree. On defendant’s motion, County Court dismissed the conspiracy charge for insufficient evidence. Following a trial, a jury convicted defendant of the remaining four charges. County Court sentenced defendant to prison terms of 12 years
Defendant asserts that because he requested that codefendant Graven be called to testify on defendant’s behalf before the grand jury and that this allegedly exculpatory evidence was not presented, the indictment should have been dismissed. By statute, a defendant may request — orally or in writing — that the grand jury exercise its discretion to call a particular witness (see CPL 190.50 [6]) and, here, after hearing defendant’s testimony, a grand jury member asked the prosecutor whether Graven could be produced to give testimony. At the time, however, the grand jury was considering similar charges against Graven arising out of the same incident and Graven had not given the required written notice to the District Attorney that he — as the subject of a grand jury investigation — desired to testify (see CPL 190.50 [5] [a]). The prosecutor thus addressed the grand jury’s inquiries regarding Graven’s availability as follows: “All I can tell you is that you are considering charges against that individual, okay. So, the DA’s Office — when you are considering charges against somebody, the DA’s Office can’t produce that person. He’s a defendant. And a defendant is always free to testify before the grand jury when they request to testify before the grand jury. * * * We can’t request of a defendant to come in and testify. * * * All I can tell you is if the defendant had requested from the DA’s Office to testify, he would be here. That’s the only way I can phrase it.”
Prior to trial, defendant moved to have the indictment dismissed due to the People’s failure to produce Graven at the request of the grand jury. County Court denied the motion, concluding that the People had no duty to request that a codefendant give testimony. Upon our review of the relevant facts and circumstances, we perceive no error or failure in compliance with defendant’s statutory rights under CPL article 190 which would amount to one of those rare situations where the indictment must be dismissed because “the integrity [of the grand jury proceeding] is impaired and prejudice to the defen
Significantly, although a defendant has a qualified right to testify voluntarily before the grand jury if he or she gives the required written notice (see CPL 190.50 [5] [a]), he or she may not be compelled to testify (see People v Corrigan,
Next, we reject defendant’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, finding without question that a “valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences could lead a rational person to the conclusion reached by the fact finder on the basis of the evidence at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the People” (People v Williams,
On this record, we find no merit to defendant’s claim that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Defense counsel made appropriate pretrial motions, engaged in cogent cross-examination and rendered opening and closing statements which emphasized possible inconsistencies in the People’s case. Viewed in totality, the representation was meaningful (see People v Henry,
Mercure, J.P., Crew III, Lahtinen and Kane, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Notes
Graven testified on defendant’s behalf at trial and stated that he, and not defendant, possessed the cocaine and threw it out the window during the chase. This testimony was obviously rejected by the jury.