96 Mich. 368 | Mich. | 1893
Respondent was convicted in the supeiuor court of Grand Rapids, under an information charging that she did solicit and induce Emma Haehn and Lillie Pail, females, to enter a house of ill fame, situate at Woodville, resorted to for the purpose of prostitution and lewdness, for the purpose of becoming prostitutes.
“ Did you, from the evidence in that case, form any opinion as to her character for virtue and chastity?”
The answer, under objection from the prosecution, was excluded. Five jurors who sat in the case of Smith remained on the panel in thé present case.
Lillie Pail was called as a witness for the prosecution, and testified substantially that on Sunday, December 12, 1892, the respondent asked her to go to Woodville, into a house of prostitution, to become a prostitute. On the next day she saw the respondent again, who gave her 50 cents to pay her fare and that of Anna Nelson on the ■ train to go there, the respondent at the same time-telling her that other girls were going, and to go to the depot, but not to recognize her there. The witness also testified. that before that time she had had illicit intercourse with a man for
The statute under which the prosecution was had reads:
“Every person who shall keep a house of ill fame, resorted to for the purpose of prostitution or lewdness, and every person who shall solicit or in any manner induce a female to enter such house for the purpose of becoming a prostitute, or shall by force, fraud, deceit, or in any like manner procure a female to enter such house for the purpose of prostitution or of becoming a prostitute, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction thereof,' shall be punished by imprisonment in the State prison not more than five years, or in the county jail not more than one year, or by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment,, in the discretion of the court.” 3 How. Stat. § 9286.
It is contended by counsel for respondent that the conviction must be set aside for the reasons:
1. That there was no evidence that the house to which these females were asked to go had ever been resorted to for the purpose of prostitution or lewdness.
2. That the words used in the statute, “for the purpose ■of becoming a prostitute,” imply a change of state or condition, and that these females were shown to have already become prostitutes before beihg solicited.
3. That the testimony did not show that the respondent solicited Lillie Pail to go to this house, and that what was said amounted to nothing more than an inquiry if she would go to a sporting house.
4. That the court erred in permitting the jurors who had formed part of the panel on the trial of Frank Smith to sit in this case.1
1. The testimony tended strongly to show that the
2. The offense was charged in the language of the statute, — that is, soliciting females to enter a house of ill fame, kept for the purpose of prostitution and lewdness, for the purpose of becoming prostitutes. There was some testimony tending to show that these girls had already entered upon a life of shame, and that when the respondent found them they were then, or had been, inmates of a house of prostitution. The question is therefore presented whether the Legislature intended to create an offense under the statute which should apply to one who solicits a female who is already a prostitute to enter a house of prostitution, and especially where the female so solicited is at the very time an inmate of a house of prostitution. The language of -the statute is peculiar: “Every person who shall solicit or in any manner induce a female to enter such house for the purpose of becoming a prostitute,” etc. It is contended by counsel for respondent that the word “ becoming,” as used in this statute, implies a change of state or condition, and that one who is already a prostitute cannot, within the meaning of the statute, become what she already is.
The court, speaking of this subject to the jury, said:
“It is not a question of removing prostitutes from this*372 city to some other town, to get rid of them. The statute is aimed at the person who is so depraved as to become the go-between between innocent girls and houses of ill fame, or between women and houses of prostitution, by-means of solicitation. If the court should charge that the Legislature intended to forgive the person whose business it was to solicit women of pronounced bad character from one' house of ill fame to another (which I shall not charge), then, in such case, it would be a matter of serious deliberation whether Lillie Pail had become such a notorious prostitute, she being a young girl of 17 or 18, and never, so far as the evidence in the case is concerned, had submitted her person to a man until a few days before the alleged solicitation, — as to whether she was what would be termed a common prostitute.”
The court had evidently overlooked the testimony of Lillie Pail. She was asked:
“Q. What were you doing at this time? What were you employed at, — what work, if any?
“A. I was in a sporting house. It would have been a week Monday night that I had been there. Mrs. Cook came on Sunday night. That sporting house was located next door to Nellie Angel’s, what was called 'No. 50 East Fulton street.’ It was kept by a Mrs. Wilson.
“Q. Had you been doing business there, as you call it?
"A. Yes, sir.
“Q. By 'business’ you mean entertaining men for pay, as sporting women do?
"A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Having illicit intercourse with men for pay; that is what you mean by 'business?’
"A. That is what I mean; yes, sir.-”
The court in its charge did not direch the jury whether the respondent could or could not be convicted if the girl Lillie Pail was a common prostitute at the time she was solicited to go to Woodville, but left that question an open one, putting the case to the jury upon the theory that the evidence would not warrant them in finding she was a prostitute at that time. The charge was misleading to the jury, and the court should have construed the statute, so that the jury might have such construction as a guide in their
The other questions raised need not be noticed.
Judgment reversed, and new trial ordered.
See People v. Troy, post, —, where a challenge for cause was sustained under a similar state of facts.