*1 Aug. S075232. [No. 2001.] PEOPLE,
THE Plaintiff and Respondent, COLLINS, Defendant and
DAMANI Appellant.
Counsel *4 Court, Baker, and by under the for Defendant
Randy appointment Supreme Appellant. Druliner, General,
Bill Attorney David P. Chief Assistant Lockyer, Attorney General, Bass, General, K. Attorney Ronald A. Assistant Laurence Sullivan Ott, General, for Plaintiff and Attorneys A. Gregory Deputy Respondent.
Opinion a
GEORGE, the of criminal validity C. In thiscase we must determine J. court, trial, the of a the trial in advising defendant’s waiver when jury waiver, him he the informed that would receive defendant before accepting trial, the could “some benefit” if he waived his court jury although of in a divided not what the benefit would be. Court Appeal, specify decision, under these circumstances determined the waiver obtained of a trial obtained We conclude that by valid. waiver, this an is a valid and that court’s assurance of benefit not unspecified of Accordingly, judgment error reversal defendant’s conviction. compels of Court of reversed. Appeal
I was filed defendant Damani against an information January On Collins, acts of lewd or lascivi- that he had committed five forcible alleging Code, 288, subd. (Pen. 14 years ous a child under age § conduct on a child under that age conduct on (b)), acts of lewd or lascivious five Code, 288, the same (a)), based (Pen. subd. without the use of force § of Penal of the acts violation that four alleged five acts. The information defendant’s use (b), were committed by section subdivision Code and that three of and unlawful bodily injury, force or fear of immediate (b), (a) subdivisions of Penal Code section acts violation 1203.066, Code, (a)(1), (Pen. conduct subd. substantial sexual § involved sentence, or (8)), grant suspension any probation, precluding amended the information was of those On striking findings. April (Pen. defendant had suffered convictions allege additionally prior Code, Code, 4532, 11351.5) and had (b); Health & Saf. previously subd. § § Code, 667.5, (b)).1 (Pen. term subd. served prison § trial, 10, 1997, the called for selection was On June matter was of the first scheduled to commence. Prior to entrance group prospec- informed the trial court that counsel had dis- tive defense counsel jurors, trial. defendant the of his waiving jury cussed with possibility the trial court’s communication with defendant We set forth in some detail in order to provide adequate on his waiver subject determinations made the trial factual context in which to understand and, Court of Appeal. subsequently, to “waive The trial court of defendant whether wished jury” inquired not, asked and defendant The trial court whether again “waive.” responded *5 defendant wished to with into court or instead having jurors brought proceed a trial without a and defendant “without a jury, jury.” have responded, entitled his tried before a trial court stated that defendant was to have case that defense counsel had defendant about observing giving jury, spoken'with before a his trial and the trial take jury having place solely up that The trial court of defendant whether was what wished judge. inquired Defendant that he defense counsel’s recom- to do. would follow responded mendation and trial. waive jury understood that he was
The trial court then asked whether defendant a that if he had a trial a of 12 by jury, jury entitled to have trial by jury; case; that in order to return a individuals would be selected to decide his verdict; if he to to the that agree verdict of all 12 would have guilty, jurors case; that the hear the evidence in the did not have a court would jury the trial in effect be the in the case and would make would judge burden to determination of or not that the guilty guilty; prove prosecution’s the trial by a reasonable doubt would be the same whether guilt beyond statutory further are to the Penal 1 All references Code. court; retain his to confront and rights or that defendant would by witnesses, on to the attendance of witnesses his own compel
cross-examine behalf, bеhalf, his and to remain silent or choose evidence on own solely by that defendant would testify; relinquish other his maximum would retain all his rights; potential punishment or was the same whether his trial was before a before court. Defendant the affirmative to these responded questions. that by
The trial court then whether defendant understood waiv- inquired he was not ing any leniency anything jury, “gaining promises else relative At this waiver.” point, responded The trial court asked whether defendant understood that negative. hear based trial court would the evidence make decisions and consistent with law. Defendant responded evidence presented affirmative. then occurred: exchange
The following that I’m Okay. you you And do understand not promising “The Court: . Do that? to waive . . understand anything just you jury? you to get it I was told that would—that it was some reassurance “Defendant:
some type of benefit. think I think that—I what Okay.
“The Court: [defense counsel] somebody to is I men- have been indicated counsel when referring might that this to be with that there well be going you tioned issue discussed on the in it. has some court. having jury, Just benefit effect time but try Do understand that? not two weeks’ By taking up you Do judge you it in alone. ... under- having rather giving—just front of stand that? Yes.
“Defendant: *6 as Let me ask that. your understanding you Is that well? “The Court: Yes. “Defendant: any I’m not that there’s I didn’t and specify specifying Court:
“The are but you getting benefit, but that some particular benefit, by waiving jury, Understood? yet. I tell what is because I don’t know you can’t Yes. “Defendant:
“The Court: Okay. Is that agreeable you?
“Defendant: Yes.
“The Court: Do have about you any waiving questions jury? “Defendant: No. Has Okay. made threats or anybody any
“The Court: promises you you waive get jury?
“Defendant: No. free, I’ll find that Mr. Okay, Collins has made a
“The Court: and waiver intelligent jury trial.” to the response prosecutor’s defendant he un- inquiry, acknowledged derstood that the earlier offer prosecutor’s no concerning negotiated plea was available and longer that defendant faced a maximum sentence potential of 41 years trial court prison. asked defendant again whether anyone had made a representation in order promise to induce him to waive by jury, The trial responded negative. court determined that defendant had made a voluntary, knowing, waiver of the intelligent jury trial. The trial court then obtained the and defense prosecutor’s counsel’s agreement (See Const., I, to waive trial Cal. by jury. art. §
The case to trial before the proceeded court. The trial court found defend- ant of three guilty counts of forcible and five counts of nonforcible lewd lascivious acts a child under (§ of 14 age (a), subds. years. (b)(1).) The trial court found true the that defendant allegations committed three of the acts force or fear and that two of the acts involved substantial 1203.066, (§ sexual conduct (a)(1), (8)), subd. and that defendant had served 667.5, (§ term prior prison (b)). subd. The trial court sentenced defendant to a total term of 24 years prison, consisting term of upper eight years, each, two consecutive terms of six years for the three violations of section (b), subdivision and two сonsecutive terms of two each years for two violations section (a). subdivision The trial court stayed sentences on the three remaining (a), violations of section subdivision as well as the enhancement for the service of a term. prior prison
Defendant on the sole that his appealed ground to trial benefit, was induced the trial court’s offer of a and therefore *7 under the federal and state Constitutions was not made The voluntarily. of that issue was analogous
Court this Appeal, determining question in of a of the to trial considered defendant’s waiver “sufficiency” right 268, 1132, (1992) Howard 1 Cal.4th 1175-1178 Cal.Rptr.2d (Howard), P.2d and the standard of review enunciated employing 1315] decision, that decided in a decision under totality split circumstаnces, knowing, defendant’s waiver of his trial right by jury em- dissenting and and therefore valid. The intelligent, voluntary justice, review, the same standard of concluded that defendant’s waiver ploying trial his was not right knowing, intelligent, voluntary. We for review. granted petition
II
A Defendant contends the trial court’s statement that defendant would be date receive benefit”—of a nature that would determined at a later “some to a if defendant waived his right by jury—amounted improper trial in inducement to waive that and that defendant’s waiver to that inducement not be deemed knowing, intelligent, response to due of law Defendant voluntary. urges right process consequently under the federal state Constitutions was As we both violated. explained, merit. conclude thаt defendant’s contention has a brief review of the nature Our consideration issue requires that must the constitutional at stake and the procedural protections Amendment, The Sixth made to the states its waiver. accompany applicable Constitution, this federal context Fourteenth Amendment confers a defendant in a criminal by jury. prosecution upon 145, 148-150, S.Ct. (Duncan (1968) v. Louisiana 391 U.S. 155-156 [88 1444, 1446-1448, (Duncan); Hamlin Argersinger L.Ed.2d see 491] 25, 2006, 2007-2990, 27, 530].) 32 L.Ed.2d U.S. 29 [92 be a to a trial is “fundamental recognized 2078, 275, (Sullivan v. Louisiana right.” Duncan, (Sullivan); 182] I, 1444, 1451-1452].) article section 16 of the California Similarly, the right confers a defendant in a criminal prosecution Constitution Ernst a trial Cal.4th jury. (People (1979) 23 (Ernst); In re Lewallen Cal.3d 298] (Lewallen); see P.2d 100 A.L.R.3d Cal.Rptr. this have state constitutional recognized also We §§ 441, 448-449.) (Ernst, fundаmental.
305 the Nonetheless, right a defendant’s waiver of the accepting practice courts, constitutional. and state is clearly in both federal common 1444, 1452]; 145, Patton v. S.Ct. (Duncan, U.S. 157-158 391 supra, [88 261-263, 253, 276, 298, 74 S.Ct. (1930) U.S. 308-312 States 281 [50 United 854, on other Wil (Patton), grounds 70 A.L.R. disapproved L.Ed. 1893, 1898-1899, 78, 26 S.Ct. (1970) U.S. liams v. Florida 399 [90 of several other 446].) the waiver required L.Ed.2d As with fundamental, a defendant’s waiver as have been long recognized rights it is knowing the court unless not be may accepted by right “ ‘ is, nature of both of the “made with a full awareness and intelligent, the decision to abandon and the the abandoned right being consequences “ ’ ” it,” that it the of a free “in the sense voluntary product as well as ’ ” intimidation, coercion, than or deception.” and deliberate choice rather 851, 564, S.Ct. (Colorado (1987) U.S. 573 479 Spring [107 857, the waiver of voluntary L.Ed.2d knowing, intelligent, 93 954] [a Amendment must a con self-incrimination against precede Fifth privilege McCarthy v. United States interrogation]; fession that is product police 1166, 1170, 459, (1969) S.Ct. 394 418] [an [89 a guilty of a known must right accompany intentional revocation privilege to trial by jury, right which in effect is a waiver of right plea, witnesses, self-incrimination]; confront and the privilege against opposing 1019, 1024-1025, (1938) Johnson Zerbst 304 U.S. [58 1461, L.Ed. and intentional waiver of 146 A.L.R. 357] [a is before a defend Sixth Amendment to assistance of counsel right required Patton, counsel]; ant 281 U.S. at without proceed pp. is S.Ct. at waiver of intelligent right 261-263] [an
required].)2
In the constitutional doctrines that formulating permit procedural waiver, forfeiture, and in instances of constitutional rights, high many course, mаny rights, emanating from constitutional or 2 Of it is well established whether “ sources, ‘may by the failure to make other be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases ” (United determine timely having jurisdiction assertion of the before a tribunal it.’ 1770, 1776, 123 508]; L.Ed.2d see States v. Olano 507 U.S. 598]; People v. Cal.Rptr.2d v. Simon 25 Cal.4th 1093].) discussing a P.2d Saunders motion, timely statutory discretionary judgment upon permitting federal rule reversal high explained: “Waiver is different from forfeiture. Whereas court in United States v. Olano is the ‘intentional timely is the failure to make the assertion of a forfeiture [, supra,] right.’ v. Zerbst 304 U.S. relinquishment or abandonment of known Johnson waivable; participate defendant must whether the particular 464 .... Whether waiver; waiver; required certain are for whether personally prоcedures whether voluntary, particularly depend informed or all on defendant’s choice must be Olano, 1777].) (United stake. States [Citations.]” that, although dealing with a fundamental constitutional In the we arte waivable, only the record that the decision to do clearly may be waived if there is evidence in knowing, intelligent, voluntary. so was that the state not defendant for *9 long recognized has punish a for exercise of or defendant leniency a constitutional right, promise (United (1968) the exercise States v. Jackson refraining right. from of 1209, 1215-1217, 138]; Waley U.S. 20 L.Ed.2d 390 580-582 S.Ct. [88 964, 965-966, (1942) Johnston 316 104 86 L.Ed. U.S. S.Ct. [62 1302].) is Coercion in either form has been whether its source rejected, executive, (See, in nature. judicial Perry legislative, e.g., Blackledge 2098, 2102-2104, (1974) 417 S.Ct. 40 L.Ed.2d U.S. 628] [94 from Fourteenth Amendment due clause process [prosecutor prohibited on a misde- a convicted misdemeanant reindicting felony charge following “real- meanant’s successful invocation of because of the remedy, appellate ”]; (1969) istic of ‘vindictiveness’ North v. Pearce 395 likelihood Carolina 2080-2081, court U.S. 725 S.Ct. [89 656] [trial due a sentencing Fourteenth Amendment clause from process prohibited by as for “vindic- defendant more retaliation because harshly filing appeal, con- a defendant attacked his first against having successfully tiveness for trial”]; after viction must no in the sentence he receives a new part play Jackson, at at United States v. 390 U.S. S.Ct. pp. Act life a imprisonment prescribing upon Kidnapping 1215-1217] [Federal of death sentence the defend- upon but plea guilty permitting jury impose trial, ant’s election of a exercise of not discouraged plead guilty trial, unconstitutional].) have a and was
The line “the State’s of decisions such coercion-condemns prohibiting a defendant who had chosen unilateral imposition penalty (Bordenkircher a . . .” Hayes exercise legal right. 663, 667, (Bordenkircher), added.) The italics S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 604] that line is recognized
denial of due of law of decisions process frequently that the state act in retaliation danger might against attributable to (Id. his or her conviction. lawfully p. defendant for challenging he done the law 668].) “To a because has what punish person to do is of the most basic sort allows him a due violation рrocess plainly [citation], a course of action whose and for an of the State agent pursue rights a reliance on his is person’s legal ‘patently objective penalize (Ibid.; see v. United unconstitutional.’ Wasman States [Citations.]” 3217, 3222, L.Ed.2d 468 U.S. (plur. opn. J.); C. States v. Goodwin United Burger, 74].) L.Ed.2d 274, 278-281, Lewallen, this court recognized
In 23 Cal.3d decisions, that the enunciated in the federal high principle, applied for a defendant the federal Constitution from punishing state is prohibited a defendant for forbearing exercise a constitutional rewarding Lewallen, declined to the defendant exercise a right. from the of such a sentence on one count reduced offer prison accept prosecutor’s Following for a on сount. guilty exchange plea counts, on that but on other guilty he not count guilty in which was found determined that he should court in sentencing expressly the terms of received under a sentence than would have receive greater of his because offer plea guilty, merely the rejected premised upon stated in this regard: The trial court in Lewallen election of trial. concerned, he’s trial and far as I’m if defendant wants “‘[A]s *10 that, convicted, hand not but on the other he’s to be with penalized going there was a to have had if he’s not have consideration would going ” (Id. had 277.) essentially We concluded that the trial court plea.’ that his exercise to trial and held right the defendant for the of his punished 279-281; (1981) 125 (Id. be v. Colds People sentence must vacated. 860, court’s imposition 863-864 Cal.App.3d Cal.Rptr. [178 430] [trial sentence, had circumstance the defendant solely based mitigated trial, accord, People to was unauthorized and right illegal]; jury 482, 582, 478, P.2d (1993) 5 fn. 1 Cahill Cal.4th 1037] [20 (Cahill) through greater punishment prom- obtained threat [confession ise of more lenient deemed involuntary].) sentence other stated in courts in California and in
We Lewallen: “Appellate have trial court used vacated sentences when the has jurisdictions apparently norm, than the its either more or more sentencing power, severely leniently (Le- in to matters. order the resolution of criminal expedite [Citations.]” wallen, 274, trial court’s supra, explicit Cal.3d impropriety of more if the defendant lenient treatment waives promise sentencing to the of harsher treatment by jury comparable imposed impropriety right because of his or her to trial having by jury. invoked course, made In the the trial court’s remarks were not at the but the commencement of the shortly before sentencing stage, course of of his trial. defendant’s waiver obtaining right Moreover, the trial remarks did include the promise court’s not specific sentence, relief, that the trial such as reduction in but rather statement confer the event waived jury court would benefit in defendant unspecified Thus, trial, need “not the case.” we try two weeks’ time thereby taking up attend examine that discuss the safeguards also decisions various procedurаl such to trial right the waiver of constitutional as the ing fundamental by jury. exercise
To incursions on defendant’s against protect inappropriate trial, such as that to of a fundamental constitutional right, federal Constitution has been construed as long safe requiring procedural such as the that a guards, waiver of be requirement right question made (See, defendant Brookhart v. personally expressly. e.g., 1, 1245, 1248-1249, Janis 384 U.S. 7-8 S.Ct. [86 314] [a defendant must waive the not because that personally right plead guilty, right encompasses right right confront opposing witnesses, Zerbst, self-incrimination]; and the Johnson v. privilege against 1019, 304 U.S. 464-465 supra, defendant expressly 1023] [a counsel]; must waive Sixth Amendment to assistance of Aetna Ins. v. Kennedy 301 U.S. L.Ed. 1177] [a Patton, case]; must waive to trial in a expressly civil defendant expressly 261-263] [a must waive to trial With fundamental jury].) respect particular trial, moreover, our state Constitution explicitly the defendant’s requires (Cal. waiver in court. personal express open Const., I, 16; Ernst, 441, 445; art. In re Tahl § (Tahl); Cal.3d P.2d v. Holmes Cal.Rptr. 449] (1960) 54 Cal.2d (Holmes).) Cal.Rptr. *11 addition, In in the wake of the numerous decisions that a concluding waiver of the fundamental constitutional a trial rights must accompany be knowing, intelligent, and the doctrine that when a voluntary, developed defendant elects not to exercise such and thus rights by guilty pleading trial, his or her forgoing right record must reflect that the defendant is, did so and he or she and knowingly voluntarily—that was advised of elected to refrain from the fundamental The exercising rights question. most decision that rule is prominent articulating Boykin v. Alabama 1709, 1711-1712, U.S. 242 (Boykin). Tahl, Holmes, (See 131-134; 1 Cal.3d supra, see also 54 Cal.2d supra, 442, 443-444.)3 case,
In the the trial court set out to its constitu discharge trial, tional to advise defendant of his to and to procedural duty Boykin, consistently recognition entry plea 3 In with its earlier that a defendant’s guilty rights, entering in effect three consequently waives constitutional and that before such plea personally being a defendant must to a trial after informed waive States, charges (McCarthy supra, v. United U.S. 1170- Janis, 1171]; 1245, 1248-1249]), supra, high Brookhart v. U.S. affirmatively voluntary held that the record and must disclose waiver rights (Boykin, prior acceptance guilty plea. of those to the trial court’s of the court, 1711-1712].) following S.Ct. аt the federal This standard, Boykin’s compliance procedural requirement, concluded that in order to ensure with rights prior the trial court must obtain the defendant’s of those on the record express waiver (Tahl, guilty accepting plea. requirement 1 Cal.3d fn. This (See subsequently inquiry was codified. 1192.5 court “shall cause an to be made of the § [the .”].) satisfy freely voluntarily made . . . plea defendant itself that the knowing, waiver of was whether defendant’s determine impartially adherence to these trial court’s formal proce- The voluntary. intelligent, its however, the substance of not ensure either that does dural requirements, was ensuing or that defendant’s waiver satisfied that obligation comments court, following The trial pro- and voluntаry. knowing, intelligent, some form of benefit its intention to bestow cedure while announcing constitutional of that fundamental for defendant’s waiver exchange to remain obligation in a manner that at odds with its judicial acted of the waiver. and detached in the voluntariness evaluating neutral learning At the outset the trial court indicated that previously, upon counsel that the court had informed defense defendant waive might it,” jury” be a benefit in because “just by having “there well might time some effect on “that has and thus not two weeks’ taking try court, he defendant that informing the court.” the trial Subsequently of an nature in the event waived would receive benefit unspecified that he understood. to trial secured defendant’s by jury, response to defendаnt to determining court made these and offers prior representations intelligent, that his trial was knowing, court’s with defendant negotiation The form of the trial voluntary. presented unintentional a “substantial coercion.” v. Orin danger (People 193].) Cal.3d Cal.Rptr. addition, to obtain of the trial court’s comments was objective that, (when itself
defendant’s waiver of a fundamental constitutional right court. In trial), elects to is not negotiation by go subject *12 effect, from the refraining the trial court offered to reward defendant for Lewallen, 274, (See 23 Cal.3d supra, exercise of a constitutional right. accord, 278-281; 860, 863-864; Colds, 125 People supra, Cal.App.3d 602, 450].) (1992) 8 605 v. Alexander People Cal.App.4th Cal.Rptr.2d [10 the benefit The circumstance that the trial court did not the nature of specify sentence, reward, or other a of a in by making mitigation promise particular does not effect of the court’s assurances. negate coercive defendant, to him to The inducement offered the trial court to persuade trial, due defendant’s right waive his fundamental a violated of law.4 process today practice holding question do not our to call into the well-established 4 We intend (see guilty prosecutor negotiate plea a of or nolo contendere in which the and the defendant 595, 385, 409]),
People (1970) practice P.2d a v. West Cal.Rptr. 3 Cal.3d 477 606-609 [91 attending including the rights obviously relinquishment involves a of the constitutional state, examining prerogative of the by jury. high explained As the court has every burden on the exercise through plea: to offer such a prosecutor, “[N]ot 310
B error of the trial court’s next consider the effect We above, determined described the Court Appeal of conviction. As judgment “sufficiency” to the analogous that the issue was question Howard, 1 supra, to trial considered in defendant’s of the waiver - 1175, 1132, error “in the totality the trial court’s Reviewing Cal.4th 1178. circumstances,” determined that of the Court of the majority Appeal was knowing, intelligent, of his waiver dissent, standard, concluded to the the same and the voluntary, employing contrary. 1174-1175, Howard, court erred in the trial
In 1 Cal.4th supra, pages self- against of his constitutional privilege to advise the defendant failing (as by Boykin, of that required incrimination and obtain privilege 1709, Tahl, 1712], 1 supra, supra, 132-133, guilty), context of a defendant’s plea prior Cal.3d term of that he had served prior the defendant’s admission accepting (See (1974) re Yurko 10 Cal.3d imprisonment. when a Boykin/Tahl requirements P.2d [applying
Cal.Rptr. that the conviction].) admits We determined the truth of a prior constitutional standard reviewable under federal trial court’s error was “if the record affirma of a defendant’s guilty plea validity upholds totality under the intelligent that it is voluntary shows tively Carolina 1 Cal.4th at North (Howard, citing circumstances.” 160, 164, 162]; Brady U.S. Alford 1463, 1468, v. United States because the was not 747].) We concluded that reversal required, L.Ed.2d not to admit knew he had the right revealed that the defendant record against waived his privilege term and thus allegation knowingly prior prison 1179-1180.) Subse (Howard, self-incrimination. Cal.4th footnote Allen quently, not 525], we have “[although P.2d we observed on test would apply the Howard totality-of-the-circumstances held directly offense, our subsequent to a substantive direct from guilty plea appeal *13 right encouragement to such a is invalid. every pressure or waive right, and not guilty squarely held per se rule against encouraging pleas. We have no Specifically, there is for the by offering benefits in return encourage guilty plea a substantial may that a State “ only a certainty . . . possibility or [not of] for the defendant ‘the plea,” which obtain guilty . . .’ a trial and a verdict of could imposed that be after penalty thаn the sentence lesser by required guilty a verdict [citation], imposed to be after penalty a than that but also of lesser 492,497-498, 212, (Corbitt Jersey S.Ct. U.S. 218-220 [99 v. New jury.” a Bordenkircher, added; supra, 434 U.S. omitted, pp. 466], see fns. second italics L.Ed.2d 667-668].) at pp. 362-364 [98 441, Ernst[, . Cal.4th (See supra,] to have it. . . cases seem assumed 576, 831, 570, ; fn. 5 . . 6 Cal.4th Cal.Rptr.2d . v. Adams People 215, 831]; (1993) 6 Cal.4th 268-269 862 P.2d v. Wash 1107].)” error that harmless argues compels The General Howard Attorney not, however, error does a harmless standard As we shall analysis. explain, Constitution, cannot, case. the the the Under federal and apply present fundamental, “struc- as and its denial is to trial is right by jury recognized error,” the of conviction without tural reversal compelling judgment (Sullivan, supra, of determination necessity prejudice. Duncan, 2083]; supra, Constitution, the 1451-1452].) under the California Similarly, fundamental, to trial is and its denial is considered a “structural
right jury within the “miscarriage defect in the proceedings,” resulting justice” Constitution, VI, of California article section meaning requiring (Ernst, be set Cal.4th conviction aside. judgment 448-449.) Ernst, we discussed the difference between
effect of a trial error in a defendant’s failing court’s obtain express as the fundamental constitutional to trial from right by jury, distinguished to a trial. failure We concluded the court’s to obtain waiver right 448-449; Holmes, (Id. to trial se. reversible by jury per 442, 443-444.) supra, 54 Cal.2d
In the the trial court the nature of the explained in order to determine whether defendant’s decision waive right was The trial court defendant to intelligent. questioned knowledge determine whether defendant had sufficient of the right being waived, and obtained defendant’s affirmations that he understood repeated the difference his case it to the court. But trying between trying once defendant his that he would receive some understanding conveyed event by benefit in the after been advised having that he nature trial court would receive some benefit of undetermined time, be at a later the defendant could be by longer determined no said to have trial. voluntarily relinquished error caused the trial assurances a benefit was not court’s by corrected circumstance that these assurances were provided and advisements course of court’s otherwise explanations appropriate trial. the error remedied Nor was concerning threats or whether defendant had received any court’s subsequent inquiry *14 trial, of a benefit in order to to promises him waive his persuade followed defendant’s that he had not such by express received representation inducements. West, that, 3 Cal.3d we recalled supra, during period States, v. United
prior Brady 397 U.S. when supra, negotiation plea between and defendants inwas use but of uncertain prosecutors widespread as constitutionality, negotiated regarded because plea suspect judicial decisions that a if induced concluding guilty plea, by promises threats, was and thus invalid. involuntary “Consequently judges commonly of defendants whether had been made to induce them inquired any promises defendants, guilty, that the court would invalidate the plead fearing West, bargain, commonly negative.” responded (People supra, “ 606.) Cal.3d at ‘A defendant who is to lie when the asks p. judge expected if a result of a is in guilty plea no promise leniency position in a engage with the same at the same time forthright exchange judge[] when is the question of his understanding relinquishment (Id. at rights.’ p. [Citation.]” In the the trial court’s present assurances of benefit improper court, obtainable had by waiver a similar effect. The trial after assurances, those defendant as to he had providing whether questioned received to induce him any to waive his to trial promises by jury. been assured the trial court that he Defеndant—having by would receive some benefit if he loath to being presumably jeopar- dize that on the record in a understanding—answered manner intended to with the trial uphold agreement court rather than to his actual convey state of mind. Defendant’s volition been there can be having compromised, no of harmless error the remainder of the application analysis premised upon made defendant in his representations with court. colloquy The manner in which trial court induced defendant to his right waive Cahill, (See trial rendered that waiver at 5 Cal.4th involuntary. supra, 1; Lewallen, fn. 278-279.) 23 Cal.3d at Like a trial court’s p. supra, pp. denial of the refusal to such a outright provide its error in of that inducing waiver amounts improperly “structural defect in the that the of convic- proceedings” requiring judgment tion be set aside without the of a determination of necessity prejudice. (Sullivan, 2083]; 508 U.S. at S.Ct. at supra, pp. p. Arizona Fulminante 499 U.S. Duncan,
302]; Ernst, 1451]; 391 U.S. S.Ct. at supra, pp. 448-449; Cahill, 501-502; 8 Cal.4th at supra, see pp. Olano, also United States v.
313 “ fairness, integrity public affect the ‘seriously error” [“plain defendant’s inno- independent of judicial proceedings’ reputation tried a case reversal].) improperly where Additionally, and cence” require meaningfully there is no to a jury, opportunity court rather than to the (See of the error. the absence ensued in have the outcome that would assess 2078, 2081-2083].)5 The 275, Sullivan, [113 of the judgment. reversal court’s error thus compels trial is reversed. of the Court of Appeal The decision Chin, J., J., Kennard, J., Baxter, J., concurred. Werdegar, that defendant’s the majority with BROWN, J., Concurring. I agree intelligent cannot be deemed to a trial jury waiver of his for exchange benefit in of some of the trial court’s offer light unspecified in however, of that waiver would, the validity evaluate I expressly waiver. test. of the circumstances well-established totality under the 441, 443 Here, (1994) 8 Cal.4th in v. Ernst unlike the situation trial 298], jury there was no express in which Cal.Rptr.2d waiver, is its The waiver, validity. and the only an question we have express the admonitions preceding benefit an error in offer of an undefined was other statements during proceed not cured by trial waiver jury circumstances). It is difficult (an examination of the tоtality ing other than validity determine the waiver’s else we would imagine how Indeed, the majority made. under which it was the circumstances examining (See, maj. analysis. e.g., opn., an of its alludes to such approach parts communication ante, the trial court’s set forth in some detail 301 p. [“[w]e trial, in order to of a jury provide defendant on the of his waiver subject with be context”]; “may 2 trial right id. at fn. [jury factual p. adequate to do so was that the decision in the record if there is evidence only inconsistent with of review is not regarding applicable conclusion standard 5 Our 572, 18 2], P.3d People Epps (2001) Cal.Rptr.2d conclusion in statutory case, on-the the trial court denied the defendant provide need not that because the stаte allegations. This court observed prior-conviction Jersey (Apprendi v. New allegations prior-conviction trial on Wiley 435]; People v. 2361-2362, 2366, 486-490, L.Ed.2d 541]), statutory the denial of the P.2d Cal.4th 29.) (People Epps, supra, p. Cal.4th at the federal Constitution. implicate did not law, of harmless error subject to the state test one of state it was purely Because the error was 243]), only upon requiring reversal (People v. Watson P.2d 46 Cal.2d in the absence to the finding of a result more favorable probability of a reasonable contrast, 29.) (People Epps, supra, 25 Cal.4th at the error. innocence, right recognized as guilt the issue of trial on involves Const., Amend.; (U.S. Cal. 6th both the federal and state Constitutions. fundamental under Const., I, art. § Moreovеr, knowing, intelligent, this is standard the voluntary”].) and both the and the dissent in the Court of parties majority Appeal agree waivers, should in the context of and it is the standard for the apply *16 numerous, all, of waiver if not constitutional rights. v. Castaneda (People (1975) 52 circum Cal.App.3d Cal.Rptr. [evaluating [125 9] see, determine stances of trial its waiver Edwards v. validity]; e.g., 1880, 1883-1884, (1981) 68 L.Ed.2d Arizona [101 of of to counsel [validity waiver in each case on the depends 378] case]; facts and circumstances Fare Michael particular surrounding v. C. 2560, 2571-2572, (1979) 442 U.S. 61 L.Ed.2d 197] and counsel waiver minor examined under the totality [self-incrimination circumstances]; (1996) of the 13 Cal.4th Panizzon 851, 913 P.2d circumstances to Cal.Rptr.2d [examining surrounding 1061] determine whether defendant’s appeal bargained sentence was v. Hоward knowing, intelligent, voluntary]; People 1132, 1175 valid if [guilty plea 1315] record shows it is under the of affirmatively voluntary intelligent totality circumstances].) for the court had
Suppose, below offered defendant example, unspeci- counsel, fied benefit in this but then a sidebar had with following benefit, retracted the dired apologized, any voir promise extensively the defendant to ensure was under no illusion that benefit would be any erred, gained by waiving While under the jury. initially totality the circumstances not conclude the we would trial waiver subsequent jury was invalid because the defendant understood benefit was clearly being no offered in for his waiver. This result has much to commend it. exchange course, determine
Of once we waiver was not valid under the circumstances, then the becomes the effect of the absence totality question of a valid waiver. I the trial court not authorized to agree proceed waiver, absence of a valid and hence we must reverse.
Furthermore, instead of that the undefined benefit here noting simply waiver, could not result in a intelligent majority possibly endorses the that no be accorded a broadly leniency may ever principle ante, defendant because of a trial waiver. at (Maj. opn., . . is the federal Constitution from . prohibited by rewarding [“state defendant for from the of’ a constitutional id. at forbearing exercise right]; p. 430], Colds [citing People Cal.App.3d Cal.Rptr. with for the that “trial court’s of mitigated aрproval proposition imposition sentence, had based circumstance the defendant solely upon ante, was unauthorized and illegal”]; maj. opn., p. treat more lenient court’s of a trial explicit promise impropriety [“The to the comparable if the defendant waives sentencing ment in the defendant’s having because of of harsher treatment imposed impropriety relies on While the majority his or her to trial by jury”].) invoked 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d U.S. 570 v. Jackson United States stated, ante, more 306), recently court has high (maj. opn., that not every established clearly “The in this Court since Jackson have cases every a constitutional and not right, pressure burden on the exercise of (Corbitt Jersey New is invalid.” to waive such encouragement 466], omitted.) fn. (1978) 439 U.S. 218 [99 S.Ct. Rather, the trial court’s offer it seems sufficient to conclude here that *17 waiver not knowing benefit would render the necessarily some unspecified (1979) 23 Cal.3d This court’s statements in In re Lewallen intelligent. 823], re- P.2d 100 A.L.R.3d Cal.Rptr. 278-279 [152 a defendant for from forbearing counted by majority regarding rewarding ante, at are dicta. (Maj. opn., pp. the exercise Lewallen, court 306-307.) That is we concluded the trial punished because to trial and refusing accept plea the defendant for exercising 276-277, (Lewallen, negotiation. be situations in we would not find that there which
Conceivably, benefit noted rendered the invalid. For if a defendant asked example, and the the court what benefit there would be in a court trial over stated, “Well, more than jury court trials tend to quickly proceed trials,” statement rendered it is we would conclude the trial court’s unlikely intelligent, voluntary, trial waiver not subsequent jury knowing, as that he in fact wanted the trial over if defendant rejoined particularly addition, as here defense counsel at sentenc- suggested quickly possible. her by reducing that defendant’s waiver had benefited the minor victim ing seem the trial court of traumatic events.” It would “exposure presentation defendant’s sen- could consider such a circumstance in reducing properly However, had mentioned this to the court as a reason for his tence. waiver, the trial court noted it trial waiver entering prior that render consider such a would gesture any sentencing hearing, would it best Not the answer to these seems waiver invalid? questions, to avoid our in future cases. foreclosing options