delivered the opinion of the court:
Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant was convicted of residential burglary (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, pаr. 19 — 3), then sentenced as a Class X offender (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005 — 5—3(c)(8)) to a term of nine years’ imprisonment. On appeal, defendant contends that his sentence must be vacated because the State did not provide him notice in the charging instrument that it would seek an enhanced sentence upon conviction.
The evidence adduced at trial showed that defendant was identified as one of two men who were apprehended at the scene of a residеntial burglary at 4342 N. Francisco in Chicago. The evidence further showed that about 3 p.m. on February 4, 1991, a neighbor notified pоlice of a burglary in progress, and when they arrived at the designated address, one of the officers saw defendant in thе interior stairway which led to the burglarized apartment. Defendant and another offender then attempted to esсape through the roof but were arrested.
In his post-trial motion, defendant asserted that sentencing as a Class X offender would be inappropriate since notice of this possibility was not included in the charging instrument. The trial court rejected his argument; then, based on the uncontested evidence of defendant’s separate, prior felony convictions in the sequence required by statute, the court sentenced defendant as a Class X offender to nine years’ imprisonment.
On appeal, defendant asserts that his sentence was improper because the State did not cоmply with section 111 — 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 111 — 3), which requires that defendant be notified in the charging instrument of the State’s intent to seek an enhanced sentence. Since the State failed to include this noticе in the charging instrument, defendant contends that his sentence must be vacated and his cause remanded for sentencing on his Class 1 felony conviction. The State responds that section 111 — 3 does not apply to the mandatory sentencing рrovision at issue; and, alternatively, the State says that if this court determines otherwise, the sentence should be affirmed sinсe defendant was not prejudiced by the lack of notice.
Section 5 — 5—3(c)(8) of the Unified Code of Corrections provides for mandatory Class X sentencing once the elements specified therein are satisfied. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, pаr. 1005 — 5—3(c)(8); People v. Kennard (1992),
"When the State seeks an enhanced sentence because of a prior convictiоn, the charge shall also state the intention to seek an enhanced sentence and shall state such prior сonviction so as to give notice to the defendant. However, the fact of such prior conviction and the Stаte’s intention to seek an enhanced sentence are not elements of the offense and may not be disclosed to the jury during trial unless otherwise permitted by issues properly raised during such trial. For the purpose of this Section, ‘enhanced sentence’ means a sentence which is increased by a prior conviction from one classificаtion of offense to another higher level classification of offense ***; it does not include an increase in thе sentence applied within the same level of classification of offense.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. Ill — 3(c).
Under the wеll-settled rules of statutory construction, the starting point in any examination is the language of the statute. (Castillo v. Jackson (1982),
Applying these principles to the above-quoted statute, we find that its provisions apply only tо those situations where the State intends to enhance the penalty by raising the classification of the offense duе to a prior conviction. (See, e.g., retail theft (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 16A — 10(2)) and criminal sexual assault (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 12 — 13(b)).) Thе language explicitly excludes those situations, such as the one at bar, where the sentence is increased because of a prior conviction, but the classification of the offense remains the same.
In addition, we obsеrve that section 5 — 5—3(c)(8) of the Unified Code of Corrections contains no notice requirement in contrast to the hаbitual criminal statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 33B — 1 et seq.), which requires reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard оn the recidivist charge. (Oyler v. Boles (1962),
In sum, where the sentence, but not the classification of offense, was enhanced by defendant’s prior convictions, we find no statutory violation in the sentencing procedure emplоyed here where defendant was sentenced as a Class X offender in compliance with People v. Williams.
The judgmеnt of the circuit court of Cook County is therefore affirmed. Pursuant to People v. Nicholls (1978),
Affirmed.
CAMPBELL and BUCKLEY, JJ., concur.