Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Tompkins County (Barrett, J.), rendered September 16, 1988, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of criminal possession of а weapon in the third degree.
Defendant was indicted on charges relating to the unlawful possession and sale of firearms in Tompkins County. Defendant was also facing criminal prosecution on similar charges in Federal court. While these cases were pending, dеfendant cooperated with Federal, State and local authorities in their ongoing investigations. After the Federal charges were disposed of by defendant’s guilty plea, dеfendant sought to accept a plea arrangement which had been offered in the instant case. According to the terms of this plea bargain, defendant would pleаd guilty to attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, a class E felony, in satisfaction of all four counts of the indictment. In exchange, the prosecution would recommend that defendant receive the minimum prison sentence, as a sеcond felony offender, of 1 Vi to 3 years to run concurrent with the Federal sentencе.
When defendant attempted to plead in accordance with this arrangement, County Court refused to accept the plea on the ground that the case was alrеady set for trial and that it was the court’s "policy” not to accept a negotiated plea on the eve of trial. The court further stated that, pursuant to this policy, thе only acceptable guilty plea would be one to the top count of the indictment. Although defense counsel objected on the ground that he had never been informed by the court of its policy of imposing time limits for accepting plea offers, the сourt adhered to its refusal to accept the negotiated plea.
Defendant thereafter entered a plea of guilty to the top count of the indictment, a сlass D felony, and at sentencing received the mandatory minimum sentence, as a predicate felony offender, of 2 to 4 years’ imprisonment. This appeal by defendant еnsued.
Defendant contends that County Court abused its discretion in refusing to permit him to plead guilty tо the reduced charge, based solely upon its policy of not accepting suсh a plea on the eve of trial. In our view, this contention has merit. We cannot endоrse a court’s general policy of not permitting plea bargains based on cirсumstances unrelated to the particular defendant and the proposed bargаin at issue (see generally, People v Glendenning,
In light of this error, defendant asks this court tо modify the judgment by convicting him of the lesser crime of attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree and reducing his sentence to IV2 to 3 years’ imprisonment. However, we do not believe that defendant is entitled to specific performance of the original plea arrangement inasmuch as there is no evidence in the record which indicates that County Court’s approval was ever obtained (see, People v Tobler,
Nor could this court properly modify defendant’s conviсtion to attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree wherе, as here, defendant’s admissions during the course of the plea allocution fully suppоrt the more serious offense to which defendant entered his guilty plea (see, People v Potskowski,
The only remedy which this court may grant defendant is a reversal of the judgment of conviction and remittal to County Court. Defendant, however, has expressly declined to request this form of relief and, consequently, we are constrained to affirm.
Judgment affirmed. Mahoney, P. J., Kane, Mikoll, Yesawich, Jr., and Levine, JJ., concur.