People v. Coddington CA1/1
A171630
| Cal. Ct. App. | Nov 17, 2025|
Check TreatmentFiled 11/17/25 P. v. Coddington CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A171630
v.
(Del Norte County
JAMES MCKENZIE Super. Ct. No. CRF16-9495)
CODDINGTON,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant James McKenzie Coddington appeals from the trial court’s
order declining to dismiss sentencing enhancements under Penal Code
section 1385, subdivision (c).1 On appeal, Coddington contends that the court
abused its discretion. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
We described much of the relevant procedural background in an earlier
appeal by Coddington involving the same sentence at issue in this appeal,
and we repeat that background here. “Coddington has an extensive criminal
1 All subsequent statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise specified.
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history. The case establishing the basis of this appeal arose in connection
with an incident in October 2016 in which he attacked a fellow inmate at the
Del Norte County Jail. As a result of the incident, Coddington was charged
by felony information with one count of assault by force likely to cause great
bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)) and one count of making a criminal threat
(§ 422), both with a special allegation of great bodily injury (§ 12022.7). The
information contained three additional allegations: that Coddington
previously had been convicted of a serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a), ‘serious
felony allegation’), that he had a prior strike conviction (§ 1170.12, ‘prior
strike allegation’), and that he had served three prior prison terms (former
§ 667.5, subd. (b), ‘prison priors’).
“In May 2017, Coddington pleaded guilty to the count of assault with
force likely to cause great bodily injury, and admitted the special allegation of
great bodily injury.2 He also admitted two enhancements as alleged in the
information—the serious felony allegation (§ 667, subd. (a)), and the prior
strike allegation (§ 1170.12)—and one of the three prison priors (former
2 As part of the plea, three other cases were also resolved. In one,
Coddington had faced the possibility of about six years in prison for charges
relating to evading a peace officer, unlawfully taking a vehicle, possessing a
firearm as a felon, and possessing drugs in jail, assuming he received
consecutive sentences of one third the midterm, doubled based on his prior
serious felony conviction. (Veh. Code, §§ 2800.2, subd. (a), 10851; §§ 18, subd.
(a), 1170, subd. (h), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1), 4573.6, 29800, subd. (a)(1).)
Because Coddington entered a plea in the instant case, this separate case
was instead dismissed with a ‘Harvey waiver,’ meaning the trial court could
consider the dismissed charges in sentencing. (People v. Harvey (1979)
25 Cal.3d 754, 758–759.) In the two other cases, Coddington was accused of
felony violation of postrelease community supervision (PRCS, § 3455). When
the trial court sentenced Coddington in this case, the court found him in
violation of PRCS, ordered him to time served, and terminated him from
PRCS in those cases.
2
§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The indicated sentence was 13 years. Had Coddington
been convicted on all charges in the original complaint, he faced up to
17 years, four months, calculated as follows: four years on the assault charge
(the upper term of four years, § 245, subd. (a)(4)), plus eight months for
criminal threats (one-third the midterm of two years, §§ 422, subd. (a), 1170,
subd. (h), 1170.1, subd. (a)), doubled because of the strike (§ 1170.12,
subd. (c)(1)), plus five years for the prior serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)), plus
three years for the great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)).
“Based on the plea, the trial court sentenced Coddington to 13 years in
prison, calculated as follows: the lower term of two years for the assault
conviction (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)), doubled because of the prior strike allegation
(§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)), plus three years for the great bodily injury allegation
(§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), plus five years for the serious felony allegation (§ 667,
subd. (a)(1)), plus one year for the prison prior.
“By motion filed in the trial court in August 2022, Coddington moved to
be resentenced to remove his one-year prison-prior enhancement. His motion
was based on two laws relating to prison priors that were enacted after his
conviction. The first, Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill
No. 136), amended section 667.5, subdivision (b), effective January 1, 2020, to
eliminate sentence enhancements for prison priors unless the prior term was
for a sexually violent offense. (People v. Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 375, 380 (Burgess); see Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1.) The second, Senate Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 483), was enacted in 2021, and it extended Senate Bill No. 136 to all persons, such as Coddington, currently incarcerated in jail or prison. (Burgess at p. 380
; see Stats. 2021, ch. 728,
§ 3.) As a result of these enactments, section 1172.75, subdivision (a),
renders legally invalid any prison prior imposed before 2020 except where the
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prison prior was for a sexually violent offense. Other than seeking to remove
his one-year prison-prior enhancement, Coddington did not seek any further
sentencing relief.
“At a brief hearing on the motion, the trial court vacated Coddington's
one-year prison-prior sentencing enhancement. This reduced Coddington's
sentence from 13 years to 12 years, which was the entire relief Coddington
had requested. Proceeding without an attorney, Coddington filed a notice of
appeal.” (People v. Coddington (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 562, 565–567
(Coddington I, fns. omitted).)
On appeal, Coddington argued that he was entitled to seek yet further
reductions of his prison term under recent legislation affecting other aspects
of his conviction. We agreed and remanded the matter for a full
resentencing. (Coddington I, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 567.)
This appeal involves the subsequent resentencing hearing. Coddington
sought dismissal of the five-year enhancement for his prior serious felony
conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)) and the three-year enhancement for personally
inflicting great bodily injury (§ 12022.7). The People opposed the request,
and the probation department submitted two supplemental presentence
investigation reports.
At the hearing, the trial court indicated it had “spent a lot of time
looking at everything that was submitted, as well as reviewing the original
probation report.” The court ultimately determined that dismissing the
enhancements would “result in a serious danger to others” and would not
further the interests of justice.
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I.
DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Declining to
Dismiss Additional Sentencing Enhancements.
Coddington contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his
request to dismiss the two enhancements. The contention is meritless.
As amended by Senate Bill No. 81, section 1385, subdivision (c)(1),
explains how trial courts should consider whether to dismiss sentencing
enhancements. The law generally directs that, “[n]otwithstanding any other
law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of
justice to do so.” It states, “[T]he court shall consider and afford great weight
to evidence” a defendant offers on various enumerated mitigating
circumstances. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(A)–(I).) Enumerated circumstances “are
not exclusive,” however, and the court can consider other factors if doing so
furthers justice. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(4).) A defendant’s proof of one or more
relevant circumstances “weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the
enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement
would endanger public safety.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).) “ ‘Endanger public
safety’ means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement
would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others.” (Ibid.)
Coddington maintains that two enumerated circumstances were
relevant to his resentencing request. The first one applies when “[m]ultiple
enhancements are alleged in a single case.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B).) The
second one applies when an “enhancement is based on a prior conviction that
is over five years old.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(H).) He also contends that other
circumstances were relevant, including the “significant steps [he took] toward
rehabilitation while in prison,” and the support he has from people in the
community.
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Last year, the Supreme Court in People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th
1024(Walker) provided clear direction on how trial courts should apply section 1385, subdivision (c). Neither party, however, discusses Walker in their appellate briefing, though respondent discusses a case cited approvingly by Walker. (Walker at p. 1029
[plain language of § 1385, subd. (c) contemplates trial courts will exercise discretion consistent with People v. Ortiz (2023)87 Cal.App.5th 1087
].) Walker explained that, “absent a finding
that dismissal would endanger public safety, a [trial] court retains the
discretion to impose or dismiss enhancements provided that it assigns
significant value to the enumerated mitigating circumstances when they are
present. [Citation.] In other words, if the court does not find that dismissal
would endanger public safety, the presence of an enumerated mitigating
circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of an enhancement unless
the sentencing court finds substantial, credible evidence of countervailing
factors that ‘may nonetheless neutralize even the great weight of the
mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in
furtherance of justice.’ ” (Walker, at p. 1029.) The court emphasized “that,
in most cases, ‘if the trial court finds that dismissal of an enhancement would
endanger public safety, then it is hard to see how dismissal would further the
interests of justice,’ notwithstanding the applicability of any mitigating
factors identified in subdivision (c)(2).” (Id. at p. 1033.)
We review a trial court’s decision not to dismiss an enhancement for
abuse of discretion. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 373.) The
court’s decision may not be set aside merely because reasonable people might
disagree with it, and this court may not substitute its judgment for the trial
court’s judgment. (Id. at p. 377.) Abuse of discretion “asks in substance
whether the ruling in question ‘falls outside the bounds of reason’ under the
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applicable law and the relevant facts.” (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th
148, 162.)
The trial court’s order does not come close to satisfying this standard.
To the contrary, the record demonstrates the order was thoughtful, detailed,
and eminently reasonable. The court’s ruling speaks for itself, and we quote
from it at length:
“And the bottom line, I do not find a dismissal of either enhancement
would be in the interests of justice. And I reach this conclusion regardless of
whether [Coddington] is entitled to have the Court give great weight to the
mitigating factors in subdivision C of 1385 because I find dismissal of the
enhancement would result in a serious danger to others. [¶] . . . . [T]here
were a number of factors that I think do point towards dismissing the
enhancement, but I think they were outweighed by those things that are
opposed to dismissal and in furtherance of justice.”
The trial court expressly recognized that Coddington established two of
the enumerated circumstances, but it found that dismissing the
enhancements would endanger public safety: “The legislature has directed
courts to afford great weight to two mitigating factors that are present in this
case; one, that [Coddington] pled and was sentenced to multiple
enhancements and, secondly, that the five-year enhancement was for a
conviction that was more than five years old at the time that he was
sentenced. It’s close to 20 years. [¶] However, the Court is to give a great
weight to those factors unless dismissal would endanger public safety and
specifically result in serious danger to others. And I find that dismissing or
releasing Mr. Coddington at this time would result in serious danger to
others.”
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The court also recognized that Coddington presented some evidence of
other relevant, non-enumerated factors: “[Coddington] has clearly pursued
some community college classes although it’s unclear to me exactly to what
extent he has. He got a great review from his working in the prison kitchen.
He apparently has family support, at least oral support, but I’m not exactly
sure to what extent they would really help him. He has taken classes with
regard to improving sobriety but given his disciplinary record and recent
drug test, they don’t appear to have been particularly effective.”
But the trial court did not believe the mitigating factors outweighed the
aggravating factors, especially in light of the potential harm to public safety:
“I also take into consideration the legislature’s apparent intent going forward
to generally avoid multiple enhancements in cases and enhancements based
upon facts more than five years old. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] But countering those
things that I find weigh in support of dismissing is [Coddington’s] very long
criminal history and his background as far as I can tell. [¶] He has a —his
criminal history is full of violence and use of weapons, including firearms and
ammunition, as well as in his prison disciplinary history includes use of
weapons and some sort of stabbing or cutting instruments. [¶] He’s had three
prior prison terms before this one. Never been free of prison or some sort of
supervision in more than 20 years now, since 2004. [¶] He’s charged with
recent criminal felony history, including weapons and drugs. And while he’s
pled guilty and may or may not be convicted, that’s something I’m
considering that was stipulated to. [¶] His prison discipline history includes
at least two violent incidents. And while he is denying that he was really
involved, he was found guilty in the administrative proceedings, including
attacks on other inmates, one in conjunction with another. Plus, he’s got the
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current criminal charges charging him with possession of weapons and drugs.
He has recent drug tests that were positive for multiple substances.”
Turning to the circumstances of the underlying offense, the trial court
found that they too weighed against dismissing the enhancements: “Then
concerning also the violence of the underlying offense, the unprovoked attack
upon another inmate, surprise attack, he didn't basically see it coming, as I
have indicated I recall the video from the original sentencing. [Coddington]
or the victim in that case suffered multiple lacerations on the head as well as
bruises and one laceration it took six stitches to be closed. [Coddington] at
that time had numerous other charges dismissed, including two different
cases that the Court of Appeal I believe indicated that if he was convicted of
those, that I could have added another six years to the sentence in this case.
[¶] The Court can consider in determining whether the interests of justice
would be served the mitigating and aggravating factors that were involved in
that case. There were no mitigating factors that I saw and there was
numerous aggravating factors. Now those would have to be charged and at
the time they did not. And there’s case law that says they don’t have to be
charged. When the court looks at whether . . . the furtherance of justice
would be served in dismissing charges, the court ruled they do not actually
have to have been charged and proven. And there were numerous
aggravating factors involved, including prior convictions for [Coddington], the
fact that he served prior prison terms, three prior prison terms, he was on
probation or parole, in this case I think PRCS, at the time the crime was
committed and that his prior performance on supervision was unsatisfactory.
[¶] So, there were numerous aggravating factors that the Court does take
into consideration with the underlying charges. It appears to me that
[Coddington’s] violent history is the best indicator of the danger he poses of
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committing violence in the future. And so I have looked at both the violence
in this case as well as the violence against inmates since he’s been
incarcerated in his case plus his underlying charges and prior convictions
that have involved firearms, felon in possession of ammunition, shooting . . .
a firearm from a vehicle, all convictions that were sustained. [¶] And I also—
in looking at the furtherance of justice is the fact that—the reason the five-
year term is something that if [it] hadn’t been for the plea bargain and
sentence bargain, he could have been sentenced to an eight-year base term as
it was. [¶] This is clearly an aggravated case for reasons I have already
indicated as well as the injuries that were suffered by the defendant. And
this would have been a four-year upper term doubled for eight years. And so
that’s just one year less than the five-year enhancement. So, this was not a
disproportional sentence. I believe that the sentence, if we took away the
five-year enhancement, would be a seven-year term. I don’t think that the
D.A. ever would have offered the seven-year term. I don’t think the Court
would have accepted a seven-year term under these circumstances. [¶] So,
again, looking at furtherance of justice, I don’t think that a seven-year term
would be in the furtherance of justice. [¶] So overall, the sentence was not
excessive and for the reasons that I have indicated, I am not going to exercise
my discretion to strike the five-year enhancement of great bodily injury.”
In sum, the trial court carefully explained its decision, which itself was
consistent with our Supreme Court’s interpretation of the relevant statute.
On appeal, Coddington maintains that the “determination by the trial court,
that the dismissal of the enhancements would endanger public safety” was
itself an abuse of discretion and that the court’s order refusing to dismiss the
enhancements was another abuse of discretion “even if the trial court was not
required to give the mitigating factors their typical weight.” We are
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unpersuaded. There is no basis in the record for us to conclude that the trial
court abused its discretion in denying Coddington’s resentencing motion.
(See Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1033.)
III.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s resentencing order is affirmed.
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_________________________
Humes, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Banke, J.
_________________________
Langhorne Wilson. J.
People v. Coddington A171630
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