*1 lips in his already asphyxiated and that the muscles Howell could have died, there is no in the simply twitching been as he basis could have possibil- infer that defendant would have been aware of record to ity. trial insufficient presented conclude that the evidence was
We and held his foot in the placed to establish that at the time defendant neck, kill or that he area of Howell’s defendant intended to Howell consciously “practically that his conduct was certain” to aware 5(b) (West 2006). result. The evidence cause 5/4— sufficient, however, recklessly to establish that defendant acted suf placed his in the area of Howell’s neck and exerted when he foot Accordingly, power death. under the pressure ficient to cause Howell’s 615(b)(3) (134 615(b)(3)), Ill. 2d R. we granted by Supreme Court Rule degree of the offense for defendant was convicted reduce the manslaughter. degree involuntary from first murder to modified, affirmed and the cause remanded to As the conviction is directions that a sentence be the circuit court of Cook involuntary manslaughter. imposed for modified and remanded with directions.
Affirmed GORDON, JJ., CAHILL and R.E. concur. ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, OF
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE RAYQUON COLEMAN, Defendant-Appellant. (6th Division) 1 — 09—0067
First District September Opinion filed GORDON, E., J., specially concurring. ROBERT Pelletier, Unsinn, Gonzalez, Michael J. Patricia and Thomas G. all *2 Appellate Office, Chicago, appellant. State Defender’s of (Alan Alvarez, Attorney, Chicago Spellberg and Anita M. State’s of J. Lavin, Attorneys, counsel), People. Michele Assistant State’s of for the opinion JUSTICE CAHILL delivered the of the court: Following trial, Rayquon a bench Coleman was (1 possession convicted of of a to grams controlled substance cocaine) mandatory with intent deliver and sentenced as a X Class (see 5—3(c)(8) (West 2008)) felon years’ to nine 5/5 — imprisonment appeal, with fines and fees. On defendant contends that erroneously he was assessed a fee for the arrestee medical costs (the (730 fee) (West 2008)) fund Fund ILCS because there was 125/17 no evidence injured, county that he was or incurred medical him, expenses for while was in the county. Defendant also contends and the State concedes that the trial court erred in as- 2002.1(a) sessing a preliminary examination fee. 55 ILCS 5/4 — (West 2008). charged by
Defendant was indictment for an offense committed on 9, or about December 2007. He convicted in November 2008 and sentenced on December His sentence included prelimi- nary examination fee the Fund fee.
The statute relevant preliminary hearing to the here fee provides that the “State’s shall attorneys following be entitled to the *** [f]or fees: examinations preliminary for each defendant held to 2002.1(a) (West 2008). bail or recognizance, ILCS $20.” 55 A 5/4 — preliminary particular procedure examination is a in the Code of (Code) (725 (West 2008)), Criminal of 1963 Procedure ILCS 5/109—3 but Code defines a preliminary hearing also examination as “a a judge before to determine if is probable there cause to believe (725 the person accused has committed offense” ILCS 5/102 —17 (West 2008)). supreme Our recently ambiguity, court has resolved this holding that a preliminary examination for a purposes the fee is probable hearing cause under section 109—3 of the Code. (2010). Smith, 236 Ill. 2d 162 The State probable concedes that a hearing cause held in this case because defendant was indicted, examination preliminary improperly and so fee was as sessed. challenges contention his assessment of the
Defendant’s second gener Fund fee on the absence of evidence that he suffered Defendant custody. ated medical enabling preceding relies on the amendment version of statute its August because it the Fund to restricted expenses relating fund and “medical the arrestee administration while he or is in the of the sheriff.” 730 ILCS she (West 2006). postamendment The State refers us instead to the ver may spent it that the provides sion because Fund on “costs Fund,” link removing and administration of the a expenditures expenses. age of to the defendant’s medical (West 2008). replies postamendment Defendant that if the ver actually fee fine it applies, sion then the Fund because is not fine, and, it expense related to an incurred due to defendant as a prohibition ex post violates laws. facto August 15, 2008, provided: Before hospital by any person “When are services held shall be entitled to obtain Medical to the reimbursement from Arrestee’s Costs Fund Fund. To extent are available from the the extent care, reasonably including person able for that reimburse- *3 any ment or from benefit program from insurance other medical programs person, to the he or she the available shall reimburse county.
The fee for or county shall be entitled to a each conviction $10 violation, petty of- supervision order of for a criminal other than a fense or offense. shall be taxed costs to be col- business The fee defendant, entry upon if of possible, lected from the conviction or part The not be a of supervision. an order of fee shall considered any fine in the purposes the for of reduction fine. by county in fund deposited
All collected shall the a such fees be known Fund. to be as the Arrestee’s Medical Costs established solely of costs Moneysin Fund shall be used for reimbursement the relating is in expenses for to the arrestee while he or she of the of the sheriff and administration the Fund. Section, relating ‘medical expenses For purposes the this only expenses the means incurred for arrestee’ those injury an provided or to an arrestee account of care treatment of his her arrest un- during the course or by suffered the arrestee any self-inflicted; term not include less such the does ar- provided to an expenses for medical care or treatment incurred existed restee on of a health condition arrestee account prior his or her to the time of arrest.” August 15, provided: After by any person required “When medical are held from county the shall be entitled to obtain reimbursement County the extent are avail- Jail MedicalCosts Fund to the reasonably person able from the To the the Fund. extent that care, pay including any able to for that from insur- reimbursement program programs ance other or from medical benefit available person, county. shall or she reimburse the county The shall be entitled to a fee for each conviction violation, supervision order of for a of- petty criminal than a fense or business The fee shall taxed as col- offense. be costs to be defendant, entry lected if possible, upon from the convictionor supervision. an order of The be part fee shall not considered a any the fine purposes reduction in the fine. by
All such deposited fees collectedshall be in fund be established and known as the Jail MedicalCosts Fund. Moneys in solely the Fund shall be used reimbursement to the county of costs for medical and administration of (West2008). Fund.” 730 ILCS 125/17 (1st Cleveland, Dist., 393 Ill. Div. 1st 2009), this court interpreted preamendment statute to mean charged defendant could not be the Fund fee because no there was evidence that he medical expenses Cleveland, incurred in custody. while 3d at 714.
In People v. Evangelista, 2009), court considered a defendant’s preamendment contention that the statute only authorized the Fund fee when medical treatment in custody and the State’s contention the statute creates an any insurance fund to medical costs of arrestee who requires treatment in custody. word construed the “arrestee” in the
statute’s limitation to refer to all arrestees rather than defendant. citing (West 2006) (“Words importing singular number 70/1.03 may extend and applied persons things”). to several The statute requires an arrestee to reimburse the for his medical care can, where he and Evangelista illogical found that it would be require statute to additional those who arrestees *4 medical received care. Ill. Fund App. 393 400. The covering is an insurance fund expenses by medical incurred all arrest ees, just not expenses particular of a 393 defendant. App. Ill. Fund fee applies regardless to convictions 754 expenses injury or incurred medical defendant suffered
whether the People also v. App. 3d at 399. See custody. Evangelista, in while 2009) (followingEvange Elcock, App. Ill. 3d 539-40 396 lista). (1st Dist, 2009), 6th Jones, App. Ill. 3d 651 Div. considered a this court appeal pending, leave to
pet. for of the preamendment version challenge the Fund fee under Jones, The Jones court affirmed App. 3d at 661-63. statute. fee, rejecting both the defendant’s conten of the Fund the assessment expenses or medical there no evidence of his tion that Jones, concession of error. custody and the State’s related to his language at The court noted unconditional App. Ill. 3d 661-62. the Fund fee for each convic is entitled to the statute that The Jones court found petty or business offenses. tion other than that it exception, legislature showed creating this latter by county’s entitlement to creating exceptions capable of expressly Jones, the statute Ill. 3d at 662. Because Fund fee. medi may be used for the arrestee’s money in the Fund provided Fund, as a the Fund served administration of the expenses cal or the in the defendant while policy medical insurance Jones, 397 no medical services. him even when benefitted expenses incurred no medical at 662. Where a defendant Ill. 3d using by the statute comply could with in Jones, 3d fund administration. his Fund fee to to follow Cleveland because court declined The Jones administration as money Fund on fund expressly authorized Jones, at 662. expenses. medical well as the arrestee’s essentially medical that the Fund is agreeing While incur injured not be defendant need insurance and that a fee, the the Fund Jones to be assessed “the statutory reference to the disagreed that the the individual something other than to indicate arrestee” was intended at 662-63. arrestee. comports closely it more
Here, Jones because choose to follow we taken as a whole. While statutory language with the Fund fee violation erroneously assessed the he was contends that Fund statute, applicability Jones affirms preamendment pre- under the treated injured fee to defendants in as- did not err the trial court statute. We conclude amendment sessing the Fund fee. Supreme fee under examination preliminary vacate
We
755 (134 615(b)(2)). 615(b)(2) judgment Court Rule Ill. 2d R. The respects. circuit in all court is affirmed part. and in part Affirmed in vacated J., GORDON, J. concurs. GORDON, concurring: specially
JUSTICE E. ROBERT I opinion, concur I write concurrence special and this only opinions to clarify People App. in v. 397 Ill. 3d 651 (2009), 109874, pet. appeal People leave to and v. pending, for Cleveland, (2009), App. 393 Ill. both of I authored. 700
In Cleveland, charge the first vacated a for the Ar division $10 Fund, restee’s in ground Medical Costs on the that the defendant that undergone case had any not medical treatment and “ ” charge applied only be to ‘relating should arrestee.’ (West Cleveland, 714, App. quoting 3d at 730 ILCS 125/17 2006). 3, later,
Cleveland decided on month August 2009. Over a September 11, the Second released publication People District (2009). v. Evangelista, Ill. App. 3d 395 Justice persuasively Schostok charge wrote that the was to be collected from every defendant, in order to a fund to pay create for medical for all who required arrestees care custody. Evange medical while in (West 2006) lista, 3d at quoting 730 ILCS 125/17 “ (the ”). ‘shall charge $10 collected the defendant’ The charge collection this is $10 authorized and discussed in two paragraphs of section 17 of the Jail Act. 125/17 (West 2006). The first of paragraphs unequivocally these two states that “[t]he shall be entitled to a fee for each conviction.” (West 2006). only exception The if the is conviction is 125/17 (West 2006). for “a petty offense or business offense.” 730 ILCS 125/17 This paragraph provide exception does for defendants who had Thus, no need of care. mandatory unequivocal and language paragraph, of this first shows entitled to charge, particular whether not a medi- cal services.
Although crystal clear, Evangelista the first paragraph is court noted that paragraph “potentially confusing.” Evange the second lista, 393 Ill. 3d at 400. A line in the paragraph second states: reimbursement “Moneys solely in the Fund shall be used of costs expenses relating arrestee while or she is in the and of the sheriff administration of the Fund.” 730 ILCS 2006). (West this line to be court found Evangelista The expending read to allow confusing” because “it could be “potentially Evan question.” arrestee in the funds received for the gelista, find interpretation, Evangelista rejected potential charge be col governed when the should
ing paragraph that the first lected, governed how the collected paragraph while the second 400, citing 730 ILCS spent. should be language of court found the Evangelista Thus the it, I and now controlling of the issue before paragraph the first to be Elcock, 539-40 agree. See also 2009) observing (reaffirming holding its defendants to contribute “requires all convicted statutory scheme *6 fund”). rejecting reason for court offered an additional Evangelista singular ‘arrestee’ to interpretation. interpreted It “the potential singular thus it transformed a apply general,” to ‘arrestees’ in citing Ill. Evangelista, 393 plural word into a one. 2006) (“Words (West number importing singular ILCS 70/1.03 things”). persons or may applied extend and be to several singular into However, struggle need to to turn a word there is no goes on to direct that the one, paragraph plural when second Fund.” 730 ILCS of the moneys may also be used for “administration 2006). (West paragraph provides The second relating to the arrestee” for “medical could be used either Fund.” 730 ILCS for “administration of the Jones, I decided the sixth division On December ruling by the Second Jones, adopted authored. In the sixth division disagreed Jones, at 663. We Evangelista. District in singular “ar court’s transformation above, the same but we reached explained plural, restee” into a as the Second District. ultimate conclusion